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SUMMARY 
Several new areas in aerospace structural reliability were investigated. 
The investigations were directed toward the development of a methodology for 
selecting a combination of structural tests and structural design factors for 
aerospace systems on the basis of optimized expected cost. The optimization 
method involves the use of Bayesian statistics and statistical decision theory 
as exemplified by the work of Pratt, Raiffa, and Schlaifer of the Harvard 
School of Business Administration. 
From the basic theory, a specific model applicable to the problem of 
selecting structural tests and design factors was developed. This was accom-
plished by establishing the decision to be made as a selection of a test method 
from four alternatives or options and the selection of a design factor from a 
continuous spectrum. The strength of the structure and the loads applied to the 
structure were assumed to be random variables that influence the decision. 
The decision criterion was minimum expected cost, where probabilistic as well 
as deterministic costs were considered. 
Probabilistic strength distributions needed in the decision model 
required new developments. Subjective expert opinion, obtained through mail 
questionnaires, was used to obtain a strength distribution for a test option 
where observed data were not available. The method of acquiring opinions and 
the probabilistic models used in the analysis of the opinions were first verified 
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by a test questionnaire which gave results that could be compared with observed 
data. 
A technique employing Bayesian statistics was used to incorporate new 
information with prior data in obtaining another strength distribution. Labora-
tory test results were used to obtain a prior distribution, and flight data were 
used as new information for revising the prior distribution. 
The methodology developed was applied to several typical aerospace 
structures to illustrate the effect of system characteristics such as value of 
weight, cost of failure, and cost of testing on the optimum decision. From the 
example problem results, it was concluded that the method provides a reason-




1.1 Organization of Mater ial 
The r e s e a r c h will be introduced by a brief discussion of some background 
concepts required for understanding the remainder of the work. Following this , 
since the r e sea rch falls into the broad category of aerospace s t ructura l re l iabi l -
ity, a review of the l i tera ture in this area is given. 
In light of this review of previous work, a statement of the r e sea rch 
problem and the various topics composing the problem is presented in Chapter 
HI, followed by an overview of the method of solution. 
The three major original contributions of the r e sea rch and severa l other 
contributing innovations are presented in Chapters IV through VH. The analysis 
method developed is then applied to severa l s t ructural assemblies of NASA space 
vehicles in Chapter V1H to i l lustrate the technique and to show how the system 
charac te r i s t ics of the various assemblies affect the outcome. 
Some resul t s and conclusions from the r e sea r ch a re discussed in Chapter 
IX. Recommendations, par t icular ly in the area of possible further r e sea rch , 
are also given in that chapter . Nomenclature for the entire disser tat ion is given 
in Appendix A. 
1.2 Background 
On the following pages certain concepts which a r e essential to further 
development of the research a r e briefly outlined. In most cases , the concepts 
discussed he re have developed into common usage and only typical references , 
usually not to the original contributor, a r e cited. The references mentioned 
generally give a coherent discussion of the idea under consideration, as applica-
ble to the present r esea rch . 
1.2.1 Reliability 
Tribus [ 1 ] credi ts the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
with the following definition of reliability: the probability of a device per form-
ing adequately for the period of time intended under the operating conditions 
encountered. Some key words and phrases in this definition requi re careful 
interpretat ion in the light of each problem. 
Benjamin and Cornell [21 discuss probability as the relat ive frequency 
of occurrence of an event in repeated t r i a l s or , more l iberal ly, as an 
ind iv idua l s measu re of the relat ive likelihoods of the possible outcomes of an 
experiment. Many have argued, including Tribus [1] and McGee [3 ] , that the 
individual 's belief about the relat ive likelihood or plausibility of an event is the 
appropriate concept of probability and that the relat ive frequency interpretat ion 
is only a special case of this more l iberal interpretat ion. For example, if there 
is to be only one launch of a par t icular type of spacecraft , there is no such thing 
as a long-run relat ive frequency in connection with the probability of success . 
The single miss ion will ei ther succeed or fail. Given information about the 
spacecraft , one might assign a number between 0 and 1 as a plausibility 
(probability) measure that the mission will be a success . Note that such a 
plausibility measure can include cases where relat ive frequency is meaningful. 
It is this concept of probability as a plausibility measure that will be used in 
this r e s e a r c h . 
In the reliability context there are two possible events or outcomes — 
success and failure. Thus, reliability becomes the dec is ion-maker ' s a s s e s s -
ment of the probability or plausibility of success . Since success and failure are 
prescr ibed to be the only possible outcomes, the following relationship resul ts 
from an axiom of probability as given by Benjamin and Cornell [ 2 ] : 
P F + L = 1 (1 .1) 
or 
P F = 1 - L , 
where P is the probability of failure and L is the reliabili ty or probability 
F 
of success . In this r e sea rch , probability of failure will be a frequently used 
idea with the understanding that the corresponding reliabili ty is readily obtain-
able from equation ( 1 . 1 ) . 
Device is the next word in the definition to be discussed and is the 
identification of the a r t ic le , component, or system for which the reliabili ty is 
being discussed. The device could range from a single simple tension member , 
to a complete a i r f rame , to an ent i re fleet of a i rp lanes . 
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The period of t ime intended and the operating conditions encountered 
must also be clearly stated. These conditions of operation could range from 
withstanding a single prescr ibed application of load to survival of all expected 
conditions in a complete airplane service life. 
A p rec i se description of adequate performance is equally important; 
otherwise, reliability is an ambiguous te rm. In some situations, the appearence 
of any defect requiring repa i r would be termed inadequate performance. In 
other ins tances , only a catastrophic loss of the system is of in teres t . 
It should be noted that these asser t ions of the device under consideration, 
the overall conditions of operation, and the description of adequate performance 
should be specified in determinist ic form as a prelude to calculating the 
probabil ist ic quantity, reliabili ty. 
A misunderstanding of any of these asser t ions can cause a difference in 
reliability of severa l o rders of magnitude. Of course , more detailed probabil-
istic requi rements a r e derived from the specified determinist ic requirements 
in calculating reliabili ty. 
1.2.2 Resis tance and Load 
Two generally accepted and understood ideas of s t ruc tura l reliability 
discussions a r e the concepts of res is tance and load, under various names . 
Names often used for res i s tance a re strength, capacity, and capability. T e r m s 
used for load a re s t r e s s , s t ra in , and demand. Generally speaking, the load is 
a measure of the environment acting on the system, and the res i s tance is a 
measure of the ability of the system to withstand the environment. 
Frequently, though not always, the load represents effects not under the 
immediate control of the designer, and res is tance is visualized as a quality to 
be determined by the designer; that i s , the designer is to select a design which 
has a res i s tance sufficient to withstand the load. For example, the designer may 
be requi red to select a s t ructura l design with sufficient static strength to with-
stand a given stat ic or quasi-s ta t ic load. As another example, a design may be 
required to have fatigue capability ( res is tance) to withstand a par t icular s t r e s s 
for a given number of cycles . Very simple relationships can be used to denote a 
sat isfactory design, as 
•p 
R >: S , or R - S > 0 , or — ^ 1 , (1 .2) 
where R is res is tance and S is load. Such relationships a r e discussed in 
numerous publications. For example, see Asplund [ 4 ] , Brewer [ 5 ] , Brown [ 6 ] , 
Chilver [ 7] , Disney, Lipson, and Sheth [ 8] , Freudenthal [ 9 ] , or Su [ 10] . 
Complexities a r i s e in the satisfaction of the inequalities of equation 
(1 .2) because of uncertainties in the res is tance and load. These uncertainties 
s tem from two basic sources . F i r s t , there is a natural or intr insic uncertainty 
because loads and res i s tances a re probabilist ic phenomena. Second, the engi-
neer cannot precise ly descr ibe the phenomena. Uncertainties can also be 
classified as objective (those that can be expressed in t e rms of measured data) 
and subjective (those that cannot be or have not been measured and depend on 
personal a s s e s s m e n t ) . Uncertainty dictates that a completely rational descr ip -
tion of the design adequacy cannot be expressed by equations ( l . 2) but requi res 
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probability s tatements about the inequalities in ( l . 2 ) . Given sufficient infor-
mation about R and S, the engineer may make the following s ta tements , 
P [ R > S] = a , or P [R - S ^ 0] = a , or P [ f > 1] = a , (1 .3) 
where the f i rs t statement, for example, is read, "the probability that R is 
g rea te r than or equal to S is a . " If R and S are defined appropriately, then 
a = L, the reliabil i ty. 
1.2.3 Safety Measures 
In this discussion of safety measu re s , res is tance R and load S are 
assumed to be described in t e r m s of stat is t ical pa r ame te r s , R (mean r e s i s t -
ance) , S (mean load) , a (s tandard deviation of r e s i s t ance ) , and a 
R o 
(s tandard deviation of load) . 
The t e rm "safety measu re " as used in the heading of this section means 
any pa rame te r devised to provide a safety increment between load and res i s tance . 
Safety factors , safety marg ins , and safety indices are safety measu res to be 
discussed in this section. A number of commonly used safety measu res are 
discussed by Kececioglu and Haugen [ l l ] . Any safety measure can be regarded 
as ei ther a p rescr ibed constant which controls or specifies the design or as a 
variable which descr ibes the status of the design. These are actually two 
distinct concepts with subtle differences, and this has caused a considerable 
degree of difficulty in communication. The two concepts will be discussed in 
the following paragraphs in t e r m s of the safety measure known as the safety 
factor. The safety factor can be expressed as follows: 
9 
V - f , (1 .4) 
where v is the safety factor. In the first concept, this factor is perceived as a 
design requirement or design specification and the interpretation would be , " I t is 
required that the res is tance- to- load rat io be */." It is evident that Ĵ  is a 
constant in this case , and the equation is ambiguous unless par t icular values of 
R and S such as R and S a re used in the equation. In this case , v is called 
the mean or central safety factor and could be appropriately labeled as v. Other 
values of R and S could be used in the specification. For example, 
R - per Rn 
v = 5 = a2 > (1-5) 
S + q CT S K J 
S q 
where p and q a re constants, has frequently been used. In this dissertat ion a 
superscr ip t " ° n , " A " , or other identification will always be used to distinguish 
the specified safety factor, and the t e r m , design safety factor, will be used in 
the text. 
In the second concept, the safety factor is a property of the design. 
Equation (1 .4) would be interpreted as "The rat io of res is tance to load is y." 
Thus, v is a variable for the second concept, which descr ibes the status of the 
design. If R and S are random var iables , v is also a random variable , and 
equation (1 .4) can be substituted into (1 .3) to yield, 
P[v > l l = a = L , (1.6) 
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which directly re la tes the safety factor to the reliabili ty. 
Another frequently used safety measure is safety margin. Two different 
definitions of safety margin a r e as follows: 
SM - R - S (1.7) 
and 
R 
SM = —?- - 1 (1.8) 
Os 
q 
Through equation ( 1 . 3 ) , the reliabili ty can be calculated directly from, definition 
(1 .7) as 
L = P [R - S 5: Oj = PfSM > 0l . (1 .9) 
Equation (1 .8) is used extensively in the aerospace industry and gives the 
fraction by which the design res is tance exceeds the requirement . 
The safety index provides another means of specifying or calculating 
s t ruc tura l rel iabil i ty. Its definition is 
R - S 
^R^V 
The safety index will be used extensively in this r e sea rch . It is a relatively new 
concept which was mentioned by Corso in a discussion of Freudenthal 's paper 
[12] . The concept has been used by Blake [13 ] , and Mau and Sexsmith [14] . 
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Cornell [15] suggested its use in a structural code. 
It should be mentioned that in any given situation it would be possible to 
apply any one of the preceding safety measures. The primary factors to be 
considered in selecting the safety measure to be used are convenience and 
communication. The convenience is usually computational. For example, if 
resistance and strength are normally distributed random variables, then 
R - S is also normally distributed. This could well lead one to utilize the 
safety margin or safety index for normally distributed R and S. Communica-
tion is a tremendously important aspect which is frequently overlooked. It is 
unlikely that a new research idea will gain widespread acceptance unless the 
results are eventually cast in some form easily recognizable to practitioners 
in the field. This could lead to use of a well-known safety measure or at 
least to a demonstration of how the safety measure used relates to a familiar 
measure such as the safety factor recognized by most structural engineers. 
1.2.4 Structural Testing 
A brief explanation of structural testing will be given here to place it 
in proper context with respect to this dissertation. Small-scale static and 
fatigue tests on specially designed specimens to determine basic material 
properties could properly be called structural tests . However, the kind of 
testing considered here is on a much larger scale. The concern here is with 
the testing of large structural assemblies which make up an airframe, or even 
the testing of the complete airframe itself. This is the type of testing discussed 
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by Lowndes and Cavanagh [16], Thomas [17], and Rosenfield [18], which will 
be described as the "baseline" testing. 
In most airplanes or aerospace systems, all structural assemblies of 
the airframe have been tested in the laboratory, either as separate units or 
as a complete assembly. Both methods have been successful. If the assemblies 
are tested separately, care must be taken to simulate the boundary conditions 
where the tested structure joins the remainder of the airframe. Because of 
various practical considerations, testing by assemblies has the advantage of 
providing for more refined application of loads and more densely distributed 
instrumentation. If the complete airframe is tested, larger facilities are 
required, loading is less refined, and instrumentation is more sparse. How-
ever, the important boundary condition problem is eliminated. 
Ideally, the testing discussed above is accomplished on an airframe 
built from the same specifications and under the same conditions as the actual 
flight articles. Often, there are compromises in this respect. 
Studies have been made to determine the need for such testing. These 
studies have revealed a failure rate ranging from 32 percent to 65 percent in 
this type of testing; that is , approximately one-third to two-thirds of the test 
articles experience some type of failure at less than predicted failure load, 
as shown by Bouton and Trent [19], Jableeki [20], and Thomas [17]. There 
can be no doubt that full-scale structural testing has been an effective "error 
discloser" as discussed by Bouton and Trent [ 19]. 
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Never theless , the increasing size of airplane and aerospace s tructural 
sys tems and the complexity of environments such as tempera tures applied to 
the sys tems have encouraged a search for other means of assur ing s t ructural 
rel iabi l i ty . Lowndes and Cavanagh [16] discuss facility and operational costs 
in testing la rge high-temperature sys tems and show that costs could be an 
order of magnitude higher than previous costs for lower t empera tu res . 
Other methods of testing have been used to some extent, usually as a 
supplement to the testing discussed above. These include model tes ts (a 
scaling down of the tes t ar t ic le s i z e ) , component tes t s (the testing of individual 
small subassemblies which make up the major a s sembly) , and proof tes ts 
(the pretest ing of each actual flight a s s e m b l y ) . These alternative types of 
t es t s will be expanded in scope and considered as options which could be used 
in place of the "basel ine" type of testing previously discussed. 
1.2.5 Relationship of Safety Measures , Testing, and Cost 
Alternatives to the "baseline" type of testing appear more plausible if 
studied in conjunction with safety measures and cos t . To gain an understanding 
of the relat ionships involved, consider some extreme examples . As a first 
example, assume that the design safety measure has been set at a very high 
value so that even if e r r o r s exist in the analysis , failure is unlikely. Then 
there is no need for test ing, and the tes t cost has been saved with perhaps no 
decrease in reliabili ty and no increase in maintenance cost . However, the 
large safety measu re is certain to cause weight increases which could perhaps 
be tolerated in some sys tems but not in o the r s . 
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As a second example, assume that testing of not one but several com-
plete a i r f rames identical to the flight a r t ic le i s planned and that design changes 
will be made on all flight a r t ic les to cor rec t any deficiencies observed during 
test ing. This gives a high assurance that fewer e r r o r s will remain in the 
design or manufacturing after the test program has been completed. Then the 
design safety measure used in the initial design could be much lower, again, 
with no decrease in reliabili ty and no increase in maintenance cost , but with 
the attendant lower weight and increased performance. It is quite possible 
that this increased performance could be well worth the increased test cost in 
some sys t ems . 
Although the baseline method of testing has usually produced acceptably 
rel iable sys tems , there is certainly no proof that it i s the best method for all 
s y s t e m s . Alternative methods deserve careful study. 
1.2.6 Decision Theory 
Statistical decision theory, as exemplified by Pra t t , Raiffa, and 
Schlaifer [ 2 1 ] , provides an excellent means of studying the complex in te r -
relat ionships discussed above in a quantitative manner . A lengthy discussion 
would be required to present even a rudimentary development of decision 
theory. Instead of embarking on such a development, we will devote this 
section to describing what can be done with the theory. 
Statistical decision theory is one technique which provides a mathe-
matical model for making decisions in the face of uncertainty. For example, 
the fact that uncertaint ies exist in loads and res i s tance has already been 
discussed, yet a decision may be required on what design safety factor to 
specify. 
The decision-making process is formulated as the p rocess of choosing 
an action, a, from among the available al ternative actions, a , the 
m e m b e r s of the action space, A. For each possible action the t rue state of 
nature will yield a certain value, a measure of the consequences of the action. 
For example, the action could be the choice of design safety factor, the state 
of nature could be the reliability and system weight achieved, and the value 
could be the total tonnage of goods deliverable by a fleet of a i rp lanes . 
If the t rue state of nature were known with certainty, one would readily 
calculate the value of each alternative action and select the action with highest 
value. Statistical decision theory provides a method of determining the action 
with the highest expected value when the t rue state of nature is not known with 
certainty, but probabilist ic information is available about the state of nature 
or i ts consti tuents. 
Fur ther , if Bayesian stat ist ical methods a r e used, the probabilist ic 
information can be in the form of observed data or of the engineer ' s subjective 
degree of belief. One distinct advantage of the Bayesian approach is that 
experimental data can be combined with the pr ior information available. It is 
required only that the result ing probabili t ies represent the relat ive likelihoods 
upon which the individual is prepared to base his decision. 
The decision methodology also provides for selecting an experiment 
(or no experiment) from among several candidates which achieves the best 
balance between experiment cost and reduced risk in the action choice. Through 
Bayes* theorem a means is provided for incorporating new data with existing 
data to update probability estimates. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1 Scope of Literature Review 
The scope of the present research extends into several areas, such as 
probability, statistics, decision theory, and testing. However, the major 
motivation for the work and the primary thrust of the research is directed 
toward the reliability of aerospace structures. Since it would not be feasible 
to attempt a reasonably complete literature review in all of the areas 
mentioned above, it seems appropriate to concentrate on the area of primary 
emphasis, aerospace structural reliability. 
In some respects, a broad view of the topic of structural reliability is 
included, For example, literature in the field of structural criteria such as 
safety measures is included, whether or not the safety measure is related by 
the author to structural reliability. Also, a number of publications outside 
of the aerospace field, particularly in the area of civil engineering structures 
where a great deal of closely related work has been done, are included if the 
techniques presented can be applied directly to aerospace structures. In other 
respects, the review is restricted to a narrower viewpoint. For example, 
although several important articles on fatigue are included, the review in this 
area is by no means complete, because the present research was restricted 
to the static strength of structures. For the same reason, material on struc-
tural loads is included only as required to make the material on structural 
strength more meaningful. 
The review is conducted in essentially a chronological order. Excep-
tions to this are made when a grouping of several articles in a closely related 
area improves the continuity of the presentation. The primary purpose of the 
review is to simply relate what was done in each publication, but evaluative 
remarks are sometimes made in relating the publication to the present 
research. 
2. 2 Historical Observations 
According to Bouton and Trent [19], the concept of the structural safety 
factor for aircraft dates back to the Wright Flyer, when the Wright brothers 
established as their objective a structural system that would sustain five times 
the weight of the vehicle. It would appear that such a goal may have been some-
what arbitrary and that some rational, quantitative basis for selecting safety 
factors is desirable, but to this date no widely accepted quantitative means of 
selecting structural safety factors has appeared in the aerospace industry. 
In spite of attempts by some engineers to introduce rational means of safety 
factor selection, usually on the basis of reliability analysis, safety factors 
are still arbitrarily selected in many cases, and the particular values are 
based on precedent and tradition. 
In general, such an approach has produced acceptably reliable 
structural systems in the past; hence, there has been a great reluctance to 
change the approach. Nevertheless, it has certainly not been proved that no 
better method of selecting safety factors can be devised. It is highly probable 
that some alternate method could produce equally reliable structures with 
better performance and at lower cost, or possibly, more reliable structures 
with equal performance and cost. 
The phrase safety factor could refer to any parameter used to control 
the strength of a structure relative to the applied load. However, since the 
term "safety factor" has acquired a more specific meaning, the term "safety 
measure" will be used to refer to such parameters as discussed in Chapter I. 
2. 3 Contents of the Literature 
Tye L22] suggested in 1944 that aircraft performance envelopes, 
rather than arbitrary factors, be used to establish yield strength and ultimate 
strength requirements. For example, the ultimate condition could be specified 
as one which occurs once in 100, 000 hours and the yield condition one which 
occurs once in 100 hours. It was argued that arbitrary factors sometimes 
resulted in physically impossible load conditions. The paper contains 
examples of typical safety factors in use in the i940's. Evidently, this was a 
transition period in which the yield factor was changing from 1.5 or 1.25 to 
1.125 and the ultimate factor from 2.0 to 1.5. 
In 1947 Freudenthal published one of his classic papers [23] con-
taining many fundamental concepts of reliability analysis. The safety factor 
is defined as the ratio of the random variable resistance to the random variable 
load, rather than the ratio of a "minimum" resistance to a "maximum" load. 
Several topics such as superposition of influences, types of loads, temperature 
effects, wind forces, boundary conditions, material properties, and uncertainty 
in dimensions were discussed in analytical form. 
Chilver [7] showed that the frequency of structural failure could be 
calculated by integrating either over increments in the strength of the structure, 
considering the load fixed, or over increments in load considering the strength 
fixed in each increment. These relationships were shown as sums over 
discrete increments and in integral form. Pugsley [24] discussed several 
items affecting structural safety, including fatigue, random loading, and 
corrosion effects. The probabilistic effects of strength and loading were 
considered, and the effect of safety factor on the probability of failure was 
shown graphically. A trend toward reducing the reliability problem to one of 
economics was discussed, and a simple cost minimization model, in which 
initial cost and cost of failure were considered, was presented. 
In a 1955 doctoral thesis [20] Jablecki presented the results of 
static load testing of a large number of aircraft major components. Roughly 
one-half of the components failed at less than design ultimate load. The 
report seems to substantiate the fact that static testing is essential for a i r -
craft structures designed with small safety factors. The link of safety factors 
to the amount of testing needed has received little attention, in general. The 
publication is a valuable source of information on structural failures, and in 
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many cases, the location and cause of failure were given. Unfortunately, 
strength values of structures sustaining greater than design ultimate load were 
not given, and a strength distribution cannot be developed from the data. It is 
noteworthy that, regardless of the component, almost all failures occurred in 
some type of joint, fitting, cutouts, or some other type of load transition area. 
A general review of the role of safety factors in aircraft structural 
safety was given by Williams [25] . The importance of the ultimate strength 
test in demonstrating that an aircraft can survive greater than limit load was 
stressed. Williams visualized the ultimate safety factor as an assurance that 
the few aircraft in a fleet which might encounter excessive loads will survive. 
The fatigue or life factor assures that each individual aircraft in the fleet will 
sustain the required load repetitions. 
Freudenthal published a handbook-type exposition on structural 
safety [12] in 1956. The relationship of economics to reliability was intro-
duced. Analytical relationships among several safety measures, statistical 
distributions, and the probability of failure were given. In discussions of the 
paper, the safety index (unnamed at the time) and additional ways to compute 
the probability of failure were introduced. Asplund [4] exploited the idea mat 
some risk is unavoidable in design and related this risk to mortality and the 
efficient use of resources. 
A progress report of an ASCE committee on factors of safety [26] 
was written by Chairman O.G. Julian in 1957. The committee recommended 
the use of two separate factors: a factor of safety and a factor of serviceability. 
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The factor of safety was defined as the ratio of mean collapse resistance to the 
mean load and was to assure a sufficiently high probability that the structure 
would not collapse. The factor of serviceability is a similar ratio, but with 
respect to serviceability rather than collapse. Nomograms and tables were 
given for determining probability of failure versus safety factor for normal 
and log-normal load and strength distributions. 
In Part I of a United States Air Force Report [27], Landes, Wagner, 
and Kriegshauser reviewed the structural requirements and characteristics of 
several missile systems with the goal of developing design criteria on a 
reliability basis. Because of the lack of data to implement such criteria, they 
recommended, on an interim basis, that separate factors be applied to speed, 
quality, and maneuverability instead of applying a single safety factor to 
loads. In Part II of the report [28], Ready developed a framework for 
establishing design requirements to achieve a given level of reliability. The 
methodology deals almost entirely with load variability with little attention to 
strength variability. Because of an attempt to make the method all-inclusive, 
it appears very difficult to understand and to use. The report also contains 
some questionable assumptions in the area of probability and statistics. 
Nevertheless, it is the first attempt to develop structural criteria adaptable 
to very complex environmental conditions. 
Su [10], Brown [6] , and Svensson [29] discussed means of combining 
the variability of several effects such as strength, loads, dimensions, and 
environments to obtain a single safety factor. For example, Brown combined 
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a factor on loads, a factor on strength, and a factor on social consequences 
into a single safety factor to be multiplied by a charac ter is t ic load value to 
establish a charac te r i s t ic strength value. 
Although a few authors had mentioned the possibility of optimizing 
rel iabil i ty toward some desired goal such as minimum cos ts , it appears that 
Hilton and Feigen contributed the f irs t analytical s t ructural optimization 
problem in reliabili ty [30] . Their problem was to minimize the weight of a 
s t ruc ture for a preassigned probability of fai lure. To accomplish this , 
Gaussian distributions for loads and strength were assumed. The weight of 
the s t ruc ture and the probability of failure were both expressed as functions of 
the member a r e a s , and the problem was formulated as a minimization of the 
member weights with the prescr ibed probability of failure as a constraint . It 
was shown that the heavier s t ructural members should be assigned relatively 
higher individual failure probabili t ies to achieve minimum weight. 
Freudenthal [ 9] published a method for calculating reliabil i ty when 
the combined effects of fatigue and ult imate failure a r e considered. The 
rel iabi l i ty was expressed as a function of the life of the s t ruc ture in t e r m s 
of the number of load repeti t ions for both fatigue and ult imate fa i lure . By 
assuming independence of the two failure modes , the combined probability of 
failure was obtained by adding the two contributions. The probability of 
ul t imate failure was considered constant over the life, but the probability of 
fatigue failure increased with the number of load repet i t ions . Freudenthal 
recognized that the assumption of independence of the failure modes may not 
hold in many ca se s , since a fatigue-damaged s t ructure is more susceptible to 
ult imate load fai lure . However, if the dependence of the failure modes is 
recognized in the analysis , ultimate strength data on fatigue-damaged s t ruc -
tu res a r e required in the analysis , and these data a r e not normally available. 
Structural reliabili ty as a probabilistic phenomenon was discussed 
by Bouton [31 ] , who pointed out that the probability of survival is an 
appropriate quantitative measure of rel iabi l i ty. The conflict of influences 
tending to increase rel iabil i ty (economics of failure of the system) and 
influences tending to decrease reliabili ty (system weight) were recognized. 
The author indicated that the selection of an appropriate reliabili ty is p r imar i ly 
economic in nature but considered the analysis required to perform such a cost 
optimization impract ical at that t ime . The effect of variabil i ty in loads and 
strength on reliabili ty was discussed, and the resu l t s of some example 
problems were shown, but the method of calculation was not given. A flow 
chart showing the various factors that influence component strength and the 
environment of the component, and hence determine the rel iabil i ty, was 
developed. 
A unique method of character iz ing loading was given by Leve [32] . 
In this method, the loading i s character ized by a set of determinist ic life 
h i s to r ies , and the reliabili ty over an individual life history is the minimum 
value attained along the h is tory . The total reliability is obtained by summing 
the products of the individual rel iabi l i t ies and their probability of occur rence . 
It was also shown in this paper that an assumption of independence of failure 
of individual member s is invalid if the loading in the members is not independ-
ent. Techniques for apportioning reliabili ty were also discussed, and a 
modification of the Hilton-Feigen model [30] was suggested, which accounts 
for dependence of the failure modes . 
The reliabili ty analysis and allocation methods advocated by Leve 
hinge on the idea that there a r e only a few predominant failure modes in a 
complex s t ruc ture and that other failure modes, l e s s likely to occur, a r e 
associated with these predominant modes . Only the predominant modes are 
assumed independent. The resul t of such an approach is that the overall 
reliabil i ty goal for a s t ruc ture can be achieved with lower individual member 
re l iabi l i t ies , yielding a lower s t ructural weight than an assumption of inde-
pendence of all failure modes . The problem with such an approach appears 
to be that the predominant failure modes must be known a p r io r i , whereas in 
many instances oversights or e r r o r s by the designer is a major contributor 
to unreliability as discussed by Bouton and Trent [19] . 
Possible al ternat ives in testing large a i r f rames were discussed by 
Lowndes and Cavanagh [16] . The rapidly escalating cost of full-scale testing, 
pr imar i ly due to more severe thermal environments, was discussed. The 
continued need for full-scale testing was substantiated by data which showed 
that failures occurred in many static test p rograms of aircraf t between 1940 
and 1963. The authors pointed out that testing is effective in determining 
manufacturing effects, determining analytical deficiencies, and disclosing 
human e r r o r s . 
Four alternative methods of testing were reviewed with regard to 
their effectiveness in performing the above functions. These are (1) loading 
the entire vehicle but heating only local areas, (2) separating into components 
and heating and testing each separately, (3) testing to higher than flight loads 
with lower than flight temperatures, and (4) model testing. No conclusion 
was reached as to the best alternative. It should be mentioned that component 
testing was successfully used by the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration in the Saturn program as discussed by Thomas [17]. The problem of 
boundary conditions where the test component joins the rest of the airframe 
was usually overcome by building a test fixture with stiffness to simulate 
the adjoining structure or actually using a part of the adjoining structure as 
part of the test fixture. 
A linear-perturbation method of reliability estimation and weight 
optimization was published by Broding, Diederich, and Parker [33]. Relia-
bility was related to safety factor by assuming that the safety factor is a 
normally distributed random variable. In the linear perturbation method, 
weight and safety factor are expressed as linear functions of the design 
variables through a Taylor series expansion about some reference values in 
the range of interest. The weight is then minimized with respect to each 
design variable such as strength or thickness, with a probability of failure 
for each mode of failure as constraints. The authors stated that the approach 
could be extended to the case of a prescribed overall reliability. The method 
appears to be useful when the interest is in optimizing on several design 
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variables and safety factor and weight a r e approximately l inear functions of 
the design variables in the range of in te res t . In an example problem, t empera -
tu re , allowable s t ra in , coefficient of thermal expansion, and elast ic modulus 
a r e t reated as design var iab les . 
Switzky [ 34] produced an analysis procedure for minimizing weight 
of components with a constraint on the overall probability of fai lure. This was 
accomplished by assuming that the ra t io of any given component weight to the 
total weight is independent of the probability of failure for small probabili t ies 
of fa i lure . Normal distributions of load and strength were used, and the 
probability of failure was expressed as the inverse of the cumulative d is t r ibu-
tion of the safety index. The mean safety factor was shown explicitly as a 
function of the probability of failure and the load and strength coefficients of 
var ia t ion. The weight minimization was accomplished using a Lagrange 
multiplier technique for the constrained minimization problem. A technical 
note by Ghista [35] also addressed the problem of weight minimization with 
a probability of failure constraint . The suggested t r i a l - a n d - e r r o r technique 
for solution yielded satisfactory resu l t s for a two-member example problem. 
A survey paper by Coutinho [36] reviewed basic s tat is t ical and 
reliabil i ty concepts and discussed some government reliabil i ty specifications 
and their applicability. An interest ing breakdown of types of failure and the 
responsibil i ty for each was given: initial failures a re usually t raceable to 
manufacturing and quality control, wear-out failures to maintenance, and 
random failures to design. The philosophy and operational aspects of 
reliability assurance engineering were discussed. Coutinho listed the four 
major causes of unreliability as: 
1. Lack of reliable methods for predicting operating environments. 
2. Unit-to-unit variations in resistance (within specification). 
3. Design e r rors . 
4. Manufacturing e r rors . 
A qualitative comparison of the relative reliability of different types of aero-
space systems was given. Airframes are credited with the highest reliability 
and electronics the poorest. However, it should be mentioned that alternate 
or redundant electronic systems can usually be provided at much less cost 
and weight increase than structural systems. 
Moon, Shinn, and Hyler [37] discussed the determination of design 
allowables for Military Handbook 5 [38], the primary source of materials 
strength data in the aerospace industry. Statistical techniques for determining 
allowable strengths on a probability basis, the use of specification values and 
typical values, the derivation of design allowables for a given property from 
closely related properties, and the determination of allowables at other than 
room temperature were discussed. 
A final report of the Task Committee on Factors of Safety, American 
Society of Civil Engineers, was written by Freudenthal, Garrelts, and 
Shinozuka [39]. This is an extremely useful reference which defined 
commonly used terms in reliability and gave concise derivations of 
important structural reliability relationships for numerous cases. As would 
be expected for this type of repor t , much of the mater ia l had been developed 
and published ea r l i e r , but this publication brought the information together in 
an easy- to-use handbook style . The repor t will be frequently referenced in 
this r e sea rch , especially where it concisely s ta tes some commonly accepted 
principle that has been gradually developed by a number of contr ibutors . 
The task committee defined the safety factor as the rat io of r e s i s t -
ance to load, and since res i s tance and load a re random var iables , the safety 
factor i s also a random var iable . The repor t showed how to t rea t multiple 
member s t ruc tures under multiple load cycles . This was done for the case 
that res i s tance and load a r e independent of the number of load applications 
and for the case that one or both depends on the number of previous load 
applicat ions. Consideration was given to loads applied at specified t imes 
(life is measured in number of load applications) and to loads governed by a 
Poisson law (life is measured in t i m e ) . Fatigue was treated by the residual 
strength concept, where res i s tance is a decreasing function with number of 
load applications. 
Evidently, the f i rs t attempt at recommending specific safety factors 
for aerospace s t ruc tures that vary depending on the desi red reliabili ty and the 
nature of the design was made by Bouton, Trent , and Chenoweth [ 4 0 ] . These 
authors developed, based on stat is t ical analyses , a matr ix of safety factors to 
be used under various conditions. To select the appropriate safety factor, 
one of th ree overall reliabili ty objectives i s chosen: 0.99 for h igh-r i sk 
vehic les , 0.9999 for standard vehicles , and 0.999999 for low-r isk vehic les . 
Beyond this, the safety factor selected depends upon the expected strength 
scat ter in the s t ructure under consideration (four c lasses a re listed) and 
whether the loads and strength are verified by tes t . The recommended safety 
factor ranges from i . 15 for a high-r isk vehicle, with small scat ter in strength 
and loads and strength verified by test , to 4. 0 for all s t ructures not verified 
by strength test and all s t ructures with large strength scat ter and no test 
verification of loads. The approach seems to be a very reasonable step beyond 
the usual pract ice of a rb i t ra ry selection of safety factors , and it is surpris ing 
that the approach or some variation thereof has not come into general use in 
the aerospace industry. Perhaps the reluctance to use the method s tems from 
the a p r io r i judgments which must be made: selection of a reliability goal and 
determination of strength variabil i ty. The present r e sea rch contributes to a 
rational means of resolving this problem through the use of decision theory. 
Statistical analysis of fail-safe designs was considered by Shinozuka 
and Itagaki [ 4 1 ] . It was shown in an example problem, which could ideal -
ist ical ly represen t a t h r ee - spa r wing, that the probability of survival after 
failure of one member is undesirably low (in the range of 0. 20 to 0 .33 ) , even 
for a ductile ma te r i a l . The failure condition considered was yielding of the 
s t ruc tu re , and the authors indicated that different conclusions could be 
expected for a fatigue failure mode. 
An ar t ic le by Turks t ra [42] discussed the choice of design from a 
set of designs with equal functional value based on minimization of expected 
l o s s . The basic idea offered was that, within a reasonable approximation 
under certain conditions, only bounds on reliabili ty of the candidate designs a r e 
needed, and the design selected should be the one with minimum cost which 
has a reliabili ty within a prescr ibed value; that i s , all designs with reliabili ty 
falling within the prescr ibed reliabil i ty a r e equally acceptable, r egard less of 
the exact re l iabi l i ty . This can considerably simplify cost optimization calcula-
t ions . The costs considered were initial costs and the expected cost of fai lure. 
Initial cost was assumed to be a l inear function of the mean safety factor. 
Tu rks t r a ' s method would be very limited in aerospace applications, since the 
assumption of equal functional value for all s t ruc tures would ra re ly apply. 
For example, the functional value of aerospace s t ruc tures depends greatly 
on the weight of the s t ruc ture , which is a function of the safety factor . Thus, 
designs with different safety factors have distinctly different functional values , 
because increased weight in the s t ruc ture usually resu l t s in decreased payload 
weight. 
A paper by Moses and Kinser [43] gave computational methods for 
multiple member s t ruc tures under multiple load conditions. The authors 
emphasized the bounds on reliabil i ty and the relationship of the bounds to the 
degree of dependence among the failure modes . Computations of the reliabili ty 
were made, using the known dependence of failure modes , for comparison with 
the bounds when complete independence, then complete dependence, of the 
failure modes were assumed. It was concluded that the essent ial relationship 
which controls the dependence, assuming that loads on all m e m b e r s a r i s e from 
a common source , is the load variabil i ty compared with the strength variabi l i ty. 
A small relative variabili ty of load leads to s tat is t ical independence, and a 
l a rge variabili ty of load relat ive to strength variabili ty leads to stat ist ical 
dependence. 
It was clearly demonstrated in the paper that an assumption of 
independence of failure modes, when dependence actually exis ts , can cause a 
significant underprediction of rel iabi l i ty . However, the par t icular example 
problem chosen seems to amplify the effects of such an assumption because of 
the low rel iabi l i t ies involved. For more typical, higher rel iabil i ty, the 
difference in predictions using assumptions of dependence and independence 
would not differ so much. 
Weight optimization with a constraint on the probability of fai lure, 
which was examined by Hilton and Feigen [30] and Switzky [34] , was t reated 
by Moses and Kinser [44] with dependence of failure modes considered. They 
showed that additional reduction in weight can be achieved if the assumption of 
the independence of failure modes is discarded in favor of a m o r e exact 
t rea tment . 
A book by Pugsley [45] t reated the subject of s t ruc tura l safety in 
an easy- to - read fashion. Several chapters dealt with elementary s t ructura l 
concepts and analysis , followed by a discussion of the variabil i ty in strengths 
and loads and the r i s k of fai lure . The safety ru les (or design codes) used to 
obtain safe s t ruc tures were then d iscussed. An interest ing chapter on "Some 
Famous Accidents" i l lustrated some of the conditions which can resu l t in 
unsafe s t r u c t u r e s . 
An excellent treatise of the bounds on structural reliability was given 
by Cornell [46]. The bounds depend upon the degree of dependence among 
loads and among failure modes. Expressions for upper and lower bounds on 
reliability were first given for a fundamental problem with time-independent, 
equally distributed resistance subjected to a sequence of random loads. A 
generalization was then made to time-dependent loads, time-dependent 
resistance, and unequally distributed resistance. 
Blake [13] discussed the direct application of statistical decision 
theory to structural reliability problems. He emphasized the importance of 
the cost effectiveness of a design as opposed to the desirability of the same 
fixed safety factor or the same fixed value of reliability for every component 
in a structural design. Relationships were developed for sizing a structural 
design to obtain a reliability such that system effectiveness is maximized. If 
the loads on the system and the strength of the system are normally distributed, 
the reliability was shown to be related to the safety index, and the optimum 
safety index was tabulated against a measure of the change in system effective-
ness with safety index. 
Blake continued his development by considering the possible loss of 
system effectiveness for nonoptimum safety index. Since exact knowledge of 
effectiveness, safety index, and reliability is not usually available, the 
approach adopted was to minimize the loss in effectiveness for nonoptimum 
choice of the safety index. This leads to a nonoptimum design size with a 
conservative bias. The foregoing preceded a discussion as to whether more 
information, which would permit selection of a design size nearer the optimum, 
would be worth the cost of such information, and led to a realization that, in 
addition to the intrinsic random nature of design variables affecting reliability, 
there is also uncertainty associated with a lack of complete information. Both 
of these uncertainties should be considered in cost optimization. The author 
also pointed out that the Bayesian approach permits the incorporation of 
subjective judgments with objective data in reaching a design decision. 
Benjamin [47] described the advantages of probabilistic design as 
compared with deterministic procedures. The author envisioned deterministic 
approaches as lacking in informational content, modeling of reality, refinement 
of analysis and design, and decision-making. Illustrations showed that the 
designer is not usually fully aware of the true state of affairs when determ-
inistic approaches are used. A simplified Bayesian-type decision tree was 
presented, illustrating the choice of an optimum building design for earthquake 
loading. 
Bouton and Trent [19] elaborated on the ideas initially set forth by 
Bouton, Trent, and Chenoweth [40], They described in great detail how a 
variable safety factor requirement could be incorporated into the technical 
and contractual management of aerospace systems and made an extensive 
evaluation of previous structural criteria proposals to show that none of these 
could fulfill what they considered the essential requirements of structural 
criteria. Most of the other proposed criteria could not satisfy a requirement, 
considered essential by the authors, that a means of proof of compliance must 
exist for the criteria. For example, if the criterion is that the structure must 
have a certain reliability, then proof of compliance is virtually impossible 
before the structure is placed in service. Thus, structural criteria which 
specify reliability would not be acceptable to the authors, 
A proposal for separating loads into "limit" and "omega" conditions was 
presented. The limit condition is a load at which the structure is expected to 
survive, and the omega condition is a load, possibly caused by malfunction of 
other systems, beyond which the structure is not expected to survive. 
The primary thrust of the work by Bouton and Trent was an advocation 
of changes in the present safety factor system for airframes. They showed 
how structural reliability fits into the total system approach, and emphasized 
the need for establishing exactly what is expected of the structural system and 
design and test procedures for obtaining and measuring compliance with what 
is expected. The system created by them utilizes deterministic safety factors 
for analysis and testing which have been established by probabilistic tech-
niques. The approach retains the advantage of having designers and analysts 
working with a given safety factor but also has the advantage that the safety 
factor has been determined in a rational manner. The basic premise for 
setting the safety factor is a reliability goal, but the safety factor also depends 
upon the scatter in strength of like structures and upon the number of tests 
contemplated. 
There can be little doubt that such a comprehensive evaluation and 
thorough proposal was a result of much study and deliberation. It appears that 
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the proposed criteria would be workable and would be a significant improvement 
over present practices. It does seem that the authors may have overlooked 
some plausible alternatives because of a preoccuptation with the legalistic 
aspects of the problem. For example, the proof of compliance previously 
mentioned and a requirement that blame for any failure must be traceable may 
be desirable goals but probably should not be permitted to dominate or mask 
other important objectives. 
Kececioglu and Haugen [ i i ] summarized various definitions of safety 
factors, safety margins, and measures of reliability which have been used 
and illustrated the use of some of them. A curve showing reliability as a 
function of safety index for normal distribution of loads and strength was given. 
Disney, Lipson, and Sheth [8] published formulas for determination of the 
probability of failure for several commonly used distributions of loads and 
strength. 
Some simplifications to the Hilton-Feigen model for minimum weight 
[30] were made by Murthy and Subramanian [48]. Some approximations were 
introduced that resulted in a set of equations which, unlike the Hilton-Fiegen 
model, could be solved without iteration. Some results in an example problem 
using the approximate solution had a close correspondence to the exact 
solution. 
Shinozuka presented a model for weight-optimized design subject to a 
constraint on expected cost [49]. The expected cost consisted of the expected 
cost of failure in service and in proof testing. The proof test was considered 
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to truncate the strength distribution at the proof-test level, and the reliability 
in service was thus enhanced. The optimization was performed with respect 
to the proof-test load level; that is , a proof-test level which minimized expected 
cost or weight was the result of the analysis. The procedure was developed for 
both determinant and indeterminant structures. 
The use of statistical decision theory as a tool in design is discussed by 
Cornell [50]. The Bayesian method of incorporating all physical, parameter, 
and model uncertainties into a single probability law was emphasized, since 
such a law can be used directly in design decisions and reliability estimates. 
A qualitative description of the residual strength concept of fatigue was 
given by Bouton and Trent [51] . The basis of the concept is that fatigue 
failures are, in reality, ultimate strength failures of fatigue-damaged struc-
tures. The analysis of such structures had previously been considered by 
Freudenthal, Garrelts, and Shinozuka [39] . The relationship of the concept 
to the amount and type of testing required was discussed. 
Shah [ 52] advocated a design code in which resistance and load are 
recognized as probabilistic quantities. Some of the fundamental aspects of 
reliability and statistics were reviewed. A factor to account for differences 
in laboratory and field strengths was considered. Sexsmith and Nelson [53] 
discussed the limitations in the application of probabilistic concepts to struc-
tural design. Each limitation mentioned was accompanied by a discussion of 
how it might be overcome. Some of the limitations examined were problems 
in selecting a model, consideration of subjective information, use of 
information in making a decision, and confidence limits on reliability. 
A generalization of the classical probability of failure concept as a 
structural criterion was proposed by Ang and Amin [54]. A concept of the 
"probability of unsafety" was introduced such that the event (R/S < v), v > i , 
constitutes a state of unsafety, where R is structural strength or resistance, 
S is the applied load, and v is a factor for uncertainty. For v = i , the 
concept reduced to a conventional reliability analysis. It was proposed that 
the known probabilistic information be incorporated into R and S and that v 
account for any remaining dispersions or unknowns. The structural require-
ment would then be expressed by the condition P LR/S < v] < a , where a is 
the allowable risk. It was further shown that a reasonable and conservative 
choice for a is pq where p is the probability of having a structure with 
resistance less than a characteristic value, R , and q is the probability of 
occurrence of a load greater than a characteristic value, S . 
M. 
The principal advantages of the approach are that it separates the 
uncertainty into subjective and objective parts and it makes the design much 
less sensitive to the assumed distributions of R and S if a is chosen as 
pq. The disadvantage of the approach seems to be that it involves several 
somewhat arbitrary choices {P, p, and q) instead of one choice, for instance, 
a level of reliability. It also appears that Bayesian statistics may be a more 
consistent way to introduce subjective uncertainties than the proposed method. 
A structural design code was suggested by Cornell [15] in which the 
safety factor selected depends only upon the means and coefficients of variations 
of resistance and luad, but not upon their specific probability distributions. To 
apply the method, however, a value of the safety index /3 must be selected, 
evidently somewhat arbitrarily. The author suggested that /3 be specified in 
the code and that its value depend upon the consequences of failure. 
Yao and Yeh [55] concentrated upon developing a procedure for system-
atically counting the failure paths in a redundant structure in the formulation of 
a reliability analysis. 
Thomas [17] summarized the test results for large structural assem-
blies in the Saturn V launch vehicle system and gave a rationale for determ-
ining safety factors for structures which would not be tested. The Saturn V 
test data confirmed the trend of the Jablecki data [20] in showing that struc-
tural failures are to be expected frequently in static testing of large assem-
blies. Such failures were seen as error disclosures by Bouton and Trent [19] 
and are usually attributed to analysis inaccuracies or e r ro r s . The Saturn V 
data showed a trend toward more accurate analysis as compared with the 
Jablecki data which were compiled from tests in the 1940's. 
An analysis of the Jablecki data was performed by Chenoweth [56] to 
determine the safety factor which would be required for untested structures. 
The analysis showed that large safety factors (in a range from 4 to 11) would 
be required to assure a reliability of 0. 9999 in sustaining limit load. Although 
the conclusions of the paper are generally acceptable, the definition of 
reliability as the probability of sustaining limit load is inadequate for quantita-
tive decision methods. In a more refined analysis, the probabilistic aspects 
of the loading should be considered, and reliabili ty should be defined in t e rms 
of the probability of failure in se rv ice . This would undoubtedly resul t in lower 
requi red factors of safety than those shown in Chenoweth's paper , since limit 
load is usually considerably l a rger than the expected load. 
Stevenson and Moses [57] presented an analysis method for determining 
the probability of failure in s t ruc tures for which the failure mechanism is 
expressed as a l inear combination of several res i s tances and loads . The 
method was applied to the l imit design of f rames in which the res i s tances were 
the plast ic hinge moment capability of joints and the loads were applied to 
various points of the f rame. It was shown that var iance in strength and load 
has a la rge effect on rel iabil i ty, that the par t icular form of stat is t ical d is t r ibu-
tion assumed has a small effect for high failure probabili t ies and a large 
effect for low failure probabil i t ies , and that the dependence between failure 
modes is not very significant if the dependence i s weak. 
A paper by Shah and Tang [58] developed a procedure for determining 
load fac tors . One cr i ter ion used was cost , based on a simple model consisting 
of construction cost and expected cost of fai lure. A summary of the views of 
severa l European committees studying s t ructura l safety was given by Rowe 
[ 5 9 ] . The basic approach was determinis t ic , but the determinis t ic factor may 
be developed from severa l sources of uncertainty which could be represented 
probabil is t ical ly. 
Optimum design with respec t to weight with a constraint on the p rob-
ability of failure was the subject of a paper by Moses and Stevenson [60] . The 
application was to both elastic design and limit design of frame structures. 
The problem was similar to that addressed by Hilton and Feigen [30], Switzky 
[34], and Moses and Kinser [44] except that limit design failures were 
considered. 
Ghare [61] discussed the perogative of the designer in trading off the 
safety factor used in design with the quality factor associated with production 
to obtain a required reliability within prescribed resources. 
An ultimate strength analysis of more than 300 data points of different 
types of aircraft structures and components was presented in terms of test 
strength compared with analytical strength [62] by Freudenthal and Wang. 
A comparison with the Jablecki data [20] showed some improvement in 
analytical prediction. The data were used in two reliability analyses of a i r -
craft by disregarding the fact, recognized as questionable by the authors, that 
strength deficiencies discovered in tests would be rectified. 
Blume [63] discussed the philosophy of public safety in civil structures 
and the consideration of economic and safety trade-offs. The paper was a 
discussion only, with no analysis given. In the same volume, Freudenthal [64] 
discussed similar questions and suggested a model for selecting reliability 
based on minimizing the total expected loss. The expression for loss accounted 
for initial costs (which may be a function of reliability) and expected cost of 
failure, the product of cost of failure and probability of failure. 
Carnahan published an investigation of the reliability growth in orbital 
launches from 1958 to 1968 [65]. Data in this article showed that the overall 
reliability has grown from about 50 percent in 1958 to about 95 percent in 
1966-1968 and has leveled off at about 95 percent. The causes of failure were 
examined and found to be almost entirely hardware related, as opposed to 
personnel or procedural. Ninety percent of the failures were mechanical, 
and of these 48 percent were in nonmoving parts. The author defended 
component testing as the least expensive means of increasing launch reliability. 
An excellent review of statistical methods in fatigue was given by 
Wirsching and Yao [66]. Emphasis was on various ways of presenting fatigue 
data and the use of the Weibull distribution for representing fatigue life. An 
estimation of parameters for the two-parameter and the three-parameter 
distribution was discussed and illustrated. The graphical method, the method 
of moments, and the maximum likelihood method were presented. 
Ang [67] further developed the concept of unsafety introduced by Ang 
and Amin [ 54]. The concept is that separate devices are used to account for 
subjective and objective uncertainties. Subjective uncertainties are taken 
into account by the conventional technique of requiring that some characteristic 
value of resistance is equal to the product of a safety factor and a character-
istic value of the applied load. Objective uncertainty is considered by 
requiring that the probability that the desired subjective safety factor exists 
be a predetermined value. This value is called the probability of unsafety. 
Ang recommended that a log-normal distribution always be used for the 
subjective safety factor, based on physical grounds. When this is done, the 
objective probability of unsafety becomes much less sensitive to the assumed 
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statistical distribution of resistance and load than would exist if all uncertainty 
is incorporated into the probability of unsafety. It should be noted that two 
separate deterministic selections must be made to apply the method: a safety 
factor and a desired probability of unsafety. 
An extension of the Shinozuka model [49] was presented by Heer and 
Yang [68] . The area of extension was in the application to designs susceptible 
to brittle fracture in which the growth of flaws due to cyclic and sustained 
loading was considered. The effect of the flaw growth is to lower the struc-
tural resistance with use of the structure. In the optimization procedure, 
weight was optimized with a constraint on the total expected cost. The predic-
tion of the reliability of structures subjected to stationary random excitations 
was considered by the same authors [69]. The degradation of resistance by 
the loading history was considered in the reliability prediction. The applica-
tion of the random loading was to a single-degree-of-freedom system, along 
with other quite restrictive assumptions. 
In a philosophical paper [70] in 1971, Lind formalized the art of safety 
factor selection and showed that the rationale of several proposed design codes 
can be derived from various combinations of a small set of postulates. The 
postulates common to all of the proposed codes were first enumerated. For 
example, the consideration of strength as a random variable is one of these 
postulates. Next, the postulates peculiar to the individual code proposals 
were stated. For example, Cornell [15] postulated that the means and coef-
ficients of variations of loads and resistances should be considered as a 
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sufficient statistical description. 
Hardrath [71] presented an excellent capsulation of the fundamentals 
of fatigue and fracture mechanics and included a bibliography of approximately 
200 sources. The Task Committee on Structural Safety of the ASCE Structural 
Division published a literature review of structural safety [72] which contains 
a useful bibliography of approximately 400 references, 
A paper by Tang and Yao [ 73] extended the Miner fatigue damage 
criterion such that the fatigue lives (in cycles) at each stress level are treated 
as random variables instead of constants. In this case, the cumulative damage 
itself then becomes a random variable. 
Campion, et al. [ 74] evaluated the criteria developed by Bouton and 
Trent [ 19]. The method was reviewed to determine the data required and the 
availability, the implications of such an approach in the structural design 
process, the methods by which the implementation could be achieved without 
discontinuity, and handbooks. A trial application of the procedure was made 
to the C-141 transport aircraft wing. The evaluators concluded that total 
application of the procedure is premature, essentially because of a lack of 
data for implementation. Additional trial applications to existing systems 
were recommended, along with efforts to collect and develop the required 
data. 
A development with an optimization objective closely paralleling that 
of the present research was presented by Mau and Sexsmith [ 14]. This was 
a problem of optimizing expected cost as an unconstrained minimization 
problenio The result was a Bayesian-type decision p rocess , i l lustrated 
by the authors in a simple decision t r e e . The ent i re model was extremely 
simplified to minimize computations. For example, the initial cost of 
the s t ruc ture was related only to the mater ia l cos ts , failure modes were 
assumed independent, costs consisted only of initial costs plus the 
expected cost of failure, and load and res is tance were assumed normally 
distributed. Permit t ing different types of testing in the design al ternatives 
was not considered. 
Lind [ 75] proposed distribution functions for load and res is tance 
composed of a normal central portion and an exponential tail portion 
for reliability calculations. Lind believed that the incorporation of new 
data with p r i o r data by simply recalculating the required s ta t is t ics was 
s impler than a Bayesian procedure for the proposed distr ibutions. 
Several probabilistic models were reviewed by Heller [76] with 
respect to their representat ion of component life. The viewpoint was a 
comparison of the physical phenomena to be represented with the proper t ies 
of the models (normal , log-normal , exponential, or Weibull) . It was 
shown that the Weibull model provides a convenient representat ion of life-
type phenomena0 Graphical means of determining model pa rame te r s 
were discussed and i l lustrated with a fatigue example. This was done for 
both complete samples and for extreme observat ions. 
A review of s tat is t ical methods applicable to s t ruc tura l reliability was 
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given by Lemon [77]. The concepts of conceptual models, distributions, and 
parameters were reviewed, including the basic terminology used to describe 
distributions. A very readable explanation of order statistics was given. 
Point and interval estimation of parameters was explained and "within" and 
"between" batch variability was discussed. Chi-square and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov goodness-of-fit tests were explained. A fairly thorough treatment of 
the Weibull distribution was presented, including illustration of the effects of 
parameters, parameter estim.a.tion, distribution of certain functions of the 
parameters, and confidence bounds on the parameters. 
Forney [78] discussed the recent improvements in reliability methods 
for computing fatigue lives of aircraft structures, particularly the development 
of models for estimating the expected time to the first failures in a fleet. A 
multiphase program of the Air Force Materials Laboratory for reducing 
structural reliability analysis methods to practice was described. One phase 
of the program was concerned with cost and weight trade-offs as affected by 
reliability; this is closely related to the present research. 
Some of the problem areas in structural reliability computation and 
communication were pointed out by Bouton [79]. Among these are the effect 
of analytical errors and the problem of giving a precise definition to reliability. 
For example, the importance of defining whether the reliability pertains to the 
entire fleet or to a single aircraft was pointed out, as well as the need for 
carefully defining what constitutes a failure. 
Buntin [80] discussed a proof-test program currently in use on the 
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F-111 a i rcraf t . The main purpose of the proof-test program is to detect flaws 
in high-strength steel pa r t s in the aircraf t which could cause failure during 
s e r v i c e . The p rogram was instituted because an ear ly flight failure was 
attributed to a flaw in a wing-pivot fitting. Basic fracture mechanics and 
proof test concepts were described, including a method of allowing for a yield 
zone at the crack t ip. A flow diagram for calculating the probability of 
surviving a given number of flight hours after proof tes t was shown, but 
analytical details were not given. F rom a total of 325 operational aircraft 
which were proof tested, two failures occurred during testing, neither related 
to flaws. This demonstrated the ability of proof testing to detect anomalies 
other than flaws. 
A discussion of the la tes t developments in the U . S . Air Force s t ructural 
integrity program was presented by Haviland and Tiffany [ 8 1 ] . The discussion 
revealed a trend toward more attention to fatigue and fracture toughness 
p rob lems , a resul t of encountering such problems on the F - i l l and C-5A 
i r p l a n e s . Rosenfield [18] discussed the static tes t philosophy of the U .S . 
Navy on major a i rcraf t s t ructura l a s sembl i e s . A review of [16] , [17 ] , [18] , 
[ 19] , [ 20] , [ 62] , and [ 81 ] reveals a marked s imilar i ty in static s t ruc tura l 
tes t methods used by the Air Fo rce , Navy, and the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administrat ion. 
There can be li t t le doubt that some important contributions in the field 
of s t ruc tura l reliabil i ty have not been included in this l i t e ra ture review. How-
ever , it i s hoped that the review does include a sufficient number and variety 
of contributions to provide the reader a beginning point in the pursuit of some 
particular aspect of this many-faceted and interesting field of research. 
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CHAPTER III 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM, THE SETTING, AND THE 
METHOD OF SOLUTION 
3.1 Statement of the Problem 
In this section a concise statement of the r e sea rch problem, a discussion 
of the related topics to be considered, the problem setting, and an overview of 
the method of solution will be outlined. 
3. 1. 1 Concise Statement of the Research Problem 
The need for s t ruc tura l test ing of aerospace s t ructura l sys tems has been 
shown separately by Freudenthal and Wang [ 62] , Jablecki [ 20 ] , and Thomas [ 17] . 
Their resul t s show that one-third to two-thirds of the tested s t ruc tures fail at a 
load lower than that predicted by the analysts . The t e rms "analyst 's predicted 
failure load" or "design ultimate load" have been used to designate the actual load 
predicted by the analysts at which failure is predicted to take place . No safety fac-
tors a re included in this load. Aerospace s t ruc tura l testing is expensive, and the 
sample s izes a re usually smal l . In addition to the influence of s t ruc tura l test ing 
on the cost of the s t ruc tura l sys tem, a prescr ibed safety measure also influences 
the cost through its effect on reliabili ty and performance. Safety measure has 
been used as a general t e r m meaning the safety factor, reliabili ty measure , 
safety index, or other variable used to control the strength of the design. 
The r e s e a r c h program discussed in this dissertat ion is to develop a 
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methodology for selecting a suitable test option and an appropriate safety 
measure based on optimized expected costo In the course of the development 
two additional problems have been considered, the solutions to which were 
required to provide information needed as input to the cost optimization model. 
1. In pre l iminary design and in making design decisions on the test 
options and safety measures based on optimized expected cost , it is necessary 
to es t imate the probabilist ic strength or failure distribution before testing has 
actually been ca r r i ed out and the observed data become available. In this 
disser tat ion a methodology will be developed to systematical ly obtain the 
subjective expert opinion by using mail questionnaires and to use the answers 
to these questionnaires to represent the probabilist ic strength distribution 
analytically. These investigations and developments a r e discussed in 
Chapter V. 
20 In developing the methodology to select the tes t option and safety 
measu re , it is necessary to update the probabil ist ic strength distributions as 
new data become available in the form of tes t data or flight experience. 
Fu r the rmore , any procedure for updating should be adapted to the s t ructura l 
testing procedure used in the aerospace industry, which will be discussed in 
Chapter IVo This has been accomplished using Bayesian techniques and is 
discussed in Chapter VI. 
3 . 1 .2 Related Topics 
Several individual, closely related topics must be investigated and 
placed in a p roper relationship to each other in the resea rch p rogram. Each 
topic is underlined in the following text. 
The first topic to be discussed is "s t ruc tura l testing. M The topic can 
perhaps best be introduced by examining an almost universally used s t ructura l 
test procedure which may be regarded as a "s tandard" procedure . An examina-
tion of Thomas [ 17] , Rosenfeld [ 18] , and Bonton and Trent [ 19] shows that 
such a procedure is used by the United States Air Force , the Navy, and the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration in testing a i r f r ames . This 
s tandard procedure consists of testing one full-scale specimen of each of the 
major s t ruc tura l assemblies which compose an a i r f rame. The testing is 
accomplished by applying static loads to the assembly with hydraulic cyl inders , 
weights, a i rbags , e tc . Ideally, the tes t ar t ic le is constructed from the same 
design drawings as the flight a r t i c l e s . Often, there a re compromises in this 
respec t . If a failure occurs at less than the predicted failure load, a design 
change is made, and a re tes t is accomplished. This procedure is i terated 
until one design " p a s s e s " the tes t , and the successful design is then used in 
production a i r f rames . To permit a lucid description, the above procedure has 
been highly idealized. 
In some aerospace p r o g r a m s , records have been kept which give some 
insight into the levels at which failure can be expected in such test ing. 
Freudenthal and Wang [ 62] , Jablecki [ 20] , and Thomas E17 ] present such 
r eco rds . The failure levels in cer tain groups of s t ruc tures a re i l lustrated by 
the cumulative distribution functions (CDF rs) plotted in Figure 1. The CDF's 
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Figure 1. Fai lure Data for Structural Assembl ies . 
because the data were p rese rved only for assemblies which failed at less than 
100 percent of design load. 
Although the difference between the 1940 data and the more recent 
resul ts indicates a significant improvement in analytical accuracy, the role of 
the s tandard stat ic tes t as an e r r o r d isc loser is sti l l very evident. It is 
important to rea l ize that the distributions in Figure 1 do not represent the final 
product, since the standard procedure requi res a design change and a r e t e s t of 
any s t ruc ture failing to achieve design ultimate load. Although some uses have 
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been made of tes t and flight data, no procedure has been developed in the 
aerospace industry to analytically update the strength distribution after redesign, 
re tes t , and flight experience. Bayesian techniques will be used to develop such 
a distribution in the present research* 
The standard test procedure has been effective in producing acceptably 
rel iable s t ructura l sys t ems . However, as pointed out in Chapter I, there is no 
evidence that it is the most cost-effective procedure for every system, 
especially if the prospect of varying the design safety measure is admitted. 
Alternatives to the standard procedure will be introduced and discussed in 
Chapter IV. 
To use s tat is t ical decision theory in selecting a par t icular test option 
from various available tes t options, it is necessary to know the probabil ist ic 
representa t ion of the s t ruc tura l s trength distribution for each proposed test 
option. For example, one of the CDF's in Figure 1 could be taken to represent 
the strengths before any redesigns a re applied to the understrength assembl ies , 
Beyond this s imples t case , no observed data have been located to calculate 
s trength distributions for other test options. However, Bayesian procedures 
[ 2 ] , for example, permi t the use of any available information — observed or 
subjective — in obtaining strength distributions or in other elements of the 
decision p r o c e s s . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , even for tes t procedures where no observed data have been 
accumulated, the subjective belief of the decis ion-maker can be used to establish 
a distribution for the purpose of making a decision. Collective expert opinion 
has been used to establish probability data for oil spills [ 82] , by Nair , Shah, 
Smith, and Shah. A s imi lar technique will be developed in the present r e sea rch 
p rogram on s t ructura l reliabili ty. The accuracy of such a procedure will be 
established by direct comparision of some subjective distributions obtained 
from expert opinions with the available observed data, such as shown in 
Figure 1. 
Once par t icular distributions of strength have been established for the 
various test options, a second design variable under the control of the designer 
can be exercised. This is the design safety measure as discussed in Chapter I. 
The safety measure commonly used in aerospace s t ruc tures is the safety factor, 
which establishes some charac ter i s t ic value of the s t ruc tura l strength or 
res i s tance relat ive to a charac ter i s t ic value of the load. The design safety 
measure to be exploited in the present r e s e a r c h is the safety index, since it 
pe rmi t s the designer a grea ter flexibility by allowing him to control variability 
as well as a charac ter i s t ic value. 
The safety index has been shown to provide computational convenience 
if both load and res is tance a r e normally distributed. For example, see 
Kececioglu and Haugen [ 11] or Mau and Sexsmith [ 14] . Cornell [ 15] proposed 
the use of the safety index in a design code and pointed out that it can be used 
as a safety measure when only the means and variances of load and res is tance 
a re known, and no other information is available about the actual distr ibutions. 
The role of the safety measure in controlling the res i s tance is i l lustrated in 









S, LOAD DISTRIBUTION (ASSUMED KNOWN) 
• R1 AND R 2 , STRENGTH DISTRIBUTIONS 
1 R2 RANDS 
Figure 2. Effect of Safety Factor . 
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figure is the mean safety factor, v . 
In Figure 2, the load distribution is assumed to be known, and the figure 
is assumed to be drawn for a par t icular tes t p rocedure , which determines the 
shape of R. The shape is the same for R t and R2. The designer can thus con-
o o 
t ro l the strength of his design by selecting a design mean safety factor, vx or v2 
(or any other value) . A s imi la r argument holds for any other design safety 
measure . 
The role of the tes t procedure and the design safety measure in con-
troll ing the design strength has been discussed. The designer is confronted 
with the decisions of what tes t procedure and what value of the design safety 
measure to use for his design. Since the load and strength a re not determinist ic 
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values but a re represented by probability distr ibutions, this is a decision in the 
face of uncertainty. Provided that the designer can quantify in a prescr ibed 
manner his preferences among the possible outcomes that will resul t from each 
of his al ternative decisions and an assessment of the probability of each 
possible outcome, s tat is t ical decision theory provides a formal framework for 
making such a decision. 
In this par t icular application, the preference for outcomes will be 
expressed in t e rms of the cost of each outcome. The cost model is expected 
to include all of the significant costs relevant to the decision. These include 
development cos ts , maintenance cos ts , cost of failure, and cost of loss in 
performance, each of which may be further subdivided. 
3.2 The Problem Setting 
It is important to delineate the setting in which the decisions of what 
type of testing to do and what safety measure to use a re most conveniently made. 
Of course , such decisions could be made at almost any t ime during the design 
p roces s . However, the decision process developed in this r e s e a r c h would 
appear to be more appropriately applied during one par t icular phase of the 
typical design cycle. 
To apply the decision methodology developed he re , certain information 
peculiar to the par t icular s t ruc tura l sys tem in question must be available. 
This includes such information as the change in weight as a function of the 
design safety measure , the economic value of changes in the s t ruc tura l system 
weight, and the anticipated cost of various methods of test ing. It seems evident 
that a pre l iminary design must be available to develop this type of information. 
Of course , it might be possible to extend the present method to use probabilist ic 
es t imates of this information before design has begun. 
On the other hand, if a detailed design has already been developed, 
fabrication drawings have been re leased, and tes t hardware and facilities com-
mitted, a decision to change the design safety measure or the method of testing 
would be costly. 
F rom the preceding discussion, it can be inferred that the appropriate 
t ime for applying the decision methodology to select a test p rogram and a design 
safety measure is after pre l iminary design is completed but before detailed 
design begins. For example, the methodology is not intended to provide a means 
of selecting between a skin-s t r inger design and a honeycomb sandwich design, 
for, say, an interstage s t ruc ture . However, given that the design is skin-
s t r inger , the methodology provides a means of selecting a safety measure which 
will, in turn, determine the required skin thickness and s t r inger c ross sectional 
p roper t i e s . Likewise, the methodology would dictate face sheet thickness and 
core p roper t i e s , given a honeycomb sandwich design. This is not to say that 
the method would not be useful in selecting between these two design concepts. 
However, to influence the selection, the method must be applied to each design 
separate ly and the final resu l t s compared. 
Equally as important as the t ime phasing is an appreciation of the level 
of assembly to which the methodology applies. The method could be adapted to 
any level of assembly, provided that data a re available to determine stat ist ical 
strength distributions for the par t icular level under consideration. However, 
for severa l reasons the present r e sea rch is directed toward large s t ructural 
assembl ies such as complete wings, thrust s t ruc tu res , propellant tanks, or 
in ters tages . F i r s t , the available data for developing stat is t ical strength d is -
tributions a re applicable to this level of assembly. Second, s t ruc tura l tests 
a re usually conducted on these large assembl ies . Next, it would be very 
inconvenient for the designer to attempt to apply different safety measures to 
the various subassemblies within the large assembly. 
The method is expected to be most applicable to s t ruc tures under over-
all compress ive and bending loads. Again, the data from which the strength 
distributions a re developed are for these types of s t ruc tu res . However, the 
compressive or bending loads in the test sample were often applied in a 
complex manner such as concentrated engine thrust applied to a large longeron 
which, in turn, shears the load into the fuselage s t ruc ture . Thus, the resul ts 
a re expected to be valid for such s t ruc tu res . Extension to other types of 
s t ruc tures would involve only a development of strength distributions for the 
s t ruc ture of interest . 
3.3 Method of Solution 
In the first section of this chapter on the statement of the problem, some 
preview information on the method of solution was discussed in describing the 
problem and its ramifications. In this section, the method of solution is to be 
made more specific. Although it is intended to give a complete outline of the 
proposed solution, extended discussions will be deferred to la ter chapters , 
where various subjects a re developed in detail. It is intended to provide in this 
section a general outline of how the developments in Chapters IV through VI will 
be used in Chapter VII. 
An action or decision space is created. This consists of a d iscre te 
portion (the selection of one test procedure from severa l d iscre te possibil i t ies) 
and a continuous portion (the selection of a design safety index from a continuous 
spec t rum) . A complete action must consist of a selection of both a test p roce-
dure and a safety index. Selection of the tes t option determines the shape of the 
probabilist ic s trength distribution relat ive to the analysts1 predicted failure load. 
This strength distribution is considered to be a par t of the state of nature . 
Selection of the safety index determines the location of the strength distribution 
relat ive to the probabilist ic distribution of the applied load, also considered to 
be a par t of the state of nature . Every combination of course of action and state 
of nature resu l t s in a known value to the decis ion-maker . In par t icu lar , the 
negative of value in this problem is the cost associated with each combination of 
action and s ta te of nature . The cost may include the development cost, cost of 
manufacturing, maintenance cost, cost of failure in operation and testing, and 
cost of loss in performance. 
The expected cost for each course of action is obtained from the definition 
of expectation. The action is selected ( i . e . , the decision is made to use the 
test procedure and safety index) which resu l t s in the minimum expected cost. 
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The formulation just described is i l lustrated graphically by the decision 
t ree in Figure 3. The fan-shaped displays for j3 , R . , and S indicate that these 
a re continuous variables . No formal t reatment of decision analysis or decision 
t rees is given here . Raiffa [ 83] gave a very readable introduction to the 
subject. P ra t t , Raiffa, and Schlaifer [21] gave a virtually self-contained 
development, and Benjamin and Cornell [ 2] gave a development oriented to 
engineering decisions. Savage [ 84] presented an exposition on the relationship 
of the Bayesian approach to other schools of thought in probability and s ta t i s t ics . 
Tribus [ 1] re lated decision analysis to a broader spectrum of ideas . After the 
problem has been cast in the form of a decision t r ee , the decision process will 
be based on the procedures presented by Pra t t , Raiffa, and Schlaifer [ 21] . To 
analyze the decision t r e e , the expected cost for each test option, E[ U//3, T j , is 
determined. This expected cost includes the direct cost C . The direct cost 
i 
is that portion of the cost not affected by the s tate of nature . Figure 4 shows 
graphically how the minimum cost test procedure and corresponding safety 
index a re selected. The optimum decision for the case i l lustrated in the figure 
is to select tes t option T0 and the corresponding safety index, /30. 
The decision problem has been placed in the context of s ta t is t ical 
decision theory to take advantage of the formal developments in this field, 
which establish the conceptual and mathematical r igor of the procedure used 
to optimize expected cost . Chapter VII will be devoted to a more complete 
development of the decision model. 
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Figure 4. Optimum Decision. 
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CHAPTER IV 
TEST OPTIONS, STRENGTH DISTRIBUTIONS, AND SAFETY MEASURES 
Statistical decision theory provides the basis for the r e sea rch problem. 
However, it is instructive to discuss the problem in some of the terminology of 
optimal s t ruc tura l design to clarify the role of some of the variables involved. 
An introduction to this terminology has been presented in a review art ic le by 
Sheu and P r a g e r [ 85] . 
Geometric design constraints r e s t r i c t the choices of s t ructura l type and 
shape open to the designer. In this disser ta t ion, all overall s t ruc tura l dimen-
sions, s t ruc tu ra l member a r rangements , and the type of construction a re con-
sidered fixed. The only choices open to the designer a r e local dimensions such 
as thicknesses and cross-sec t ional a r e a s , 
Behavioral design constraints set bounds on quantities that charac ter ize 
the behavior of the s t ruc ture under conditions of se rv ice . In the present 
r e sea rch , the assumed behavioral constraint is that the s t ruc ture shall not 
exhibit any behavior which indicates an inability to sustain the applied loads. 
The design objective for the s t ruc tures considered here is the minimiza-
tion of the total expected cost of the s t ruc tu re , including the probabil ist ic as 
well as the determinist ic cos ts . It will be assumed that the test options and the 
design safety measures a r e the two design variables that can be used by the 
designer to control the strength of a structural assembly. The test option can 
be used to control the strength by disclosing rectifiable design errors or by 
eliminating random understrength designs. The test option can also be used to 
eliminate some uncertainties regarding the engineer's knowledge of the design 
strength, thereby improving the accuracy in estimating the design performance. 
The safety measure can be used as a design variable to control the design 
strength by establishing a characteristic design strength relative to a charac-
teristic load, or more generally, by controlling both a characteristic value and 
the variance of strength. 
4.1 Test Options 
The concept of a test option is introduced in this section to explain a pro-
cedure by which the method of testing can be used as a design variable. Unlike 
the classical experiment of statistical decision theory, the test option includes 
a predetermined (deterministic) response by the designer to each possible test 
outcome. The testing and predetermined actions by the designer together are 
used to control the state of nature. The classical experiment in statistical 
decision processes is used to observe the state of nature. From a probability 
standpoint, a predetermined action means that for each possible outcome of the 
test, one particular subsequent course of action will be taken with probability 1, 
and there is zero probability that any other course of action will be followed. 
The standard test procedure discussed in Chapter I provides a ready example. 
For the outcome that the structural assembly fails to pass the test, the 
predetermined action is to redesign and re tes t . For the outcome that the 
assembly passes the tes t , the predetermined action is to make no design change 
and to discontinue testing, even if the test reveals an overdesign. 
Four tes t options a re included in this r e sea rch . An unlimited number of 
tes t options could conceivably exist , and each could be t reated in a manner 
s imi la r to that presented here . It would be possible to create new tes t options 
by various combinations of the tes t options considered here . A description of 
each of the four test options is given as follows. 
4. 1. 1 No-Test Option, Tn 
Under the No-Test Option procedure no s t ruc tura l testing is done. Analyt-
ical predictions alone are used to establish the design and predict the strength. 
This is much like what is done on most civil engineering s t ruc tures where 
s t ruc tura l testing is not accomplished on each individual design. It would be 
inprudent, of course , to use this option if some radically new design concept is 
to be used. 
4 . 1 . 2 Standard Test Option, T1 
The Standard Test Option procedure has been introduced in Chapters I 
and III. This is the normal procedure used in the aerospace industry to qualify 
the a i r f rame for flight use . It consists of testing one each of the large a s s e m -
blies such as a complete wing, a fuel tank, or an interstage s t ruc ture which 
make up the a i r f rame. More than one assembly may be tested in a single tes t 
setup. It is not unusual to tes t a complete a i r f rame . A design change is 
required to be made on any s t ruc ture failing to sustain design ultimate load. 
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Failure does not necessarily mean collapse or breakup; it could mean that some 
measured parameter such as displacement or strain falls outside a prescribed 
range. Testing and redesign are to be iterated until a design passes the test. 
Testing is to be done on assemblies built to the same specifications as the flight 
articles. 
4.1.3 Proof Test Option, T? 
In the Proof Test Option procedure, every production flight article is 
pretested in the laboratory to some prescribed load level less than design 
ultimate load. Articles which fail to pass the proof test are discarded from the 
population or repaired and retested until they pass the proof test. This effec-
tively prohibits the use of random understrength structures as flight articles and 
establishes a lower bound for the strength of those structures that are used. It 
is possible that proof testing could alter or damage the structure in a way that 
would invalidate its original characteristics. Before the proof test option is used, 
sufficient studies must be made to assure that the proof test will not be damaging 
to the structure. The proof-test procedure has been used extensively for 
pressure vessels, including the large propellant tanks of launch vehicles. Little 
use has been made of it for other types of structures and loadings. In the 
present research, test option T2 includes the use of proof testing for all types 
of structures and loadings. For example, bending of wings and combined 
compression and bending of fuselage structures are considered appropriate for 
proof testing. 
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4 . 1 . 4 Model Test Option, T s 
The Model Test Option procedure is to perform all testing on either scale 
models of the actual s t ruc ture or subassemblies (components) instead of on 
complete a ssembl ies . Such a procedure would not requi re la rge , complex test 
facili t ies. The evaluation approach would be an iteration of design, analysis , 
and testing until the analysis and test resul ts agree . The same design would 
then be used for the flight hardware, and the analysis procedure which agreed 
with the model test resu l t s would be used to analyze the flight design. 
To accomplish the above procedure , it would be necessary to identify 
and numerical ly define the requirements of the flight ar t ic le and to measure 
certain pa rame te r s identified with these requirements in the model testing. An 
analytical prediction of the same pa rame te r s must be made on both the test and 
flight a r t i c l e s , and the analytical predictions must agree with each other and 
with the tes t resul ts before the flight ar t ic le design is placed in se rv ice . This 
is the method by which model test resu l t s a re projected to full-scale design. 
It would be desirable that the descriptions of tes t options be completely 
free of any ambiguity. However, the testing of complex aerospace hardware 
contains so many compromises that it is doubtful if this could ever be achieved. 
Hopefully, the preceding descriptions a r e specific enough to permi t mutually 
exclusive classifications of the available tes t options within reasonable 
to lerances . It is not the objective to define a test option so r igorously that it 
would be difficult to plan a p rogram which falls within a given tes t option. 
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4. 2 Strength Distributions 
4 . 2 . 1 Qualitative Comparison 
The tes t options described above a re determinis t ic in nature in that an 
a pr ior i disposition of every test outcome has been established. Because of 
th i s , it is reasonable to postulate that a probabilist ic strength distribution exists 
for the population of s t ructura l assemblies developed by each tes t option. Each 
of these distributions can be referenced to the strength value predicted by the 
analyst. This value is the 100-percent value shown in Figure 5, where a 
qualitative comparison of the strength distributions that might resu l t from the 
various test options is shown. 
The general shape of the No-Test Option probability density function 
(PDF) is inferred from the Saturn Booster Data [ 17j for which the CDF is 
shown in Figure 1 of Chapter III. Note that other available data in Figure 1 
tend to confirm the general shape of the left side of Figure 5 ( a ) . For the 
standard tes t option, all tes t ar t ic les which fail to sustain 100-percent load a re 
redesigned and re tes ted . However, this does not completely a s su re that all 
flight ar t ic les have strengths grea te r than 100 percent , since there would be 
some sca t te r among nominally identical s t ruc tu res . A distribution of the 
general shape of Figure 5(b) resu l t s for this t es t option. In Figure 5 ( c ) , r 0 
is the proof test level. Thus, any s t ruc tures from the original population shown 
in Figure 5(a) with strengths less than r 0 a r e discarded from the population. 
This would resul t in a distribution s imi la r to that shown in Figure 5 (c ) . A 
model tes t p rogram would eliminate some of the unknowns causing the sca t ter 
Figure 5. Qualitative Comparison of Strength Distributions. 
in Figure 5(a), resulting in a more peaked distribution as shown in Figure 5(d). 
The scarcity of applicable data for calculating the preceding distributions 
is unfortunate, considering the amount of testing that has been done on large 
structural assemblies. The lack of published data can almost certainly be 
attributed to the fact that testing of such large assemblies has been done as a 
par t of specific system developments ra ther than as scientific r e sea rch . In 
development programs the need for recording and compiling data in the form 
required to determine PDF*s has generally not been recognized. 
Four sources of data on large s t ruc tura l assemblies have been located, 
but for various reasons only one, the Saturn V Booster data [ 17] , appears 
usable at this t ime. The Jablecki data [ 20] represen ts the s ta te -of - the-ar t in 
the 1940rs and is useful for showing the historical trend of analysis improvement. 
However, data a re given only for assembl ies which failed at less than limit load 
so that a complete PDF cannot be determined. Freudenthal and Wang's data on 
recent a i rcraf t [ 62] also give the resul ts on large assembl ies , but only for 
p rematu re fai lures . In addition, some panel, beam, and frame data ( s t ruc tu res 
which should not really be described as large s t ructura l assembl ies) a re 
included. Martin and Bouton [ 86] presented the so-called Lustig data r e p r e -
senting aircraft from 1950 to 1970. Again, only p remature failures were l is ted, 
and in this case not even the total number of tes ts is known. This makes it 
impossible to construct even a portion of the CDF, as was done for the other 
data in Figure 1, Chapter HI. 
The two following sections in this chapter will be devoted to determining 
strength distributions that can be real ized by tes t options T 0 and T2, using 
reasonably well-established stat is t ical analysis methods. Strength distributions 
that can be real ized by test options Tx and T3 requi re special t reatment and will 
be the subject of Chapters V and VI. 
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4 . 2 . 2 Strength Distribution for No-Test Option, Ta 
4 . 2 . 2 . 1 Saturn V Test Data. The test data of Thomas [ 17] a r e directly 
applicable to the No-Test Option, since these data represent a sample of 
s t ruc tures before any redesign or re test ing was accomplished. As such, the 
data can be interpreted as a sample from the population of s t ruc tures which has 
not been previously tested. Table 1 is a listing of the failure loads for Saturn V 
s t ructura l assemblies as a percentage of the design ultimate load, assumed to be 
the analyst 's predicted failure load. Thus, each data point is the strength or 
res i s tance , r . , of the par t icular s t ruc ture tested, 
The data represent all of the major s t ructura l qualification tests on the 
Saturn V launch vehicle, including several assemblies from each of the three 
s tages , in ters tages , and the instrument unit. In some c a s e s , where more than 
one load condition was applied to a s t ruc ture and the load conditions were 
distinctly different from each other, more than one data point was taken on a 
single s t ruc tu re . Note that there a r e a number of censored data points ( tes ts 
which were terminated before failure occurred) in the sample . Tests were 
terminated for various reasons such as economy of testing or a des i re to save 
the assembly for some other use. 
It would be impossible to give a general physical descript ion of the 
s t ruc ture or a general description of the types of loading that would charac ter ize 
the sample of Saturn V s t ruc tu re s . Construction ranged from riveted skin-
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compress ive or bending, but loads were often concentrated loads applied to 
large longerons or to beam or t rus s s t ruc tures attached to the fuselage shell . 
It is important to note that throughout this r e sea rch all large s t ructura l 
assemblies a r e assumed to belong to a single population for purposes of 
s ta t is t ical analysis . This is done i r respect ive of the mode of failure or the type 
of s t ruc ture . Freudenthai and Wang [ 62] made an identical assumption, justified 
by the following statement: 
This assumption is unavoidable because replications of ultimate load tests 
of large s t ruc tures and s t ruc tura l pa r t s a r e and will always be severely 
limited by technical and economic considerat ions. Without it, reliability 
analysis of a i rcraf t s t ruc tures becomes obviously impossible since the 
individual smal l samples a r e useless for this purpose. 
4 . 2 . 2 . 2 Computer P rogram for Two-Paramete r Weibull Distribution. A 
computer p rogram developed by Hanagud [ 87] for est imating pa rame te r s of the 
two-parameter Weibull distribution for complete and censored samples was 
available at the Georgia Institute of Technology, School of Aerospace Engineer-
ing. The computer program is based on the maximum likelihood method for 
estimating pa ramete r s as presented by Cohen [ 88] . The cumulative distribution 
function of the Weibull distribution is given by 
F H ( r ) = l - e ^ > 
and the probability density function is 
r / , k / r \ \ v / , , 
£R ( r ) = v {v) e ' <4" 2> 
where R is the random variable, v is the scale parameter, and k is the 
shape parameter. The method of maximum likelihood is based on determination 
of the values of parameters k and v which maximize the joint probability of 
observing all of the data points in a particular random sample. For the present 
problem, this means that the method of Cohen can be used to determine values 
of k and v that maximize the likelihood of the joint occurrence of the data 
points in Table 1, including censored values. 
More specifically, the maximum likelihood estimator of the vector of 
parameters [ k, vj is the value of [ k, v] which causes the likelihood function to 
be a maximum. The likelihood function is proportional to the joint probability 
distribution of the random sample, assuming independent observations. Assume 
that (R„, R . . . R j are observed failure loads and that (R. , R. n . . . R ) v 1 2 i i+1 i+2 n' 
are observations at which no failure occurred (censored values). The joint 
probability of (R , R . . . R.) for known [k,v] is 
f
R l , R 2 . . . R f
 ( r i ' r 2 - - - r i ' k , V ) = (4-3> 
i 
^ (r^k.v) iR (r2|k,v) . . . ^ (r f |k,v) = TT ^ (*tfr.v) 
1 2 I i=l i 
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Similarly, the joint probability of the observed censored values is 
p f R ^ - , > r ^ i J - P [ R n > r n
] = '.IT U - F R ( r . | k , v ) ] . (4.4) i+1 4+1 
i=i+l 
Regarding equations (4.3) and (4 .4) as functions of unknown paramete r s 
[ k, v ] , the likelihood function L gives the relat ive likelihood of observing the 
sample (R. . . . R„, R. „ . . . R ) as a function of [ k, v ] . 
1 i i+1 n' 
L ( k , v | B 1 = r 1 . . . H i = r i ; B i + 1 > r i + 1 . . . . B f l > r ) (4 .5) 
n 
= TT f R (
r i ' k » v ) TT [ l - F (rlk,v) 
i - l i j= i+ i j J 
Explicitly, 
L = fMv)kl^(-v) ft - (4)k 
i=l x • L J i=i+i L 
(4.6) 
Since there is a monotonic, one-to-one relationship between the likelihood 
A A 
function and its logarithm, they have a maximum at the same values [ k, v] 
Thus, 
:„ L = £ 
i - l < • ( ! ) • < * - I > ' » ( T ) " ( T ) 

















- 0 (4.8) 
n / r. 
- ~ + ! Z T- (4.9) 
i=l 
These equations can be simplified by eliminating v and obtaining an equation 
for k to be solved by NewtonTs iteration technique. 
i i h 
z + i I i=l 





k ( in r. - k i -ay 
The value, k , satisfying equation (4. 10) is the maximum likelihood estimator 
for k and can be substituted into equation (4.9) to solve for the maximum 
A 
likelihood estimator v. A computer program for obtaining these estimators 
is given by Hanagud [ 87]. 
When the method was applied to the data in Table 1, maximum likelihood 
A A 
estimators of the parameters were determined as k = 6.43 and v = 115. 5. A 
plot of the probability density function f (r) that can be realized with test 
option T0 is given in Figure 6. A Chi-square goodness-of-fit test, in which 
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R, STRENGTH - PERCENT OF ANALYST'S PREDICTION 
Figure 6. Strength Distribution for No-Test Option. 
only the uncensored data points could be used, showed that the model could be 
accepted at the 11-percent significance level. Six intervals of equal probability 
were used in the test . A computer p rogram from Hanagud [ 87] was used for 
the Chi-square tes t . 
4 . 2 . 3 Strength Distribution for Proof-Tes t Option, T9 
A very common method of assuring the reliability of p r e s s u r e vessels 
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and tanks in both the aerospace and civil engineering fields is the proof teste 
In this method of testing, before each production p r e s s u r e vessel or tank is 
placed in se rv ice , it is p r e s s u r e tested in the laboratory to a p r e s s u r e grea te r 
than that expected to be encountered in se rv ice . The technique has seldom been 
used for s t ruc tures other than containers , but there a re notable exceptions. 
Buntin [ 80] described a proof- test p rogram for the F - l l l a i rcraf t . The main 
purpose of the p rogram was to detect flaws or crack- l ike defects in certain 
steel par t s in the aircraf t , which could cause failure in se rv ice . Although no 
such flaws were detected in proof testing of 325 operational a i rcraf t , two p r e -
mature failures due to other causes did occur„ This indicates the ability of the 
proof t e s t to detect and eliminate defective s t ruc tu res of all types from the 
operational population of s t ruc tu res . 
An idealized representat ion of the effect of proof testing on the strength 
distribution is a straightforward application of truncated distributions as dis-
cussed by Benjamin and Cornell [ 2] . If equation (4 .2 ) is the strength distribution 
of the population of s t ruc tures that have not been tes ted, then the distribution 
for proof-tested s t ruc tures is assumed to be 
f R ( r ) = 0 , r < rQ (4.11) 
lnKr) 1 - F f r ) v W 
k 
/ T* \ 
k - 1 
, r • 
Rv 0J 
0 
where F ( r ) is the cumulative distribution of equation (4 .1) evaluated at 
ix 0 
7 
the proof-test level r . The resulting distribution was illustrated qualitatively 
in Figure 5(c)„ The distribution is plotted for 60-percent and 80-percent 
proof test levels in Figure 7„ 
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Figure 7. Strength Distributions for Proof-Test Options. 
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4.3 Safety Measures 
Safety measures were defined and discussed in Chapter I. The effect of 
the mean safety factor in controlling res i s tance relat ive to load was i l lustrated 
in Chapter HI. In this section attention will be focused on the relationship 
between the safety index and safety factor, and a par t icular safety factor will be 
carefully defined. 
In equation ( l . 5} a charac te r i s t i c safety factor was defined as 
R - p c r 
0 = - . (4.12) 
S + q < T s 
In equation ( l . 10), the safety index was expressed as 
P = , R " S „. • (4-13) 
v̂v 
Suppose that S , <r , and cr a re known quantities, and a design safety index 
XV b 
A 
/3 has been p resc r ibed . Then the mean res i s tance required in the design can be 
established from equation (4.13) as 
A 
R - J3N/O- 2 + o- 2" + S . (4.14) 
IX b 
A 
If it is now desi red to determine the design safety factor v consistent with the 
A 
prescr ibed /3 , equation (4.14) can be substituted into equation (4.12) to give 
A S + ^ V + V - P*R 
v = . (4.15) 
S + q«r s 
Equations (4.12) and (4.13) can be used to derive a number of relationships 
A A 
between v and /3 s imi lar to equation ( 4 . 1 5 ) , depending on which pa ramete r s 
a re assumed to be known and which a r e unknown. 
4 . 3 . 1 A Special Safety Factor Definition 
For the subsequent work in this r e s e a r c h and for convenient application 
of the r e s u l t s , it is desirable to use a par t icular definition of design safety 
factor. Although the definition to be used here has not previously been explicitly 
stated, its use has been implied in many situations in civil and aerospace 
engineering. In fact, in determinis t ic design approaches the implied use of such 
a definition is probably the rule ra ther than the exception in the design of most 
s t r uc tu r e s . This definition is 
~ = - | , (4 .16) 
where R is the strength of the s t ruc ture calculated by the analyst, S is a so -
called limit load, and v is the design safety factor. Very often in the pas t , S 
has been stat is t ical ly determined as 
S = S + q a g , (4.17) 
where S is the mean load, v is the standard deviation, and q is a constant. 
o 
Much less frequently, R has been stat is t ical ly defined, and in many cases 
where this has been done, consideration of factors affecting s trength variability 




where y is the coefficient of variat ion. Equation (4.17) becomes 
S = S + q S y g = S ( l + q y s ) . (4.19) 
Equation (4. 16) can then be written as 
R 100 
S ( l + q r s ) S ( l + q y g ) 
(4.20) 
where S is expressed as a percentage of the design ultimate load. Equation 
(4. 20) is the objective of the ent i re development in this section and will be used 
assumed to be due only to sca t te r in mater ia l p roper t ies . As will be seen in 
subsequent chapters , sca t te r in mater ia l proper t ies is a relatively minor con-
tr ibutor to the variance in R . A key assumption in this r e s e a r c h is that R is 
— r*t 
not defined as R - p <J . R is defined as the strength predicted by the analyst. 
The relationship of the determinis t ic quantity R to the mean value will depend 
upon the type of testing ( test option) contemplated. Consequently, the probability 
r^ 
that the strength will be less than R is different for each tes t option. This is 
r^ 
i l lustrated in Figure 5 where R , the analyst 's predicted strength, is 100 percent 
for each tes t option,, 
Fu r the rmore , it will often be convenient to use the coefficient of variation 
of load ra the r than the standard deviation: 
extensively in the computations in subsequent chapters . The design safety factor 
r** 
v is i l lustrated graphically in Figure 8. As has been previously mentioned, the 
design safety factor establishes the location of R relat ive to S , and hence in 
effect, controls the design for a known load distribution. The opposite view-
point can be taken. The factor v can be considered to establish the permiss ib le 
loading which can be applied to a given design with strength R (character ized 
by 5 ) . 
DESIGN SAFETY FACTOR = „ - 100 
sn+qys) 
S, LOAD DISTRIBUTION 
R, STRENGTH DISTRIBUTION 
S S(l+qys) R =100 RAND S 
Figure 8. Special Design Safety F a c t o r . 
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CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS OF SUBJECTIVE EXPERT OPINIONS 
Helmer [89] made the following observation: 
While model-building is an extremely systematic expedient to p r o -
mote the understanding and control of our environment, rel iance on the use 
of expert judgment, though often unsystematic, is more than an expedient: 
it is an absolute necessi ty. Expert opinion must be called on whenever it 
becomes necessary to choose among several alternative courses of action 
in the absence of an accepted body of the theoretical knowledge that would 
clearly single out one course as the prefer red al ternative. 
The use of subjective expert opinion is as old as civilization, but systematic 
methods have largely been res t r i c ted to application with observed data. Helmer ' s 
purpose was the systematic collection of expert opinions through a method called 
the Delphi technique. The distinguishing feature of this technique is that a 
sequence of questionnaires is sent to the exper ts , and each questionnaire in the 
sequence is based on information from the previous quest ionnaires . The 
respondents are thus made aware of the opinions of other experts and are en-
couraged to make use of these opinions in formulating new responses or revising 
previous responses . 
Since each questionnaire in the Delphi technique is based on previous 
responses , the model for analyzing resu l t s must necessar i ly be loosely defined. 
A more r igorous model for analyzing subjective information with respec t to p r e -
dicting the future was presented by Gordon and Hayward [90] and Enzer [91 ] . 
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This model, the c ross - impac t matrix method of forecasting, pe rmi t s the 
probability of each event in a forecasted set to be adjusted in view of judgments 
relating to potential interactions with the other forecasted events . This is 
accomplished by determining the probability of each event, conditional upon the 
occurrence of each of the other events . The effect of the events on each other 
is called c ros s impact and is often ignored in l ess r igorous methods. 
The foregoing developments were adapted and applied to the social 
sc iences . Nair , Shah, Smith, and Shah [82] used a probabilist ic model to study 
the technical problem of oil spills in the s e a s . They used expert opinions, 
gathered through mail questionnaires and personal interviews, as input to the 
model. The investigators were able to construct a probabilist ic model of spills 
with respect to s ize , cause , and location. 
5 .1 Bayesian Viewpoint of Subjective Information 
An overal l appraisal of the Bayesian viewpoint in s ta t is t ics was eloquently 
presented by Savage [84 ] . McGee [ 3 ] , Papoulis [92] , and Zellner [93] gave 
excellent presentat ions on the adaptation of these concepts to probability analysis 
Tr ibus [ l ] re lated the Bayesian viewpoint to a broader spectrum of ideas , 
including the rat ional description of problems and use in design. A complete 
decision methodology based on the Bayesian viewpoint was constructed by P ra t t , 
Raiffa, and Schlaifer [21 ] . An orientation of Bayesian s ta t is t ics to decisions in 
engineering problems was given by Benjamin and Cornell [ 2 ] . 
The Bayesian viewpoint originates in the concept of probability as an 
individual's degree of belief ra ther than the traditional concept that probability 
must be interpreted as a relat ive frequency of occurrence . Thus, probability is 
a resul t of the encoding of the decis ion-maker ' s personal belief into a plausibility 
(probability) measure . This is accomplished by assigning a r ea l number 
between zero and unity to the event in question, which is then taken as a measure 
of the relat ive likelihood that the event will occur. An assignment of zero 
represen ts no likelihood of occurrence , and unity represen t s certainty of 
occurrence . An assignment of 0.5 represen t s an equal likelihood of occurrence 
and nonoccurrence. Note that if the individual has no information available to 
him other than a measured relative frequency of occurrence in an experiment, it 
would be unreasonable for him to assign a probability other than the measured 
relative frequency. In this sense the "frequentist" concept of probability is a 
special case of the Bayesian concept. 
The Bayesian concept of probability leads to the conclusion that all 
available information should be used in making probability es t imates . This 
information may be objective, subjective, or both. Bayesian stat ist ical methods 
have been devised [ 1 ] , [ 3 ] , [93] which permit the consolidation of both types of 
information into probability es t imates . An application of such methods is used 
in Chapter VI. 
The rea l strength of the Bayesian viewpoint l ies in its applicability to 
decision methodology. Since a probability assignment represen t s the individual's 
degree of belief based on all information available to him, the implication is that 
he should be willing to base his decisions on such probability ass ignments . On 
the strength of this implication, a formal decision procedure which permi ts the 
use of Bayesian s tat is t ical methods in s tat is t ical decision theory has been devel-
oped [21] , which makes consistent use of the dec is ion-maker ' s probability 
ass ignments . The method is discussed in Chapters i n and VII. 
5.2 Mail Questionnaires 
Given that subjective information is appropriate for use in decision 
methodology, the questions a r i se as to how such information is best obtained 
and formulated in a manner suitable for use in decisions. In the present r esea rch 
there is a need to determine a strength distribution for tes t option T3 for which 
no observed data are available. The existing s ta te-of- the-ar t in obtaining such 
a distribution would be to guess or to consult with experts and then guess . The 
objective in this chapter is to develop a methodology to systematically obtain 
unbiased subjective expert opinions, statistically analyze these opinions, and 
obtain probability distributions for strength to be used in applications in la ter 
chapte rs . 
Two questionnaires (Appendix B) were devised to elicit the opinions of 
s t ruc tura l analysis and testing experts about strength distr ibutions. Question-
naire A was sent to approximately 55 supervisory and technical management 
personnel in industry and government, known by the author to have a background 
pert inent to the subject ma t t e r . This questionnaire was used to tes t the method 
of acquiring opinions, the probabilist ic models , and the ability of experts to 
provide the type of information needed. It contained questions leading to strength 
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distributions of aerospace s t ruc tures in a typical development program before 
test resu l t s a re available. The exper ts ' opinions were compared with some 
available observed data to determine the validity of r e su l t s . 
After prel iminary analysis of Questionnaire A re su l t s , Questionnaire B 
was sent to approximately 30 respondents of Questionnaire A. To assure 
validity of r e su l t s , Questionnaire B was identical in format to Questionnaire A 
but contained questions leading to a strength distribution for s t ructura l assemblies 
developed through an extensive model and small component development test 
p rogram, tes t option T3 . No observed data a re available for this case , and the 
subjective expert opinions a re the only source of information for obtaining the 
needed strength distribution. 
An attempt was made in sending out the questionnaires to follow techniques 
which had proved to elicit a high percentage of responses . Such techniques are 
discussed by Bauer and Meissner [94 ] , Campbell and Katona [95 ] , Jeanne and 
Gullahorn [96] , and Pa r t en [97] , Hints provided by these authors include careful 
and p rec i se construction of questions, minimization of writing required of 
respondents , appearance and neatness of the questionnaire, t ransmi t ta l by 
personal le t ter on prest igious let terhead, enclosure of self-addressed stamped 
envelope, and pretest ing of the questionnaire. Pre tes t ing was accomplished by 
asking severa l faculty members to answer and comment on the questionnaire 
and then making changes based on the comments . 
Considering that the questionnaires were lengthy and that no tangible 
reward was offered for completing them, the response can be considered very 
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good. Thirty-nine of 55 copies of Questionnaire A were completed, and 19 of 30 
copies of Questionnaire B were completed. 
5 .2 .1 Verification of Method — Questionnaire A 
Questionnaire A was so devised that two different approaches to calcu-
lating a strength distribution from the responses could be used. For the situation 
described in the questionnaire, observed data were available from the Saturn V 
launch vehicle s t ruc tures for direct comparison with the questionnaire r e su l t s . 
A favorable comparison with the observed data would indicate that the expert 
opinions and the approach used were valid. 
The f i rs t approach util izes only the response in Table 1 of the question-
na i re , which gives the experts1 overal l views of the scat ter in tes t failure loads as 
compared with the analysts ' predicted failure load. In the second approach, data 
in Tables 2 through 10 of the questionnaire are used to construct a counterpart to 
Table 1, which gives the same information as Table 1, but is constructed by use 
of a probabil ist ic model from the various causes which contribute to the sca t te r . 
The approach yielding resu l t s which compare more favorably with observed data 
can then be used to determine strength distributions for other c i rcumstances 
when observed data a re not available. 
Similar to the construction of the counterpart to Table 1, a counterpart 
to Table 3 could be constructed from the data in Tables 11 through 19 of the 
questionnaire to check consistency. 
Certa in events re la ted to the various entr ies were labeled in accomplishing 
the questionnaire analys is . Let I. denote the event that a s t ruc tura l failure 
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occurs in load increment i, where i = 1, 2 . . . 10; that i s , I t is the event 
that a s t ruc tura l failure occurs at less than 60 percent of the analysts ' predicted 
failure load, \ is the event that a s t ructura l failure occurs between 60 and 70 
percent of the analysts ' predicted failure load, . . . I10 is the event that a 
s t ructura l failure occurs at g rea te r than 140 percent of the analysts ' predicted 
failure load. 
I t ~ < 60 percent 
\ ~ 60 percent - 70 percent 
13 ~ 70 percent - 80 percent 
14 ~ 80 percent - 90 percent 
15 ~ 90 percent - 100 percent 
6 ~ 100 percent - 110 percent 
7 ~ 110 percent - 120 percent 
8 ~ 120 percent - 130 percent 
9 ~ 130 percent - 140 percent 
10 ~ > 140 percent. 
Since failure of a given s t ructure occurs in one and only one of these 
load increments , the I. a re always assumed to be a set of mutually exclusive 
and collectively exhaustive events. 
The event that a par t icular cause is the reason for a difference between 
predicted and actual strengths is denoted C., where j = 1, 2, . . . 8. For 
example, Cj is the event that the analysts ' mathematical model is a poor repre-
sentation of the actual s t ruc tu re . All of the causes are l isted in Table 2 of 
Questionnaires A and B , Appendix B. 
D denotes the event that a par t icular discrepancy between the analysts ' 
mathematical model and the actual s t ructure is the reason for fai lure, where 
k = 1, 2 . . . 8. The discrepancies are l isted in Table 11 of the quest ionnaires , 
Appendix B . Note that the discrepancies a re actually special cases or subcases 
of cause number 1 in Table 2; that i s , it is assumed that the eight discrepancies 
are the different reasons that the analysts ' mathematical model may be a poor 
representat ion of the actual s t ructure . 
The f irst step in analysis of the resul t s consists of combining the entr ies 
of the n respondents. This is accomplished by simply determining the mean 
response for each entry in each table. Let E represent any one of the table 
en t r ies . Let E represent the entry of respondent p (p = 1, 2 . .„ n ) . The 
value of the entry to be used in all further analysis is 
n 
y E 
E. + E o + . . . + E u p 
E = - i 1 JL = E ± — , (5 .1) 
n n 
where E is the mean response. 
5 . 2 . 1 . 1 Probabil is t ic Models. Table 1 in the questionnaire represents 
the exper t s ' overall assessment of the strength distribution of the population of 
typical aerospace s t ruc tura l assemblies which have not been s tructural ly tested. 
This distribution can be compared directly with the distribution determined for 
untested s t ruc tures from Saturn V data in Figure 6 of Chapter IV. This compar -
ison will be made la ter in this chapter along with a comparison with resu l t s from 
probabilistic models . 
Basic probability concepts as discussed in standard textbooks such as 
Benjamin and Cornell [2] and Hines and Montgomery [98] a re used in cons t ruc-
ting probabilist ic models for analyzing questionnaire r e su l t s . Three counterparts 
to Table 1 of the questionnaire are constructed from the data in Tables 2 through 
10 through the use of conditional probabil i t ies . In this context I. , C., and D 
1 J K 
are interpreted as events . The symbol P[A] stands for the probability that 
the event A will occur. The symbol P [ A | B ] stands for the probability that A 
will occur given that B has occurred. A n B (the intersection of A and B) is 
the event that both events A and B occur, and A u B (the union of A and B) 
is the event that either event A or B occurs . 
P [ A | B ] is called the conditional probability of A given B and is d e -
fined [2] as 
P [ A | B ] = ^ ^ - . (5 .2) 
This can be rewri t ten to give 
P [ A H B ] - P [ A | B ] P [ B ] . (5 .2a) 
Note that questionnaire A is devised so that an entry in Table 2 can be 
interpreted as P [C . ] since frequency of occurrence can be interpreted as a 
probabili ty. Fur the r , an entry in Tables 3 through 10 can be interpreted as 
P [I. I C ] since each entry represen t s the probability of a tes t failure in load 
1 i 
increment i conditional upon a par t icular cause j . 
Then from equation ( 5 . 2 ) , 
P [ I . n C.] = P t l . l C j P [C . ] ; (5 .3) 
i J i J J 
that i s , the unconditional probability that a failure will occur in a par t icular 
load increment due to a par t icular cause is given by ( 5 . 3 ) . An interpretat ion of 
this is that P [ I . n c . l r epresen t s the probability that a failure will occur in 
increment i and that C. will be the reason for any difference between the 
J 
actual and predicted failure loads. 
Three separate probabilistic models will be developed for determining 
the strength distribution by various methods of combining the eight causes of 
differences between actual and predicted failure loads. These models will be 
called X, Y, and Z, and the counterparts to Table 1 of the Questionnaire A con-
structed from these models will be shown in Tables 2, 3, and 4 in this chapter . 
5 . 2 . 1 . 2 Model X. In Model X the causes of differences between actual 
and predicted failure loads C. are assumed to be a set of mutually exclusive 
and collectively exhaustive events. This implies that any given difference 
between actual and predicted failure loads has only one cause , and by an axiom 
of probability, 
8 
P tCj ] + P[C 2 ] + . . . + P[C 8 ] = YJ
 P [ C - ] = 1 • ( 5 - 4 ) 
3 1 J 
Since the mean responses to Questionnaire A, Table 2, do not conform to this 
axiom, the responses must be normalized. It should be noted that respondents 
were asked to answer based on the p remise that causes could occur together, and 
this normalization violates that p r e m i s e . It cannot be proved that the respondents 
would not have answered differently if they had been told that the causes were 
mutually exclusive. Normalization is accomplished by taking 
P [ C . ] 
P r e . ] = i ^ _ , (5 .5) 
where P [ C . ] is the mean response opposite cause j (Table 2 in Question-
naire A) o This normalization is i l lustrated by the Venn d iagrams of Figure 9. 
Since no two causes occur together in general , they do not occur together 
within a given failure load increment i. Therefore , the event I. n C. excludes 
i ] 
any other event I. n C . , I + \a This means that the events I. n C. and I. n c , J
 I I9 J I ] I i 
are mutually exclusive and by an axiom of probability [2] , 
8 
P [ ( l . n c j u (I. n c j u . . . u (I. n C ) ] = T P [ I . n c . ] - P [ I . ] 1 V 
i 1 i 2 i 8 rtn ! J i 1 X 
-
(5.6) 
where P[ I . ] denotes the probability of failure in increment i for Model X. 
i ]_X. 
In words , the probability of the occurrence of failure in a par t icu lar increment, 
i, due to all causes is the sum of the intersection of I with each of the causes 
[as calculated from equation (5 .3) ] . But the probability of occurrence of I. 
due to all causes is precisely what was requested of respondents in Table 1 of 
the questionnaire. Thus, it is c lear that Table 2 can be constructed through 
equations ( 5 . 3 ) , (5 .5) and ( 5 . 6 ) , which should compare favorably with Table 1 
of the questionnaire and the observed data to validate the model and the exper t s ' 
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Figure 9. Normalization of Venn Diagram for Model X. 
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responses in Tables 2 through 10, Questionnaire A. 
An example may be instruct ive. Suppose it is desired to calculate the 
entry for column (6) in Table 2 to compare with Table 1 in Questionnaire A. 
The ent r ies in column (6) (P [ I |C . ] ) of each of the Tables 3 through 10 in the 
6 J 
questionnaire would be multiplied by the corresponding frequency of occurrence 
(P[C ]) from normalized entr ies in Table 2 of the questionnaire according to 
J 
equation ( 5 . 3 ) . The result ing products are then summed according to equation 
(5 .6) to obtain the entry, P [ I ] , in column (6) for Table 2. 
6 IX 
These computations have been car r ied out for each load increment i and 
the resu l t s are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Fai lure Probabil i t ies for Model X 
I. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) '(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
60- 70 - 80- 90- 100- 110- 120- 130-
<60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 >140 
P [ I 1 0.040 0.054 0.084 0.134 0.242 0.206 0.120 0.068 0.034 0.018 
i IX  
These data will be compared with the Saturn V observed data along with the other 
models la ter in this chapter . 
5 . 2 . 1 . 3 Model Y. In model X the causes were assumed to be mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive. It may be possible that more than one 
cause could be a contributor to a given difference in predicted and actual failure 
load. This eventuality was considered in constructing the revised Table 2 in 
Questionnaire A by permitt ing the responses to total 100 percent or m o r e . If 
two causes j and k a re not mutually exclusive, then they may have a joint 
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occurrence C. n C . In Model Y the probability of this joint occurrence is 
considered in each of the failure load increments i . A Venn diagram depicting 
this condition is shown in Figure 10, where only two causes are shown for clarity, 
The intersect ions of these causes with the mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive events I. a re also shown. Now consider the relat ionships existing 
within a given load increment i . This is i l lustrated in Figure 11, where only 
two causes are shown for c lar i ty . In the following derivation it is assumed that 
all causes and the intersection of any two causes may exist but that intersect ions 
of three or more causes a re negligible. 
F r o m the Venn diagram, Figure 11, and generalization to eight causes , 
8 8 8 
P[IJ = £ P t C n i ] _ _ £ Z P t C . n C n l ] . (5.7) 
1 j = l J * 2 j=l k=l J k 
j*k 
If the causes a re assumed to be independent within i, 
P [ C . n C n i j = p [ c . n I.] p [ c n I.] . (5 .8) 
3 k I j i k I 
F r o m the definition of conditional probability [ 2 ] , 
P [ C . n I.] = P [ I . | C . ] P [C . ] . (5 .9) 
3 i i 3 3 
F r o m (5o8) and ( 5 . 9 ) , 
P [ C . n c , n I.] - P t l . l C . ] P [ C . ] P t l . l C , ] P [ a 1 . (5.10) 
j k i i j j i k k 
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Substituting (5 .9) and (5o10) into ( 5 . 7 ) , 
P [ I . l = 
8 8 8 
.]  y P[I.IC.]P[C.I - i y y P I U C J PICI PU.IC I PIC. 
1 j=i x J J 2 j =i kii x 3 L * 
3*k 
(5.11) 
Since I. a re mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive events, 
10 
YJ PH.! = 1 (5.12) 
i=l 
Now the quantities P [C . ] a re precisely the quantities represented by entr ies in 
Table 2 of Questionnaire A, and the quantities P [ I . I C.] a re represented by 
entr ies in questionnaire Tables 3 through 10. If the mean responses to Question-
naire A are substituted into equation (5.11) and the summation of P[ I . ] is taken 




P[ I . ] = lo207 ± 1 
l 
(5.13) 
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Figure 10. Venn Diagram for Intersecting Causes . 
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Figure 11. Intersection of Causes with Load Increment. 
This result indicates that the assumption of independence of causes is not 
compatible with the questionnaire responses. Note that the assumption of 
independence was involved in writing equation (5 .8) . Assume that a factor a 
exists which accounts for the dependence among causes such that 
P [ C . n c, n l . ] = a P[C. n I.] P[C. n I.] 
3 k 1 j i k i 
(5.14) 
Then, in place of equation (5.11) there results 
Pt l . l = f, PtI.IC.] P[C.l - £ f. 7, Pt l . lC. l P[C.] PtI .IC. 1 P[C. ] 
1 jti x J J 2 j=l kil ' 3 3 l k k 
J^k 
(5.15) 
Substituting this result into equation (5.12) 
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10 8 10 8 8 
y y pu.icjptc.]-£ y y y pu . i c jptc jpt i . i c jp ic j^ , 





y y pti.ic.i ptc.i - 1 
i=l j=l J J 
10 8 
(5.17) 
77 Z Z Z P[I.IC..]P[C.]P[I. |C. ]P[C.] 
i=l j=l k=l J J 
j^k 
Once a has been determined from equation (5.17) the desired resu l t s P[ I . ] 
for model Y can be determined from equation ( 5 . 1 5 ) . These computations have 
been ca r r i ed out for each load increment i, using mean responses from 
Questionnaire A to obtain the resu l t s shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 . Fa i lure Probabi l i t ies for Model Y 
I. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) ' (6) (7) (8) ( 9 ) (10) 
6 0 - 7 0 - 80- 90- 100- 110- 120- 130-
<60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 >140 
P [ I . L „ 0.049 0.065 0.095 0.140 0.183 0o20l 0.125 0.079 0o 042 0.023 l 1Y  
These data will be compared with Saturn V objective data la ter in this chapter . 
5 .2.1o4 Model Z0 A third probabilist ic model was constructed, for 
which the development and discussion is identical to that for Model Y through 
equation ( 5 . 1 3 ) . At that point instead of assuming a factor a to account for 
dependence of causes , the sample space is normalized by scaling both the causes 
100 
and intersect ions by a constant factor A. Thus, in model X intersect ions were 
assumed to be ze ro , and probabili t ies of causes only were scaled; in model Y, 
probabil i t ies of intersections only were scaled, and in model Z, probabili t ies of 
both causes and their intersect ions were scaled. 
If model Z is applied to equation ( 5 . 1 1 ) , there resul ts 
8 8 8 
P H . ] - A ( y p[i . icjp[c.] - ± y y p t i . i c j p t c j p t i . i c j p t c j ) 
1 v j =i i J J 2 j=i k4 1 J J l k k ^ 
j*k 
(5.18) 
= A (A. - B . ) 
l l 
Substituting this resu l t into ( 5 . 1 2 ) , 
10 10 10 
1 P [ V = x ( ? Ai - Z B J s x (A -B) = x • (5-19) 
Solving equation (5 .19) for the value of A required to normalize the sample 
space, 
X = r - L ^ . (5.20) 
Once X has been obtained, P [ I . ] can be calculated from equation ( 5 . 1 8 ) . These 
computations have been ca r r i ed out for Questionnaire A, and the resu l t s shown 
in Table 4 were obtained. 
5 . 2 . 1 . 5 Comparison with Observed Data. Three probabilist ic models 
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Table 4. Fai lure Probabil i t ies for Model Z 
I. 
1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
60 - 70- 80- 90- 100- 110- 120- 130- 140-
<60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 
P [ l l ^ 0.042 0.057 0.087 0.136 0.226 0.204 0.121 0.071 0.036 0.019 
l 1Z  
of the strength distribution for untested s t ruc tures have been constructed from 
the exper t s ' responses to Questionnaire A in Tables 2 through 10. In addition, 
the exper t s ' overall a ssessment of what the strength distribution should be is 
given directly by the response in Table 1 of Questionnaire A. In this section, 
the result ing four strength distributions will be compared with the strength 
distribution from the Saturn V observed data shown in Figure 6, Chapter IV. 
This will accomplished by a Chi-square test comparison of each of the four 
strength distributions with the observed data and a visual comparison of CDF ' s . 
A summary of how the Chi-square test is being used here and in Chapter 
IV may be helpful. F i r s t , in Chapter IV, a two-parameter Weibull model is 
hypothesized to r ep resen t the Saturn V observed data, and the pa rame te r s of the 
distribution a re calculated by the maximum likelihood method. A Chi-square 
test is then made by comparing the Saturn V observed data with the hypothesized 
model. Next, in this chapter , the same Weibull model is hypothesized to 
represen t the data from one of the models of subjective expert opinions, and the 
hypothesis is checked by the Chi-square tes t . 
For the Chi-square tes t , six load increments with a minimum of five 
expected failures in each increment a re considered. The test will give a 
measure of the difference in the number of s t ruc tures expected to fail in each 
load increment from the distribution determined by observed data versus the 
number expected to fail in each increment from the subjective data. Let S. be 
the number of s t ruc tures from the total of 50 s t ruc tures expected to fail in 
increment i from the subjective data and O. be the corresponding number from 
the distribution calculated from the observed data. The D t statistic is defined 
[2] as 
k (S. - O . ) 2 
Dl = Z l 0
 l , k = 6 • (5-21) 
i=l i 
This statist ic is compared with tabulated values of the Chi-square distribution 
[2] to determine the significance level at which the subjective and observed 
data agree ; that i s , 
P [ D l - X « , k - 1 ] = a ' ( 5 " 2 2 ) 
2 
where x is the value of the Chi-square random var iable with k-1 degrees 
of freedom and cumulative distribution a . The value of a is known as the 
significance level and is a measure of the agreement between the hypothesized 
model and subjective data. 
Calculation of the Dj stat is t ic for each of the four subjective models and 
determination of the significance level from standard tables (five degrees of 
freedom) yielded the resu l t s shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Results of Chi-Square Test 
Overall 
Assessment 











This indicates a very good fit for the overall a ssessment and a mediocre fit for 
the models . 
Cumulative distribution functions a re shown in Figure 12, where the 
Weibull model of observed data from Chapter IV is shown by the solid line, the 
exper t s ' overall assessment by the dotted line, and an envelope of the three 
probabil ist ic models of exper t s ' a ssessment from causes by the cross-hatched 
a rea . 
It is evident from these resul t s that the exper t s ' overall assessment is 
far super ior to the distribution determined from probabilistic models based on 
exper t s ' opinions of causes . To establish the reason for this would require 
additional quest ionnaires and analysis of the r e su l t s . With the information now 
available it cannot be clear ly established whether there is an intrinsic ability of 
experts to provide a bet ter overall a s sessment or whether the questionnaire and 
probabil ist ic models could be improved to a point where the model resu l t s would 
be as good as the overall r e su l t s . However, it is known that all of the experts 
consulted have had occasion to directly observe data applicable to the overall 
a s sessment . It is not known how many of these experts have directly observed 
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Figure 12. Comparison of Observed and Subjective CDF ' s . 
The simplicity of the overall a s sessment compared with the assessment 
from causes could also have been a factor. The la t ter required considerable 
t ime and deliberation and possibly a reorder ing of information from a form 
available to the respondent to that required to answer the questionnaire. Some 
respondents may have been unwilling to spend sufficient t ime to do this carefully. 
It should be mentioned that, although the model resul t s a re not nearly as 
good as the overall assessment resu l t s , the model resul t significance level is in 
a range sometimes accepted by stat is t icians in the absence of bet ter information. 
A significance level sometimes accepted is 1 percent , and the model resul t s fall 
within that c r i te r ion . 
5 .2 .2 Strength Distribution for T3 - Questionnaire B 
The p r imary objective of Questionnaires A and B was to determine a 
strength distribution for tes t option T3, the model tes t option. The analysis of 
Questionnaire A resu l t s in the previous section demonstrated the ability of 
experts to predict strength distributions and established that the overall a s s e s s -
ment is likely to give bet ter resu l t s than the probabilistic models of causes . 
Therefore , the exper t s ' overall assessment , Table 1 in Questionnaire B, was 
used to determine a strength distribution for tes t option T3 . This was accom-
plished by fitting a two-parameter Weibull model to the data (mean responses) in 
Table 1, Questionnaire B . 
Each percentage point in the mean response was interpreted as one data 
point, and the result ing data were input into the computer p rogram by Hanagud 
A A 
[ 8 7 ] . Maximum likelihood es t imates v = 109.4 and k = 8 . 8 were determined 
for the pa rame te r s of the Weibull distribution, 
u / k - x - ( £ ) k 
W'H) * • ^ 
A significance level of 60 percent was obtained in a Chi-square goodness-of-fit 
test between model and data, using 10 increments of equal probability. A 
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Figure 13. Comparison of Subjective Data and Weibull Model. 
In Figure 14 the strength distribution that can be real ized by tes t option 
T3 is compared with the distributions that can be real ized by T0 and Tj . The 
comparison is intuitively appealing. For the Model Tes t Option, T3 , the frequen-
cies of both gross ly overstrength and gross ly understrength s t ruc tures a re r e -
duced as compared with No-Test Option, T0 , result ing in a distribution sharply 
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R, STRENGTH, PERCENT OF ANALYST'S PREDICTION 
Figure 14. Comparison of Strength Distributions. 
peaked near the analyst's predicted value. Note that this is in contrast to the 
Standard Test Option, Tj, for which it was assumed that design changes are made 
only in understrength structures, and overstrength structures remain a part of 
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the population. The strength distribution given by equation (5 . 23) and plotted in 
Figure 14 will be used for T3 in all further analysis . 
CHAPTER VI 
A BAYESIAN APPROACH TO UPDATING A STRENGTH DISTRIBUTION 
In this chapter, Bayesian s ta t is t ics will be used to determine a strength 
distribution for test option Tlt the s tandard test procedure . Bayesian s tat is t ics 
provides a means of updating stat is t ical distributions as new information becomes 
available. For the present analysis , test data accumulated during the laboratory 
s t ruc tura l testing of Saturn V s t ruc tura l assemblies are regarded as p r io r 
information, and the data obtained through flight experience are regarded as 
new information used to update the distribution determined from the p r io r 
information0 
The Bayesian approach recognizes the validity of subjective information 
for use in probability analysis , and such information is used in determining the 
strength distribution for tes t option T 1 # However, the effect of the subjective 
data on the distribution is relatively minor, and the result ing distribution can 
be regarded as pr imar i ly based on observed data. 
The method to be used will be developed through discussions of Bayes ' 
theorem, the use of Bayes f theorem to combine new data with p r io r information, 
and the updating of the scale pa rame te r of the Weibull distribution. Next, the 
method is applied to the Saturn V tes t and flight data to determine a two-
pa rame te r Weibull distribution for tes t option T1. The final distribution which 
can be real ized by Tt is obtained from the Weibull distribution by using a 
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Bayesian analysis to account for uncertainty in the scale pa r ame te r . 
6» 1 BayesT Theorem 
A conditional probability of the event A given that the event B. has 
occurred is defined as the ra t io of the probability of the intersection of events 
A and B. to the probability of event B. and is denoted by P[ A]B ] . 
3 3 ] 
H A n B j 
p[AlBj ] = " w 1 - <6a> 
J 
from which 
P [ A n B . ] = P [ A | B ] P[B.] . (6 .2) 
3 j 3 
Similarly, 
P [ B . n A] = P[B.|AJ P[AJ „ (6.3) 
} 1 
Since P[A n B.J = P [ B . n A] , 
3 3 
P[A|B.] P [ B J = P[B.|AJ P[A] . (6 .4) 
3 3 3 
Now following Hines and Montgomery [ 9 8 ] , if B , B . . . B represen t a set 
of collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive events, then an event A can 
be wri t ten as (F ig . 15) 
A = (A n Bx) u (A n B 2 ) u . . . u (A n B j . (6 .5) 
A n B^ An B2 
A n Bj 
r A fl B: 
A n Bn 
Figure 15. Event A in Te rms of Events B. . 
P[A] = P[ A n B ] + P[A n B ] + . . . + P[A n B ] 
J. /L n 
(6.5a) 
= . £ p [ A n B . ] . 
Substituting equation (6 .5) into equation ( 6 . 4 ) , 
P [ A | B . ] P [ B . ] 
P [ B . | A ] -
] 7 p [An B. ] 
k k 
(6.6) 
Then from equations (6 .2) and (6 . 6 ) , 
P[A|B.J P[B.J 
P[B. |AJ - ^— L 
J I P[A|Bk] P[BkJ 
(6.7) 
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Equation (6 .7) is known as Bayes ' theorem and provides the means of incor-
porating new information with p r io r probability es t imates to yield pos ter ior 
probabi l i t ies . 
6. 2 Combining of New Data with P r i o r Information 
A continuous vers ion (following Papoulis [92]) of equation (6 .7) can be 
derived. Returning to equation (6 . l ) , let the event B. be the event 
{x < X ^ x + Ax} where X is a random variable, and x is a specific value of 
X o Then (6 .1 ) becomes 
r . i * n P [ A n x < X ^ x + Ax] , „ . 
P A x < X ^ x + A x = —T7 T—; — . (6.8) 
P [ x < X < x + Ax] v ' 
Now by definition of the CDF, 
P [ x < X < x + A x ] = F (x + Ax) - F (x) . (6.9) 
X X 
By definition of the conditional CDF, 
and 
F x (x lA) =
P [ X
p ^
n A 1 (6-10) 
F (x |A) - F (x IA) = P [x < X S x |A] (6.11) 
X ^ X • J- J- ^ 
P[A n x < X < x J 
P[A] 
Substituting equations (6 .9) and (6.11) into equation (6. 8) , 
[ F ( x + A x l A ) - F (x |A) ] P[A] 
P [ A | x < X < x + Ax] = — - -. T-N 7 — x • ( 6 
F x ( x + Ax) - F x ( x ) 
Now 
[ F ( x + A x ) - F (x)J 
l im - ^ = f (x) (6 
A A Ax x 
Ax—0 
and 
F ( x + A x l A ) - F (x |A) 
lim — - - = f (x |A) . (6 
Ax~0 * * X 
Now define, 
P [ A | X = x ] = lim P [ A l x < X < x + Ax] . (6 
Ax—0 
Applying equations (6 .13 ) , (6.14) and (6. 15) to equation ( 6 . 1 2 ) , 
f J x | A ) P[A] 
P [ A | X = x] = A f - ( v , (6 
X ' 
or 
P [ A | X = x J f j x ) 
y X l A ) = P[A] ( 6 
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From equation (6.16} we can wr i te , 
/ P [ A l X = x ] f (x) dx = / f (x |A) P[A] dx = P[A] . (6.18) 
- c o X _oo X • 
Substituting for P[A] in equation (6. 17) 
P [ A | X = x] f i x ) 
y X | A ) = — * . (6.19) 
/ P [ A | X = x] f ^ x ) dx 
- c o 
Equation (6.19) is the continuous version of Bayes f theorem. In this expression 
let X represen t a pa rame te r of the distribution used to model the random 
variable of in teres t and A be a sequence of independent observations of the 
random var iable . Thus, the theorem states that the distribution of the pa ramete r 
X , given the observation A , is proportional to the product of the likelihood 
function P [ A | X =x j , sometimes denoted L[X|A] , and the distribution of X 
f (x) before the observat ions. The distribution f (x |A) , sometimes denoted 
f t T ( x ) , is called the pos te r io r distribution of X, and f ^ ( x ) , sometimes denoted 
L ' ( x ) , is called the p r io r distribution of X. 
X 
Incorporated in the above viewpoint is the idea that the pa rame te r of a 
distribution is itself a random variable , a central concept in the Bayesian 
approach. This leads to the recognition that the distribution of a random variable 
such as a s trength distribution, wherein the pa r ame te r s a r e considered constant, 
does not fully r epresen t the uncertainty involved with the random variable . A 
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complete representation of the uncertainty must allow for the recognition that 
the parameters of the distribution are not known with certainty,, A method often 
employed to accomplish this is to use the parameter distribution given by 
equation (6.19) as a weighting function on the PDF of the random variable and 
to integrate over the domain of the parameter to obtain a so-called predictive 
or Bayesian PDF of the random variable. Thus, 
y y ) = / f y ( y ) y x | A ) dx , (6.20) 
yv 
where fY(y) is the distribution of the random variable Y , with parameters 
assumed given, and fv(y) is the Bayesian or predictive distribution of Y. 
The Bayesian distribution can be used to make inferences about as-yet-
unobserved data and will include the uncertainty in the parameters as well as 
the uncertainty represented by f (y) . 
6.3 Updating the Weibull Distribution 
Assume that the strength distribution for test option Tx is given by the 
two-parameter Weibull distribution, 
k 
k-1 -G) 
In the case of this strength distribution, the shape of parameter k will be 
considered constant (a condition which has been observed to be approximately 
t rue for some physical phenomena), and the scale pa ramete r will be recognized 
as a random variable. For convenience, in this portion of the analysis the 
-k 
pa ramete r A will be used in place of v . 
The Bayesian distribution of the strength distribution (6.21) will now be 
obtained. F rom Soland [ 99J (a lso , see Section 4 . 2 . 2 . 2 ) , the likelihood function 
of n observations of r in which (R , R . . . R ) represent observations of 
failures and ( R . „, . . . R } represen t observations of load levels in which no v i+1 n7 
failure occurred (a censored sample) is 
ii k _ 1 / £ 
L[A|k, R , . . . R ] = k A (R R . . . R ) exp -A ^ R. 
1 n 1 2 1 \ i=l \ 
(6.22) 
For the present problem, equation (6.19) takes the form, 
L(Alk, R R ) f / (A) 
fA"(A) = • ^— ^ — ^ , (6 .23) 
/ L f A ' ( A ) dA 
A 
where fT indicates a p r io r distribution, and f" indicates a pos te r ior dis tr ibu-
tion. The foregoing discussion emphasizes the fact that a Bayesian updating of 
a probability distribution is accomplished through an updating of the p a r a m e t e r ( s ) 
of the distribution. Note that the poster ior distribution of the pa ramete r is 
proportional to the p r io r distribution and to the likelihood function. The integral 
in the denominator can be interpreted as a normalizing constant. 
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Under certain res t r ic t ive conditions the mathematics indicated in equation 
(6. 23) need not be performed explicitly. It is mathematically convenient to use 
a distribution for the pa ramete r A such that the operation indicated by (6. 23) 
resul t s in a pos te r ior distribution of A of the same form as the p r io r distr ibu-
tion. Such a distribution of the pa rame te r is called a natural conjugate of the 
likelihood function. 
Such a distribution for A (a gamma distribution) was displayed by 
Soland [ 99] : 
i 1 -1 -Ay 
fAW = 1 r(i) ' ° ~ x < " ; ° < *' and y < * ' ( 6 , 2 4 ) 
where I and y a re the pa ramete r s of the distribution, and r is the gamma 
function. Soland applied a Bayesian stat is t ical analysis and decision methods to 
a problem of sampling electronic components for quality control. In the present 
r e s e a r c h the application is to an updating of strength distributions for aerospace 
s t ruc tura l assembl ies . 
If the pa rame te r s of the pr ior distribution fA
T(^) a r e v ' anc^ ^'» anc^ a 
sample of the Weibull p rocess yields the likelihood function (6 . 22) , it was 
shown by Soland [ 99] that the pos te r io r distribution f/T(*-) n a s t n e p a r a m e t e r s : 
y " = yf + y , (6.25) 




y = Z R i • (6-26) 
i=l 
Through the use of the natural conjugate, the mechanics of updating are 
reduced to the reevaluation of pa rame te r s indicated in (6. 25) ra the r than the 
mathematical manipulations indicated in ( 6 . 23 ) . 
The Bayesian strength distribution, using (6 .20 ) , is 
* R ( r ) = / f R ( r ) f A ( X ) ^ ( 6 * 2 7 ) 
00 i -, ^ k ( \Jl ^ - i _ A y 
f Ak r k _ 1 e'Xr < ^ A ^ — 
J ARr e r ^ 
co k - i i k N 
/ w/iY) x V x ( r + y ) dA 
dA 
Integrating equation ( 6 . 2 7 ) , 
V > r ( i ) , k , i + i " , k s i + i
 ( 6 * 2 8 ) 
J ( r + y ) ( r +y ) 
This is the Bayesian distribution of s t rength to be used in the decision p roces s . 
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In equation ( 6 . 2 8 ) , r is the random variable, k is the shape parameter 
(assumed constant) , and y and $. a re either pr ior or pos ter ior pa rame te r s of 
the distribution of A . Thus, the problem of selecting a strength distribution 
reduces to obtaining a value for k and determining pr ior values y ! and V 
and data-based values y and £ from which y r r a n d i T t can be calculated from 
equation (6. 25) and used in equation (6. 28) . 
604 Strength Distribution for Tj 
The following s tep-by-s tep approach is deemed a reasonable procedure 
for using Saturn V test and flight data to determine values for k , V\ and ytT 
for the Standard Test Option T^ 
1. Determine the shape pa ramete r k and p r io r es t imates of yf and V 
from static s t ruc tura l test data, with some subjective interpretations of the 
applicability of certain portions of the data. 
2. Determine data-based values of y and $- from the flight successes 
of the Saturn V launch vehicle, using an approximation of the loads experienced 
during flight. 
3 . Calculate pos te r ior pa rame te r s y , ! and i , T from equations ( 6 . 2 5 ) . 
6 . 4 . 1 Saturn V Test Data as P r i o r Information 
An understanding of how the tes t option T t tes t procedure affects the test 
data presented in Table 1, Chapter IV, is required in describing step 1. Let 
the data in Table 1 be divided into two groups, I and II. Group I consists of 
s t ruc tures 27 through 50 which failed or for which the tes t was terminated at 
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grea te r than 100 percent of design ultimate load. Group II consists of s t ructures 
1 through 26 which failed to achieve design ultimate load. The Standard Test 
Option Tj requi res that no changes be made in the s t ruc tures in group I and that 
all s t ruc tu res in group n be modified and re tes ted to g rea te r than design ultimate 
load. The modified and re tes ted group (not shown in Table l ) is designated 
group III. The flight ar t ic les a r e built from the same specifications as the 
s t ruc tures in groups I and III. 
Note now that all samples nominally identical to the flight ar t ic les have 
been tested to at least 100 percent of design ultimate load. Never theless , it is 
probable that some of the production flight ar t ic les would fail at less than design 
ultimate load if all flight ar t ic les could be tested, possibly because of the var ia-
tion in mater ia l p roper t ies , variation (within tolerance) of dimensions, or an 
occasional manufacturing e r r o r not evident in the tes t a r t i c le . Questionnaire C, 
Appendix B, was used to obtain expert opinions on the probable percentage of 
redesigned s t ruc tures which would fail in each of three load increments less than 
design ultimate load. The percentages predicted by the experts a re given in 
Table 1, Questionnaire C, Appendix B. If these percentages a re multiplied by 
the 26 s t ruc tures in group II and rounded to the neares t integer number of 
s t ruc tu re s , no s t ruc tures a re predicted to fail in increments 70- to 80- and 
80- to 90-percent , and two s t ruc tures a re predicted to fail in increment 90-
to 100-percent of design ultimate load. These two data points will be a s -
sumed at the midpoint (95 percent) of the increment and will be designated as 
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group IV. Note that group IV could be regarded as a remnant of the original 
group II. 
The data base for the pr ior distribution for tes t option T± will be taken as 
groups I, III, and IV. The data a re tabulated in Table 6. In this chapter decimal 
fractions ra the r than percentages a re used to avoid computations with extremely 
large numbers . The computer p rogram by Hanagud [ 87] was used to estimate 
pa r ame te r s of a two-parameter Weibull distribution model for the data in Table 
A A 
6. The maximum likelihood pa rame te r est imates were k = 9. 27 and v = 1. 265 
[ see equation (6. 2 1 ) ] . Then 
\ . = v" k = 1 . 2 6 5 " 9 ' 2 7 = 0.113 . (6.29) 
It will now be shown that this is also the expected value of A from aquation 
(6. 24) using the same data. F r o m equation (6. 26) , 
y' = £ r
9 - 2 7 = 1 3 2 . 3 . (6.30) 
i=l 
where the r . a r e data in Table 6. Also from Table 6, V = 15 is the number of 
fa i lures . The p r io r distribution of A from equation (6.24) is then 
( 1 3 2 . 3 ) 1 5 ( X ) 1 4 e " 1 3 2 ' 3 A 21 14 -132.3A 
fA'(A) = * '
 i ^ j = 0.7632x10 A e 
(6.31) 
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EW = 7 = Isfs = °-U3 • (6-32' 
As expected, this is the same as the maximum likelihood est imate , equation 
(6 .29 ) . 
Summarizing, the p r io r distribution of res i s tance R is the Weibull d is-
tribution, equation (6. 11) with pa ramete r s k = 9.27 (assumed constant) and 
- 1 / k 
v = A = 1.265. 
9.27 8.27 \1.265f 
9.27 
i '(rJ = r e x (6.33) 
RV ' , . 9 . 2 7 
(1.265) 
9 27 
, ~.nn 8-27 " ° - 1 1 3 r " 
= 1. 0488 r e 
The pr io r distribution of A is given by equation ( 6 . 3 1 ) . As indicated by 
equation ( 6 . 2 0 ) , the uncertainty in A for purposes of decision analysis can be 
taken into account by determining the Bayesian distribution of r . The p r io r 
es t imates of k , i , and y a re substituted into equation (6.28) to obtain the 
p r io r Bayesian distribution, 
~ , x i ' k r 1 ^ 1 ( v O * 33 r 8 ' 2 7 
^ - A Ml =»• 252X10 3 3 —f _ . (6.34) 
( r +y f ) ( r +132 .3 ) 
6 .4 .2 Saturn V Flight Success as New Data 
Since the method by Soland [ 98] (to be used to update the distribution) 
pe rmi t s censored samples , the Saturn V flight data, which include no fai lures, 
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can be used as new information for updating the p r io r strength distribution 
which was established from laboratory tes t data only. There have been 13 
successful Saturn V flights, with each flight having 50 s t ructura l assembl ies . 
This is a total of 650 assembl ies that have been flown without failure. The 
opinion of experts on the loads experienced by these s t ruc tures is given in 
Table 2 of Questionnaire C, Appendix B. The data in this table will be approxi-
mated as shown in Table 7 for purposes of analysis . 
Table 7. Saturn V Flight Loads 
Flight Load — Percentage of Design Ultimate Load (R.) 
<30 35 45 52.5 57.5 62.5 68 
Percentage of 
Structures 15 7.22 9.22 12.44 20.22 13.78 22.11 
Experiencing Load 
Number of 
Structures 98 47 60 81 131 90 144 
Experiencing Load 
Using these data as new information and noting that the contribution of 
s t ruc tures loaded to less than 30 percent will be negligible, the pa rame te r s of 
the pos te r ior distribution of X can be calculated from equations (6 .25) and 
(6 .26 ) : 
y = £ R.
k = 4 7 ( 0 . 3 5 ) 9 , 2 7 + 6 0 ( 0 . 4 5 ) 9 * 2 7 + . . . (6 .35) 
i=l l 
q 97 
+ 144(0.68) = 6.2 
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yf = 132.3 from equation ( 6 . 3 0 ) , 
i = 0 (no flight fa i lures) , 
V = 15 (15 test fa i lu res ) , 
y " = y + yf = 6.2 + 132.3 - 138.5 , 
i " = i + V = 15 . 
Then from equation (6 . 24), 
. , ( / o ( ! 3 8 . 5 )
1 5 A 1 4 e " 1 3 8 ' 5 A 1 K l o 21 14 -138.5A 
f^f(X) = -* r ( i 5 ) = 1 .519X10 A. e 
The expected pos te r io r value of X is 
(6 .36) 
E"(A> =7^ = i S ? = °-1083 ' (6-37) 
and the expected value of the scale pa ramete r v is 
1 
E" (v ) = [ E " ( \ ) ] = (0.1083) - 1.271 . (6.38) 
The pos te r io r distribution of r is then given by the Weibull distribution, equa-
tion (6 . 21) , with pa r ame te r s k = 9. 27, v = 1. 271: 
9.27 
U r ) '—f^f r 
( 1 . 2 7 1 ) 9 " " (6.39) 
9.27 8.27 e - ( l . 2 7 l ) = ^ ^ 8 . 2 7 e - 0 . 1 0 8 3 r
! 
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The posterior Bayesian distribution is , from equations (6. 28) and (6.35), 
k -1 , t f l i
, f _ 8.27 
,34 r F " ( r ) = ^ - ^ ^ " 1 = 1.841X 10* 
R / k t l \ i + 1 / 9 ' 2 ^ , o o rX1^ 
(r + y") (r + 138.5) 
(6.40) 
This is the final strength distribution for test option T t to be used in the decision 
analysis. Differences between the prior distribution, equation (6.33); the 
Bayesian prior distribution, equation (6.34); the posterior distribution, equation 
(6.39), and the Bayesian posterior distribution, equation (6.40), are quite 
small. Some values of the distributions are shown in Table 8 to illustrate this. 
Plots of the distributions would all appear as shown by the T1 test option in 
Figure 16. 
The small differences between the Bayesian and non-Bayesian distributions 
indicate that there is sufficient data to make a reasonably accurate determination 
of the scale parameter. Even though there were a comparatively large number 
of flight structures and no failure occurred, the flight data caused only a small 
change between the prior and posterior distributions because of the low load 
levels in flight compared with the test loads. 
The improvement in strength that can be gained by testing according to 
test option Tt is illustrated in Figure 16. The dotted line represents the 
strength distribution before the test and redesign cycle (derived in Chapter IV), 
and the solid line is the distribution from equation (6.40) after the test, rede-
sign, and retest cycle. 
Table 8. Comparison of Strength Distributions 
r x 102 yw rR-(r) ttfr) r̂ r) 
20 1.666 x 10"6 1.743 x 10"6 1.664 X 10"6 1.665 x 10~6 
40 5.367 X 10"4 5.378 X 10~4 5. 136 x 10"4 5. 138 x 10 - 4 
60 0.01533 0.01536 0.01467 0.01467 
80 0.1633 0.1635 0.1564 0. 1563 
100 0.9366 0.9318 0.9008 0. 8949 
120 2.5657 2.4973 2.5209 2.4538 
140 1.3105 1.3584 1.3993 1.4414 
160 0.007504 0.03580 0.01048 0.03473 
ft 97 _ 0 1 1 ^ r 




/ x 3 3 •£ 
P r i o r Bayesian Distribution: f T ( r ) = 9 .252X10 ——— — 
R ( r , 2 + 1 3 2 . 3 ) 1 6 
f t / . 8.27 -0 .1083 r 
Pos te r io r Distribution: f ' \ r ) = 1.0038 r e 
9.27 
Pos te r io r Bayesian Distribution: f " ( r ) = 1 .841X10 
34 
8.27 
R ( r 9 - 2 7 + 1 3 8 . 5 )
1 6 
3.0 
60 80 100 120 140 160 
R, STRENGTH-PERCENT OF ANALYST'S PREDICTION 
Figure 16. Comparison of Strength Distributions for 
No-Test and Standard Test Options. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE DECISION MODEL 
In Chapter IE, it was shown how the decision to be made falls within the 
purview of Bayesian stat ist ical decision theory. The fact that this is t rue 
negates the requirement for formal proof here that the decision procedure is 
valid. The validity has already been established by others in development of the 
theory. Entire volumes a r e devoted to the subject by Pra t t , Raiffa, and 
Schlaifer [21 ] , Raiffa [83] , Morgan [100] , Raiffa and Schlaifer [101] , and 
Schlaifer [102] . A t reatment sufficient for the present problem is included in 
Benjamin and Cornell [ 2 ] . An essential feature of the theory is that expected 
costs of uncertain events , based on probability analysis , a r e t reated in conjunc-
tion with known or certain costs in determining a cost optimum decision. 
The structuring of the decision t r e e , accomplished in Chapter III, will 
not be repeated in this chapter . Instead, a flow-chart description of the p rocess , 
which may help to demonstra te some points that could not be shown on the 
decision t r e e , will be developed. Each element of the flow chart will then be 
examined separately in more detai l . Ca re has been taken to a s s u r e that all 
assumptions and procedures in the flow char t a r e consistent with stat is t ical 
decision theory. This chart should give a good idea of the interrelat ionships 
of the problem var iables and should help to distinguish what information is 
treated as an integral part of the decision model as opposed to information 
needed as input to the model. 
Figure 17 illustrates the decision process. Consistent with statistical 
decision theory, the process is divided into three major elements: actions, 
state of nature, and values (or utilities). Generally, actions represent alterna-
tives available to the decision-maker, the state of nature represents factors 
(usually not known with certainty) which affect the consequences of the actions, 
and the values are numerical measures of the consequences of action-state 
combinations. 
7.1 Action — The Decision to be Made 
The alternative actions or decisions are illustrated in the left portion of 
Figure 17. In the present problem, an action consists of two elements: 
(1) selection of a test option or method of testing from among four discrete 
alternatives and (2) selection of a design safety index from a continuous spec-
trum encompassing (theoretically) all real numbers. The action is denoted by 
the symbol A. </3), where j represents the test option, and 0 represents the 
safety index. For example, A3 (1.5) denotes the decision to use test option 3 
and a safety index of i . 5. 
7.1.1 Selection of Test Option 
Clearly, one of the means available to the designer to control structural 
reliability is the selection of a method of testing. Testing tends to decrease 
uncertainties and design e r rors , thereby permitting the designer to more 
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Figure 17. Flow Diagram for Decision Process. 
accurately estimated the strength of the design. This affects the probabilistic 
strength distribution, which in turn influences the structural reliability. 
In Chapter IV, four possible methods of testing were described. In the 
present research, it is assumed that the designer is to make a selection of one 
of these discrete methods of testing (test options) and that the test option 
selected controls the shape of the probabilistic strength distribution of the design 
as shown in previous chapters. Since the strength distributions were basically 
derived from experience on aerospace structures built in the past, there is also 
an implication that the inspection procedures, nondestructive test procedures, 
and maintenance procedures for a given test option should be consistent with 
those on the past projects from which the data were obtained. Such procedures 
are usually designed to disclose errors and other anomalies which result in 
defective parts. It should then be expected that these procedures affect the 
strength distribution of the population of structural assemblies placed in service, 
since any defects discovered would be rectified. If the procedures in a new de-
sign are not consistent with those in past projects from which the strength distri-
butions were derived, there is reason to question the applicability to the new de-
sign. This is emphasized on the flow chart by showing these procedures as an 
integral part of the test option. 
Test option T2, the proof test option, requires elaboration here. If T2 
is selected as the test method, the choice of a proof test load level is also 
necessary. Five discrete levels of proof testing will be considered as a part 
of the decision space; that is, if the proof test option is selected, a proof test 
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level must also be selected to complete the decision. The proof tes t level 
will be expressed as a percentage of the design ultimate load. Figure 18 shows 
the matr ix of test options. 
V N O - TEST OPTION 
50% PROOF TEST 
T ] , STANDARD TEST OPTION 
T2 , PROOF TEST OPTION 
60% PROOF TEST 
70% PROOF TEST 
T 3 ' MODEL TEST OPTION 
80% PROOF TEST 
90% PROOF TEST 
Figure 18. Matrix of Test Options. 
7 . 1 . 2 Selection of Safety Index 
A second means available to the designer to control s t ruc tura l rel iabil i ty 
is the selection of a safety index. Once the safety index has been obtained, it is 
simple to convert the resu l t to the safety factor in any given problem. In the 
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applications in Chapter VIII, both the safety index and the safety factor will be 
considered. 
Thus, the second element of the decision to be made is the selection of a 
design safety index, /3. The domain of /3 is all rea l numbers . Negative 
values a r e physically and mathematically possible , but it seems unlikely that 
negative values would ever be useful in a rea l situation, since this implies that 
the expected strength is l e s s than the expected load. 
7.2 State of Nature 
7 . 2 . 1 Load and Strength Distributions 
The state of nature is i l lustrated in the middle portion of the flow diagram, 
Figure 17. Basical ly, there a r e two ingredients which define the state of nature: 
( i ) the s t ruc tura l assembly itself and (2) the environmental conditions to which 
the s t ruc tura l assembly is subjected. It i s convenient to identify specifically the 
important charac te r i s t i c s of the s t ructural assembly and the environmental 
conditions which a r e pert inent to the decision at hand. 
The important charac te r i s t i cs of the s t ructural assembly a r e i ts strength 
and weight. As indicated in the flow diagram and discussed in previous chapters , 
the shape of the strength distribution R. depends upon the tes t option. Fur ther , 
the final strength distribution R. (/3) depends on both the tes t option and the 
design safety index, since the design safety index i s used to control the 
predicted strength of the design. Within a given tes t option and under the 
assumption that the bas ic configuration of the s t ructura l assembly is fixed, an 
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increase in the design safety index to increase the strength will resul t in an 
increase in the weight. The dependence of weight on the safety index is indicated 
in the flow diagram. 
The environmental condition of importance is the load distribution applied 
to the s t ruc tu re . As indicated in the flow diagram, the load distribution is 
assumed to be known and is considered as an input to the decision model. 
7 . 2 . 2 The Probabili ty of Fai lure 
An important quantity which charac ter izes a given combination of strength 
and load distributions is the probability of fai lure. In this section, the procedure 
for calculating the probability of failure of a given s t ructural assembly, sub-
jected to n applications of identically distributed random loads, will be 
developed. The n applications of loads could represen t n separa te flights. 
The development here is consistent with that of Freudenthal, Ga r re l t s , and 
Shinozuka [39] . 
Let F (x) be the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of strength 
-CV 
of a s t ruc tura l assembly and f (x) be the probability density function (PDF) 
of the load to be applied to the assembly . By definition of the CDF and PDF, 
F ^ (x) = P [ R < x ] (7.1) 
and 
f_ (x) dx = P [x < S < x + dx] (7.2) 
Thus, the probability that R will be l e s s than x and that S will be in the 
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increment dx is 
P [R < x and x < S < x + dx] = P [E {R < x} n E { x < S < x + dx}] 
(7.3) 
where E {} r ep resen t s the event that the statement in the brackets is t r ue . 
If R and S a r e assumed independent of each other, 
P [E {R < x} n E {x < S < x + dx}] = F ^ (x) f_ (x) dx (7.4) 
R o 
by the well-known product ru l e . Equation (7.4) r ep resen t s the probability that 
R will be l e s s than S when S i s in a general increment dx. If the probability 
that R is l e s s than S is des i red for all possible load values , an integration 
over all values of x must be performed: 
P [R < S] = f F ^ (x) f_ (x) dx (7.5) 
0 R S 
Note that P [R < S] r ep resen t s the probability that a s t ruc tura l assembly with 
CDF F (x) will fail because of a single application of load from the d is t r ibu-
R 
tion f ( x ) . Thus, the probability of failure on the k application of load is 
o 
p . (k) = P [R < S] = f F ^ (x) f_ (x) dx . (7 .6) 
f ^ R S 
th . 
There a r e assumed to be only two possible outcomes on the k load 
application, failure or survival . Since the probability of failure is given by 
equation ( 7 . 6 ) , the probability of survival , from an axiom of probabili ty, is 
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p f (k) = 1 - p f (k) . (7.7) 
The probability that the assembly will survive n load applications is 
LAT (n) = P |~E, n EQ n . . . n E. n . . . n E 1 
N L 1 2 k nj 
(7 .8) 
where E denotes the event that the assembly survives the k load application, 
and the intersect ion E . n . . . n E denotes the occurrence of all events 
1 n 
E . . . E . If the survival of each of n load cycles is independent of the 
survival of all other load cycles , the probability of E n . . . n E , and hence 
the probability that the assembly will survive n load applications, is 
L N (n) = p f (1) p f (2) . . . p (k) . . . p (n) 
= [ 1 _ P f ( 1 ) ] [ 1 _ P f ( 2 ) ] ' •' [ 1 _ P f ( n ) ] 
n 
J] f i - p f ( k ) l . (7.9) 
k= 
Since the n applied loads a re identically distributed, p (1) = p (2) = . . . 
= p (n) , and 
L N (n) = [ i - P f ( k ) l
n . (7.10) 
The probability of failure of the s t ruc tura l assembly during the n load applica-
tions is 
F N ( n ) = 1 - L N (n) = 1 - [ l - p f (k)l
 n = 1 - [ p f (k)l
 n (7.11) 
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Similar results were obtained by Freudenthal, Garrelts, and Shinozuka [39]. 
A special case of equation (7.11) arises for the consideration of the 
application of a single deterministic load such as a proof test load. Let the 
magnitude of the deterministic load be r0 . Then, in place of equations (7.4) 
and (7 .5) , 
P [ R < S ] = P | ^ E J R < r 0 J n E J S = rQJ - F R ( r Q ) , (7.12) 
where P E { S = r I = 1 and P E ( R < r J = F (r \ from equation 
(7 .1) . Then the probability of failure during proof testing is 
pf (p) = P [R < S] = F R ( r Q ) . (7.13) 
If m identical structural assemblies are to be subjected to the proof test, the 
probability that one or more of these articles will fail the proof test is given by 
FM H = * - [i - FR ( r 0 ) ]
m • (7-14> 
7.3 The Cost Model: Utilities 
In Bayesian decision theory, utilities or values are, in general, a 
measure of the consequences of various action/ state -of -nature combinations. 
The proper expression and use of the utility concept has absorbed a considerable 
portion of the development of the theory. The present problem requires the use 
of only the very elementary concepts of utility, and these have a very high degree 
of intuitive appeal. The utility concepts to be used are described below and are 
consistent with Bayesian decision theory. 
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The measure of utility is very direct — the expected cost in dol lars of 
ac t ion/s ta te-of-nature combinations is used as the measure of desirabil i ty of 
the combinations. The lower the expected cost , the higher the desirabi l i ty . 
Expected costs include not only direct monetary outlays but also the monetary 
equivalent of other consequences such as performance loss due to weight of the 
s t ructura l assembly (assumed to be determinist ic) and possible monetary losses 
due to s t ructura l failure (assumed probabi l i s t ic ) . As would be intuitively 
expected, any costs common to all possible actions may be omitted from 
considerat ion. This is equivalent to saying that the choice of reference point 
does not affect the decision. As indicated in Figure 3 of Chapter HI, direct 
costs (costs not affected by the state of nature) may be considered directly 
and need not be included in the utility function. However, these costs could 
be included in the utility function, and the final resu l t s would not change. 
The total expected cost to be minimized to obtain the optimum decision 
consists of three basic pa r t s : direct costs C! , cost of weight C , and 
D w 
expected cost of failure C : 
C = C_ + C + C _ . (7.15) 
D w F 
Each of these cost constituents will be discussed separately . 
7 . 3 . 1 Direct Costs 
The direct costs do not depend upon the state of nature but may depend 
upon the action. As shown in the flow diagram of Figure 17, these costs include 
such i tems as development costs C and operational costs C0 . 
C D = C D = C d + C 0 • <7-16> 
J 
The notation C is used in the flow diagram to indicate that these costs 
3 
pr imar i ly depend upon the tes t option selected. The development costs include 
such i tems as tes t hardware , test facil i t ies, and tes t operat ions, including an 
allowance for correct ing deficiencies which may be discovered in testing. 
Operational costs include i tems such as inspection, nondestructive t e s t s , and 
maintenance. In the area of d i rec t cos t s , it is par t icular ly important to keep in 
mind that costs common to all actions need not be considered; this can signifi-
cantly reduce the amount of information required as input to the decision model. 
F o r example, if all courses of action under consideration require the use of 
the same tes t facility, the cost of the facility need not be included in the cost 
model. 
7 . 3 . 2 Cost of Weight 
Weight is usually of pr ime importance in aerospace sys t ems . In fact, 
this is the basic reason that aerospace sys tems are usually designed with much 
smal le r safety factors than civil s t ruc tu res . However, weight does not have 
equal importance in all aerospace sys t ems . It is not unusual for the monetary 
value of weight to vary by an order of magnitude between the f irs t stage and the 
upper s tages of a launch vehicle. This important fact has been largely d i s r e -
garded in the past in establishing s t ruc tura l c r i t e r ia such as safety factors . 
The value of weight can easily be included in the present decision model. 
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Within a given design concept, the weight of a s t ructura l assembly 
largely depends upon the design safety index. Let the weight relative to some 
reference value be a known function of the design safety index: 
W = W(/3) . (7.17) 
Let the known monetary value of one unit of weight in the assembly under consid-
erat ion be c . Then the cost of weight as a function of j3 appropriate for use in 
w 
equation (7 .14) is 
C = C (/3) = c W(/3) . (7.18) 
w w w 
7 . 3 . 3 Expected Cost of Fa i lure 
In Benjamin and Cornell [ 2 ] , it is shown that the expected cost of an 
uncertain event is given by the product of the actual cost of the event and the 
probability that the event will occur. In the present context, the uncertain event 
is the failure of the s t ruc tura l assembly under consideration. Note that the 
probability of failure derived in equation (7. l l ) is the probability of having one 
or more fa i lures . The possible events that can occur during the application of 
n load cycles to a fleet of s t ruc tura l assembl ies a re no fa i lures , one failure, 
two fai lures . . . or n fa i lures . According to s tat is t ical decision theory [ 2 ] , 
the expected cost of these mutually exclusive events is 
C^ = C P + C P + C P + . . . + C.P. + . . . + C P , (7.19) 
F 0 0 1 1 2 2 i i n n ' v / 
where C. is the cost of i fa i lures , and P . is the probability of having exactly 
i fa i lures . 
F rom equation (7 .6) and ( 7 . 7 ) , the probability of having a failure on the 
k load cycle is p f ( k ) , and the probability of no failure is ;p f(k). The prob-
ability of no fai lures in n load cycles , P = L (n) f W a s given by equation 
( 7 . 1 0 ) . Assuming independence of the events of failure, the probability of s u r -
^ -.st „nd /. l X t h /. l N t h , th . . . . . ., 
viving the 1 , 2 . . . ( l - l ) , ( l+l) . . . and n cycles and having a failure 
on the i cycle i s given by 
P t = P f ( l )P f (2 ) . . . P f ( i - l ) p f ( i ) p f ( i + l ) . . . P f(n) . (7.20) 
Similarly, the probability of failing on the j cycle but surviving all others is 
P. = P f ( l ) p f ( 2 ) . . . p f ( j - l ) p f ( j ) p f ( j + l ) . . . p f(n) . (7.21) 
st 
Note that the failure events , E{failure on the 1 cycle, survival of all other 
cyc le s ) , E{failure on the 2 cycle, survival of all other cycles} . . . E{failure 
on the n cycle, survival of all other cycles} a re mutually exclusive. Then, by 
an axiom of probability [ 2 ] , the probability of any one of these events occurring 
is 
11 
P l = P l + P2 + '•• + P i + ••* + Pn = £ p i ' ( 7 ' 2 2 ) 
i=l 
where P is the probability of having exactly one fai lure. Substituting equation 
(7.20) into equation (7.22) and assuming p ( l ) = p (2) = . . . P f(k) . . . = p ( n ) , 
P x = I p j O O l ^ P j U )
 + fp f(k)]
n - 1p£(2) + . . . + [ p j d t ) ]
1 1 - ^ ! ) (7.23) 
+ . . . + [p £ (k) ]
n - 1 p { (n) = np f (k ) [ i f (k ) ]
1 1 - 1 . 
Similarly, the probability of having failures on the i and r cycles and 
surviving all other cycles is 
P i j r = P f U ) p f ( 2 ) . . . p f( i - l )p f( i )p f( i+l) . . . p f ( r - l ) p f ( r )p f ( r+ l ) . . . pf(n) . 
(7.24) 
If all possible combinations of i and r are considered, the probability of 
having exactly two failures is 
P 2 = [F f (k ) ]
n - 2 P f ( l ) P f (2 ) + [F f (k)]
n" 2p f ( l )P f (3) + . . . (7.25) 
+ [F f (k) ]
n - 2 p f ( i ) P f ( r ) . . . + [F f (k)]
n - 2 P f (n- l )p f (n) 
n (n-l) r (. v , 2 r - /! \ in-2 
= 21 [ p f W ] [ Pf( k ) ] 
Generalizing equation (7.23) and (7.25), 
V ^ J T [P^)]qIPfW]^ • (7.26) 
Equation (7.26) is recognized as the well-known binomial distribution [2] , which 
has an expected value n p (k). 
If equation (7.26) is substituted into equation (7.19), and C = 0 is 
assumed, 
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c F = c i n P f ( k ) [ ? f ( k ) 1
n - 1 + . . .+cq^ i n[p f(k)]% f(k)]^ 
(7.27) 
+ . . . + C [ p . ( k ) ] n [ p ( k ) ] 
n i i 
Now assuming that C = q C , that i s , q failures cost q t imes as much as one 
T. 
failure, 
5 F = C j n p f ( k ) [ p f ( k ) ]
n - * + . . . + q q I (
1
r ; _ q ) I [ p f ( k ) ]
q [ P f ( k ) ]
n " q 
(7.28) 
nr— + . . . + n [ p f ( k ) ]
u [ p ( k ) ] } 
The t e r m in the braces in equation (7.28) is recognized as the definition of the 
expected value of the binomial distribution. Therefore, 
C F - C F n p f ( k ) , (7.29) 
where C = C is the cost of flight fai lure. A physical interpretat ion is that 
£ 1 
n p f (k) is the expected number of fa i lures . P (/3) has been used to represent 
i F . 
3 
n p f(k) in the flow diagram of Figure 17. This emphasizes the dependence of 
the expected number of fai lures on the tes t option j and the safety index, j3. 
The expected cost of failure is then given by 
C F = C F (0) = C F P F ((3) = C F n P f (k) . (7.30) 
J 3 
An identical development to equations (7.19) through (7.29) can be constructed, 
using p f (p) = F ( r ) from equation (7.13) in place of p - (k ) , the number of i K 0 i 
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proof tes ts m in place of the number of load cycles n, and the cost of proof 
test failure C in place of the cost of flight failure C . When this is done, 
P 
equation (7.30) is generalized for the proof test option to yield 
CF = CV (£) = C n p ( k ) + C m p ( p ) . (7.31) 
2 P 
7.4 Cost Optimization 
The cost constituents from equations ( 7 . 1 6 ) , ( 7 . 1 8 ) , and (7.30) or 
(7.31) a re now substituted into equation (7 .15) : 
C.(/3) = C + C (j8) + C V (/3) . (7.32) 
] D . w F . 
3 ] 
The notation here emphasizes the dependence of costs on the tes t option j and 
the safety index j3. The cost optimization problem now reduces to the min i -
mization of C.(/3) with respec t to the discre te variable j and the continuous 
variable j3. Consideration of the discre te variable j leads to separate equations 
for each tes t option: 
C 0 ( / 3 ) = C D + C w ( / ? ) + C F ( / 3 ) ( 7 * 3 3 ) 
0 0 
O «J 
A necessary condition for a relat ive minimum cost within a given test option is 
dC.(/3) 
d/3 
0 , (7 .34) 
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provided that C.(/3) is continuous throughout the domain of )3, and dC.(j3) I d/3 
exists at the minimum point. This relative minimum is the absolute minimum 
provided that C.(a) and C.(b) are g rea te r than C.(c) where a and b are 
the end points of the domain of j3 under consideration and c is the value of j3 
at the relat ive minimum given by equation ( 7 . 3 4 ) . Applying equation (7.34) to 
( 7 . 3 3 ) , 
d C (|3) 
- S T " = ° (?'35) 
d C (|3) 
~w~ = ° ' 
Let the solutions of equations (7 . 35) be denoted by /3 = j3*. The minimum costs 
3 
for each of the four test options a re obtained by substituting these solutions into 
equation ( 7 . 3 3 ) . 
C0(fi) = C ^ + Cw(^) + CF$0) (7.36) 
C (p) = C + C (J3 ) + C (/3 ) 
3KH/ D wv 3; F v 3y 
o o 
The minimum cost among all tes t options is selected by 
C = m i n { C o , C^ C 2 , C3} . (7.37) 
Thus, the minimum cost tes t option and safety index combination is that one 
corresponding to C. The minimization procedure just described was i l lustrated 
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by Figure 4 in Chapter HI. Because of the complexity of the expressions for the 
expected cost of failure, the minimization procedure must be done numerically 
or graphically. A graphical method will be i l lustrated by the applications in 
Chapter VIII. 
Throughout Chapter VII there is an implicit assumption that the minimum 
cost for the par t icular s t ruc tura l assembly under consideration is not affected 
by the other assembl ies in the s t ructural system. This assumption is not b e -
lieved to be par t icular ly res t r ic t ive for the typical aerospace system. The high 
rel iabi l i t ies expected in aerospace systems tends to reduce the dependence of the 
probabil i t ies of failure of the various assemblies on each other. Moses and 
Kinser [43] showed that an assumption of independence, when dependence actually 
exis ts , can cause significant e r r o r s in reliability prediction for s t ruc tures with 
low re l iabi l i t ies . 
CHAPTER Vni 
APPLICATIONS 
8. 1 Discussion 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the application of the con-
cepts developed in previous chapters to typical aerospace structural assemblies. 
These concepts culminate in the cost optimization presented in section 7.4. The 
applications given in this chapter are a direct application of the cost optimization 
procedure, where the costs for each test option, as given by equation (7.33), 
are calculated for several values of ]3 . Then the minimum cost decision is 
obtained by plotting the results to obtain the solutions of equations (7. 35) and 
(7.37) graphically. 
Some parametric results useful in applications have been obtained and 
included as Appendix C. These results provide graphical means of determining 
p (k) needed in equation (7.31) Graphs are also presented in Appendix C for 
converting between the safety index and design safety factor. 
8.2 Input Data 
To conserve space and to provide for easy comparison of input and 
results, the applications examples are presented together in parallel instead of 
sequentially. Example structures are representative of structural assemblies 
in NASA's Saturn V launch vehicle and Space Shuttle systems. The information 
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presented regarding these sys tems should not be taken as official NASA data but 
should be considered as typical of such sys tems . The Saturn V system is 
i l lustrated in Figure 19. The S-IVB stage aft skir t and the S-II forward skir t 
a r e the s t ructura l assembl ies from this system selected as examples . A sketch 
of the Space Shuttle system is shown in Figure 20. The External Tank (ET) 
intertank, Orbiter aft fuselage, Orbiter wings, and Solid Rocket Booster aft 
sk i r t a r e selected as examples from the Space Shuttle. 
Data required as input to the decision model for the example problems 
a re shown in Table 9. The table headings indicate where each input is used in 
the equations of Chapter VII. Weight versus safety index is also needed in the 
decision model. This is most readily obtained in the form of weight versus 
safety factor, which is given for the example problems in Figures 21 through 26. 
To plot weight versus safety index would require a family of curves . One way of 
plotting would be to plot a curve for each tes t option, which would hold for only 
one par t icu la r coefficient of variation of load. The weight versus safety factor 
curve holds for any tes t option and any coefficient of variation of load. Since all 
of the example problem s t ruc tures except the S-II stage a re designed for a safety 
factor of 1.4, the reference value of weight mentioned in section 7 . 3 . 2 should 
be the value from the figures corresponding to a 1.4 safety factor ( 1 .3 for the 
s-n). 
8.3 Results 
Results of the application of the decision model to the input data of 
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Figure 19. Saturn V System. 
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Figure 20. Space Shuttle System. 
Table 9. Input Data for Example Problems 
Value of Cost of Cost of Cost of 
Weight Flight Proof Test Test Option 
Example (dollars per Failure Failure Tj 
Problem pound) (dollars) (dollars) (dollars) 
C C C C 
W F F D 
P 1 
Equation Equation Equation Equation 
































Coefficient Number of Number of 
of Variation Flight Load Proof Tests 
of Load Applications 
Equation 
(C-4) 
250 x 10s 0 .72xlO f i 2. 0 x 10i; 3. 28 x 106 1. 0 x 106 
125 x l0e 0 .625xlO h 2 . 0 x 1 0 
250 x i0e 2.0 x 106 5.3 x 10G 
22.25 x 10b 1.0 x 1011 
0. 12916 
250 x I0fi 1.23 x 106 5.3 x l0e 8.69 x 106 2.65 x io6 0.12916 
0.05787 
3 . 3 x 10b 2 , 6 5 x 10f: 0 .05787 
250 x 10G 2 . 0 x 106 5 .3 x 106 6. 6 x 10i; 2 . 6 5 x 106 0 . 3 7 
1-1. 8 x 106 0 . 3 5 x 106 2 . 0 X 1 0 6 8 .25 x 106 1.0 x i O 6 0 .37 
Equat ion 





g , n 
890 
Equat ion 








the expected cost versus safety index and versus safety factor is plotted. Two 
sample calculations a r e shown in Appendix D, and the resul t s a re plotted as 
points A and B in Figure 27 and as points C and D in Figure 29. For clari ty, 
the proof test option T2 has been plotted separately, since there is a separate 
curve for each proof tes t level . In Figure 27(a ) , the resul t s for a s impler cost 
model in which P (/3) was assumed equal to F (n) (equation 7.11) a re plotted 
J 
as dotted l ines . This model applies only if the probabili t ies of failure a re very 
smal l . 
A summary of the final resul t s is given in Table 10 for all example 
problems and all t e s t options. The resu l t s were obtained by selecting minimum 
points on the curves in Figures 27 through 32. 
8.4 Trends Shown by Results 
The optimum decision for each of these example problems is the resul t 
of a complex interaction of severa l factors which contribute to the expected cost. 
Each of the inputs in Table 9 contributes to the expected cost. 
A higher value of weight in a s t ruc tura l assembly tends to produce lower 
optimum safety fac tors . A higher cost of flight failure tends to produce higher 
optimum safety factors . A high cost of proof test failure tends to discourage 
use of the Proof Test Option T2 and to reduce the optimum level of the proof 
tes t load. The optimum proof t es t level represen t s the most cost effective 
balance between expected costs of proof tes t failure and flight fa i lure . The 
number of flight load applications has a pronounced influence on the probability 
of flight failure, resulting in a tendancy toward higher safety factors for larger 
numbers of flights. 
The Proof Test Option, T2, which has seldom been used in aerospace 
structures of this type, appears remarkably effective, even if the maximum 
proof test level is restricted to 70 percent, as was done in Table 10. This 
effectiveness appears to arise because of the ability of this test option to pro-
duce more reliable structures with smaller safety factors than the other test 
options. This trend can be observed by comparing Figure 36(a) with Figure 
37(a) in Appendix C, for example. The advantage of test option T2 would be 
even more pronounced for one-of-a-kind structures, since only one item instead 
of several would have to be tested (m = l ) , resulting in an even lower cost. 
The SRB aft ski r t optimum safety factors are generally lower than those 
of the other structures,, This is very likely because of the lower cost of flight 
failure for this structure, resulting in a lower required reliability as compared 
with the other structures. 
An encouraging aspect of these results is the compatibility of the test 
option Tx optimum factors with past experience. The S-IVB and S-II example 
problems were included to establish this compatibility. The design safety factor 
for these structures was 1.40, which compares closely with the 1.47 optimum 
value for Tt in Table 10. A lack of compatibility with previous experience would 
have made the validity of the model developed here questionable. 
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2.6 2.6 2.25 2.32 3.15 3.08 
V 1.35 1.35 1.37 1.42 1.43 1.37 
Reliability 0.998 0.998 0.955 0.993 0.951 0.933 
Option T3 
* 
0 4.10 4 .15 4.20 4 .65 4 .45 4.00 
v 1.70 
Reliability 0.994 
1.77 1.95 2.30 1.80 1.53 
0.995 0.850 0.956 0.940 0.818 
tThe maximum proof tes t level considered feasible for these s t ruc tures is 
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CHAPTER DC 
RESULTS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
9 .1 Results 
A review of the background mater ia l in s t ructura l reliabili ty was p r e -
sented in Chapter I. This background was based on generally accepted principles 
that had evolved from the l i tera ture on the subject, which was reviewed in 
Chapter II. A problem was posed, and a method of solving the problem, based 
on s ta t is t ical decision theory was presented in Chapter III. Some concepts to be 
used in the problem solution were carefully explained in Chapter IV. The test 
option concept and a special safety factor definition were new ideas introduced 
in Chapter IV, The tes t option formalizes certain s t ruc tura l t e s t procedures in 
a manner suitable for use as one of the decision elements in s ta t is t ical decision 
theory. The special safety factor definition will make the methods developed in 
this dissertat ion much eas ie r for the typical use r to employ than would a l terna-
tive safety factor definitions. 
The use of subjective expert opinion in decision methods was exploited in 
Chapter V. Questionnaires to obtain exper t s ' opinions on s t ruc tura l reliabili ty 
and probabil ist ic models for analyzing the opinions were developed. The validity 
of the questionnaire and modeling techniques was tested by using a t r ia l ques-
tionnaire concerning a problem for which observed data were available for 
comparison with the experts 1 opinions. This comparison revealed that one 
particular model, which utilized the experts* overall assessment of a particular 
strength distribution, agreed remarkably well with the observed data. This 
model and questioning technique was subsequently used to develop a strength 
distribution for a test option for which no observed data were available. 
In Chapter VI, Bayesian statistical methods were used for combining 
prior information from laboratory tests with new information from flight 
experience to develop a strength distribution for a particular test option. This 
was accomplished by fitting a two-parameter Weibuli model to the laboratory 
data by the maximum likelihood method, then updating the scale parameter of 
this distribution with flight data, using Bayesian statistical methods. 
A decision model for selecting the test option and design safety index 
which results in minimum expected cost was developed in Chapter VII and 
applied to six typical aerospace structural assemblies in Chapter VIII. Results 
which appeared reasonable were obtained for each of the six example problems. 
9.2 Conclusions 
1. The decision techniques developed in this research can readily and 
confidently be used for selecting design factors and test options for aerospace 
structures, if minimum expected cost is the desired objective. 
2. Expert opinions are a valuable source of quantitative information in 
structural problems, provided that adequate care and deliberation are used in 
acquiring the opinions and analyzing the results. 
3 . Bayesian statistical techniques provide a viable method of combining 
prior information with new data in structural reliability problems. 
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9.3 Recommendations 
As is the case with most research, the completion of this endeavor 
provides several new problem areas in which further research could be initiated. 
Some of these will be discussed briefly. 
Oie group of such problems could come under the heading of an expan-
sion of the decision space. The introduction of failure modes other than static 
strength failures would constitute such an expansion. For example, inclusion of 
fatigue failures would require that the decision space be expanded to include the 
selection of a fatigue test procedure and a fatigue safety measure, such as a 
design scatter factor. Another example would be the consideration of fracture 
mechanics where the decision would again involve selection of a test procedure 
and a safety measure appropriate to the fracture failure mode. Another con-
sideration which would expand the decision space would be the selection of an 
optimal sample size (e .g. the optimum number of tests to run) which would 
minimize cost. 
A second group of related problems would involve a coupling of the 
decision for a given assembly with the decision for all other assemblies in the 
system. Although all the ramifications of such a coupling have not been fully 
explored, it is quite certain that it would lead to a very sophisticated optimiza-
tion procedure, possibly far beyond any that has been developed. This could be 
an area of research in its own right. Oae cause of such a coupling would be an 
assumption that the reliability of one assembly depends upon the reliability of 
another. The following conditions tend to reduce such a dependence: (l) a small 
variance in load compared with a variance in strength, (2) loads in the various 
assemblies arising from different sources, and (3) high reliability in all 
assemblies. Another cause of assembly coupling would be the application of a 
constraint on the total reliability of a system made up of several assemblies. 
Such a constraint could possibly be dictated by management or contractual 
requirement and would cause the expected cost to be higher than the attainable 
minimum* 
Other features which would increase the quality of a decision would be 
the consideration of multiple load conditions and of the lack of symmetry of the 
cost with respect to an error in the decision. The first feature would simply 
require that all load conditions be included in calculating the probability of 
failure. A special case of this would be the omega condition proposed by Bouton 
and Trent [ 19]. The omega condition is one of infrequent occurrence, such as 
a load that might be caused by failure of a nonstructural system. Such a loading 
could be treated as a load distribution conditional upon the probability of failure 
of the nonstructural system. 
The unsymmetrical cost feature would be so devised that the decision-
maker would not make the decision which absolutely minimizes cost but would 
bias his decision in the direction and by an amount that would minimize his risk 
when the asymmetry of cost with respect to his decision is considered. 
In the previous discussion of test options in Chapter IV, it was implied 
that a test option is deterministic in nature, and this is the intention in the 
present research. However, a more refined approach would not prescribe a 
completely determinist ic course of action but would recognize the probabilistic 
aspects of test ing, such as noise in the test r e su l t s . To be consistent with the 
Bayesian approach, it would not be sufficient to make inductive stat is t ical 
inferences about the probabil i t ies involved, but a means would need to be 
devised to cause such probabilities to be properly weighted as to their effect on 





A A general event. 
A, A.(j3) Action or decision space. 
AI B Event A conditional on event B . 
A n B Intersection of events A and B . 
A U B Union of events A and B . 
a A par t icular action or decision. 
A general event. 
Cause of a difference between actual and predicted strengths, 
Total expected cost. 
Optimum cost. 
Direct cos t s . 
Development cos t s . 
Cost of one failure. 
Expected cost of fai lure. 
Cost of i fai lures . 
Cost of weight. 
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NOMENCLATURE (Continued) 
c Unit cost of weight. 
w 
D Discrepancy between mathematical model and actual s t ructure . 
D A stat is t ic measuring the difference between data and model. 
d A par t icular value of D . 
E An entry in response to questionnaire. 
E Mean value of repondents ' questionnaire en t r i e s . 
E(X) Expected value of X. 
E { A } The event that the statement A is t rue . 
e A constant, 2.71828 
F (x) Cumulative distribution function of the random variable X. 
X 
L^(x) Probabili ty density function of the random variable X. 
f ! (x ) P r i o r density function. 
f ! ' ( x ) Pos te r io r density function. 
f (x) Bayesian density function. 
I. Event of failure in load increment i. 
1 
i, j , k, 1, m, n Enumeration indices. 
k Shape pa ramete r of the Weibull distribution. 
A 
k Maximum likelihood est imate of k. 
L Reliability; likelihood function. 
L (n) Probabili ty that a s t ruc tura l assembly will survive n load 
applications. 
I Number of observed failures in a sample. 
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NOMENCLATURE (Continued) 
t , i ' , i " General , p r io r , and pos ter ior values of a pa ramete r of the 
gamma distribution. 
m Number of s t ructura l assemblies to be proof tested. 
n Number of observations in a sample; number of load cycles 
experienced by a s t ruc ture ; number of alternative actions. 
0 . Number of s t ruc tures expected to fail in load increment i from 
observed data. 
P[A] Probabili ty that event A will occur. 
P_,, P ^ (j3) Expected number of fai lures . 
F F . 
3 
P . Probabili ty of having exactly i fa i lures . 
PDF Probabili ty density function. 
p A constant; proof tes t cycle . 
p (k) Probabil i ty of failure on the k application of load. 
p (k) Probability of no failure on the k application of load. 
p. Probabili ty of failure on the i application of load and surviving 
1 
all o thers . 
p. Probabili ty of failure on the i and r applications of load and 
surviving all o the rs . 
q A constant. 
R, R.(/3) Resis tance or strength of a s t ructura l assembly. 
R A charac te r i s t ic value of the r e s i s t ance . 
P 
R Mean or expected value of the res i s tance . 
r A par t icu lar value of R. 




S Load applied to a s t ruc tura l assembly. 
S A charac ter i s t ic value of the load. 
q 
S Mean or expected value of the load. 
SM Safety margin. 
SM Mean or expected value of the safety margin. 
T Test option. 
U Utility function. 
v Scale pa ramete r of the Weibull distribution. 
v Maximum likelihood est imate of v. 
W, W(j3) Weight of a s t ructura l assembly. 
X, Y, Z Par t i cu la r probabilistic models of exper t s ' opinions. 
y, yT, ytT General , p r io r , and pos ter ior values of a pa ramete r of the gamma 
distribution. 
a A constant; an allowable r i sk ; a scaling factor; significance 
level . 
j3 Safety index. 
/3 Optimum safety index. 
T The gamma function. 
y ,y Coefficients of variat ion of res i s tance and load, respect ively. 
0 Vector of pa rame te r s of a probabilist ic model; the state of nature. 
9 A par t icular value of O . 
A A pa rame te r of the Weibull distribution. 
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NOMENCLATURE (Concluded) 
X A par t icu lar value of A . 
v Safety factor; factor for uncertainty. 
v A safety factor in t e r m s of character is t ic values of res is tance 
and load. 
v Safety factor in t e r m s of mean res is tance and mean load. 
v Safety factor in t e r m s of analysts ' predicted res i s tance and a 
charac ter i s t ics value of load. 
I I Indicates the product of following t e r m s . 
2_, Indicates a summation of following t e r m s . 
<r , a , a Standard deviations of res i s tance , load, and safety margin, 
R' S' SM A. .





This appendix contains the quest ionnaires, as well as the introductory 
l e t t e r s , used to elicit the opinions of experts in s t ructura l analysis and testing, 
The opinions obtained were used in calculating strength distributions for some of 
the tes t options used in this disser ta t ion. 
Questionnaire A was used to tes t the method of acquiring opinions, the 
probabil ist ic models, and the ability of experts to provide the type of informa-
tion needed. The resul ts a re analyzed in Chapter V. Questionnaire B was used 
for obtaining information to develop a strength distribution for test option T3, 
the model test option. The required distribution is calculated from the Ques-
tionnaire B resul t s in Chapter V. The Questionnaire C resul ts yielded subjec-
tive information which was combined with observed data to obtain a strength 
distribution for t e s t option T^, the s tandard test option in Chapter VI. 
The questionnaires a r e included here exactly as they were sent to the 
exper t s . To conserve space, the mean responses to the questionnaires [ s ee 
equation (5 . l ) J a re entered in boldface type in the spaces provided for the 
expertsT r e sponses . 
GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30332 
SCHOOL OF DANIEL GUGGENHEIM SCHOOL 
AEROSPACE ENGINEERING 404-894-3000 OF AERONAUTICS 
Dear : 
I am engaged in r e s e a r c h on s t ruc tura l reliability with Dr . S. V. Hanagud 
at Georgia Tech in aerospace s t ruc tura l engineering. The end product of this 
r e s e a r c h will be a methodology for selecting a combination of design safety 
factors (or equivalent pa ramete r s ) and s t ruc tura l testing options which yields 
a minimum expected sys tem cost. 
The par t icular decision theory to be used in this p rocess permi ts subjec-
tive information as well as objective information to be employed in reaching a 
decision. One type of subjective information is expert opinion. In certain tes t 
cases a remarkable correlat ion between collective expert opinion and indepen-
dent objective data has been observed. 
The enclosed questionnaire is being sent to a few exper t s , such as your-
self, in the a rea of s t ructura l analysis and testing. It i s the f irst of a se r i e s of 
two s imi la r questionnaires which I hope you can find time to answer, 
There is no reason for me to believe that your opinions in this a r ea or 
your employment affiliation should be sensit ive information. Nevertheless , 
your reply will be t rea ted as sensi t ive, and no names or employers will be 
disclosed in the publication of r e su l t s . In fact, the repl ies wi l l be sanitized 
(identification removed) upon receipt , and the publication will be a conglom-
erate of repl ies in which no individual reply appears separately. It may be 
interest ing for you to compare your own opinions with the collective opinions 
of other experts when the resul ts a r e compiled. If you wish to receive a copy 
of the summary re su l t s , please check the box on the first page of the question-
na i re . 
As you may know, I am an employee of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration. However, I am present ly assigned to full-time graduate study 
and am asking this as a personal favor in the interes t of r e sea rch , and not as 
an employee of NASA. To answer the questionnaire will requi re some del ibera-
tion and at leas t one hour of your t ime . However, we believe this effort will be 
amply rewarded by a grea te r insight into the factors affecting s t ruc tura l r e l i -
ability. 
The questionnaire has three p a r t s , arranged in order of importance. 
If t ime does not permit you to answer the ent ire questionnaire, perhaps you 
could complete P a r t I, which is especially s imple . If you intend to reply, 
please do so by July 15, 1973. A mail-back envelope is enclosed for your 
reply to 
Dr. S. Hanagud 
School of Aerospace Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Atlanta, Georgia 30332 
If you are unable to complete the questionnaire for any reason , please 
mail it back anyway so we can keep t rack of our r e t u r n s . Detach this let ter 
for your records if you wisho 
Thank you very much for your t ime . 
Sincerely, 
JMT/ i c t 




A STUDY OF FACTORS AFFECTING 
THE ACCURACY OF AEROSPACE STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 
S. V. Hanagud and J. M. Thomas 
School of Aerospace Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Atlanta, Georgia 30332 
( ) Please send summary of study results. 
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INTRODUCTION 
EXPLANATION OF SERIES OF QUESTIONNAIRES 
The series of questionnaires consists of two separate question-
naires, A and B. Questionnaire A Is enclosed. Questionnaire B will 
be sent to respondents of A, after the results of A have been analyzed. 
The purpose of A is to determine the validity of the expert 
opinion approach in this particular application. Some objective data 
are available for comparison with the collective expert opinion to be 
obtained from A. 
If there is good correlation between the objective data and expert 
opinion from A, B will be sent out. B will relate to a situation where 
objective data are not available. Thus, the collective expert opinion 
will be the only source of data available for the situation in B. 
EXPLANATION OF QUESTIONNAIRE A 
The questionnaire seeks to determine the amount and source of 
errors which can be expected in aerospace static structural analysis 
before the analyst has obtained qualification test results. This is 
done by using the analyst's predicted failure load as a baseline 
value and attempting to determine the scatter about this baseline. 
The analyst's prediction contains no safety factor. That is, the 100% 
value is not limit load or limit load times the required safety factor, 
but Is the load at which the analyst predicts the structure will fail. 
It is assumed that there is always some difference (sometimes very small) 
between the analyst's prediction and the actual failure load. 
Innumerable questions would have to be answered to remove all 
ambiguity from the questionnaire. For example, one could legitimately 
ask: was the analysis done by the superior methods of my own company 
or by the obsolete methods of Company X? How much development testing 
or prior experience is associated with the design In question? What 
is the type of construction, etc? You are asked to answer these types 
of questions for yourself (and to yourse"lf) by drawing on your own 
experience as to what constitutes a typical development program of a 
typical aerospace system. 
It is perfectly acceptable to consult with your co-workers or to 
review any data which you may have in hand in answering the questionnaire 




PART I. HOW ACCURATE ARE ANALYSTS' PREDICTIONS? 
Suppose that during a typical development program of a typical 
major aerospace system, the point in time has been reached for struc-
tural static qualification testing to begin. The test program is to be 
accomplished by testing one each of a number of large structural 
assemblies such as a complete wing, a thrust structure, a large fuse-
lage section, an interstage structure, etc. For each assembly, the 
responsible stress analysts have given predictions of the ultimate fail-
ure loads under static conditions (no fatigue involved). We are 
interested in your judgement of how accurate we can expect these predic-
tions to be. 
In the table below are ten test failure load increments, expressed 
as a percentage of analysts' predictions. Please indicate the approxi-
mate percentage of test failures you would expect to fall in each incre-
ment for static structural tests of this sort. For example, if you 
believe 20$ of the assemblies tested will fail between 80$ and 90$ of 
failure load predicted by the analysts, you would enter 20$ in column 
w. 
Table 1. Accuracy of Analysts' Predictions 
r • 





































2.2 3.3 7.1 17.2 29.3 t 20.6 11.3 4.5 3.5 
\ 
Check: Do your estimates of percent failures total 100$. 
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PART 11(A). WHAT CAUSES ANALYSTS' ERRORS? 
We are interested in your opinion of what typically causes 
predicted failure loads to "be different from actual test failure loads 
in tests of large structural assemblies. Listed below are several 
possible causes for these differences, with space for you to add any 
other causes which might account for the differences. 
In the table below, you are asked to indicate your judgement of 
the approximate percentage of all errors which are primarily caused 
by each of the causes listed (including any you have added). For 
example, if you feel that 5 out of every 100 prediction errors are due 
to "Scatter in material properties", please enter 'V opposite item k 
in the table. 
Table 2. Causes of Errors 
*Responses not shown. See letter introducing 
Questionnaire B. 
Primary Cause of Prediction Error 
1. Analysts' mathematical model is a poor repre-
sentation of the actual structure. 
2. Analyst made a mathematical error. 
3. Analyst overlooked (or failed to analyze) 
some critical area or failure mode. 
k. Scatter in material properties. 
5. Variation (within tolerance) of dimensions. 
6. Undetected manufacturing error. 
7. Test load condition did not represent flight 
condition used by analyst for prediction, (e.g., 
aerodynamic loads and boundary conditions are 
difficult to duplicate). 
8. Other causes (Please list). 
Approximate 
Percentage of 








Check: Do your percentages sum to 100$)? TOTAL lOOfo 
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PART 11(B). SIZE OF ERRORS FROM DIFFERENT CAUSES 
On the previous page you gave an indication of what you believe 
are the causes for differences in predicted and test strengths of 
structural assemblies. In the tables below you are asked to indicate 
the amounts by which you believe these causes can affect the difference. 
The causes are to be considered one at a time. You are asked to assume 
that a given cause has been determined to be the reason for differences 
between test and predicted strengths in a number of assemblies. 
Please enter in the tables below your opinion of the percentages 
of assemblies which you believe would fail in each load increment due 
to the given cause. The sum of entries in each table should total 100$. 
Table 3. Analysts1 Mathematical Model Is A Poor 
Representation of the Actual Structure 
1 


































3.9 5.3 7.4 12.0 17.4 17.8 15.8 10.9 5.0 4.5 
Table k. Analyst Made a Mathematical Error 


































8.7 7.4 9.4 14.6 15.6 16.1 12.5 6.6 4.3 4.8 
PART 11(B). SIZE OF ERRORS FROM DIFFERENT CAUSES (Continued) 
Table 5- Analyst Overlooked (or Failed to Analyze) 
Some Critical Area or Failure Mode 


































7.6 11.2 16.2 21.2 26.6 7.3 5.3 3.2 1.1 0.4 
Table 6. Scatter in Material Properties 


































0.3 0.5 1.2 5.8 25.4 35.0 17.5 8.9 4.4 1.0 
Table 7. Variation (Within Tolerance) of Dimensions 


































0.2 0.4 2.3 7.0 32.4 36.7 12.3 5.1 3.1 0.5 
PART 11(B). SIZE OF ERRORS FROM DIFFERENT CAUSES (Continued) 
Table 8.- Undetected Manufacturing Error 


































8.6 10.9 13.6 16.9 24.3 14.4 5.5 3.7 1.5 0.7 
Table ^. Test Load Condition Did Not Represent Flight 
Condition Used by Analyst for Prediction 

































1.3 3.0 7.9 16.1 25.7 20.8 13.9 7.0 3.6 0.7 
Table 10. Other Causes 

































3.1 5.1 8.9 10.1 24.2 15.4 11.5 10.2 6.3 5.2 
Check: Do your entries in each table total 100$? 
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PART III(A). DISCREPANCIES XW MATHEMATICAL MODE IS 
The purpose of Part III is to further quantify the errors in 
mathematical models (Cause Number l ) . That is, the individual dis-
crepancies which cause the analysts' mathematical model to be a poor 
representation of the actual structure will be examined. 
In the table below, please indicate in the Frequency of Occurrence 
column the percentage of occasions you believe the discrepancy in the 
left column will be the primary reason that the analysts' mathematical 
model is in error. The Frequency of Occurrence column should total 100f0. 
Table 11. Frequency of Discrepancies 
Discrepancy Between Analysts' Mathematical Frequency of 
Model and Actual Structure Occurrence 
1. A stress distribution Is assumed instead of cal-
culated. Example: Linear stress distribution 
assumed over beam cross section near end of beam. 12.4 % 
2. A linear analysis is used where a nonlinear analysis 
is closer to reality. Examples: Elastic analysis 
used in plastic area. Small deformation theory used 
where deformations are lara;e. 18.2 
3. Empirical data is extrapolated boo far. Example: 
Lightly stiffened shell buckling coefficients used 
for heavily stiffened shell. _ 1 ? L L 
h. Incorrect boundary conditions are used. Example: 
Fixed edge used where component joins another 
elastic structure. 17.3 
5. Finite element model is too coarse. Example: 
Rapid stress changes at discontinuity or 
cutout not predicted by model. 16.6 
6. Geometric idealization is incorrect. Example: 
Sheet-stringer combination treated as 
isotropic plate. 12.1 
7. Anisotropic or inhomogeneous materials treated 
as isotropic or homogeneous. Example: 
Composite material analyzed by methods applicable 
only to homogeneous, isotropic materials. 6.1 
8. Other discrepancies (Please list). 
_ 4.2 % 
Total: 100$ 
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PART III(B) . SIZE OF ERRORS FROM DISCREPANCIES IN MATHEMATICAL MODELS 
In this part you are asked to indicate the amounts "by which you 
believe the discrepancies listed on the previous page can affect the 
difference between predicted and test strengths. The discrepancies 
are to be considered one at a time. You are asked to assume that a 
given discrepancy is known to be the reason for differences between 
predicted and test strengths. 
Please enter in the tables below your opinion of the percentages 
of assemblies which you believe would fail in each load increment due 
to the given discrepancy. The sum of entries in each table should 
total 100$. 
Table 12. A Stress Distribution Is Assumed Instead of Calculated 
































1 of Failures 
3.5 3.3 5.6 15.7 23.3 18.8 14.9 7.9 5.0 2.0 
Table 13. A Linear Analysis Is Used Where a 
Nonlinear Analysis Is Closer to Reality 


































5.0 4.6 6.2 15.5 19.0 17.3 10.7 10.2 8.3 3.3 
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PART I I I ( B ) . SIZE OF ERRORS FROM DISCREPANCIES IN MATHEMATICAL MODELS 
(Continued) 
Table l̂ f. Empir ica l Data Is Ex t rapo la ted Too Far 
1 - . _ 


































3.2 5.6 10.0 15.7 24.1 19.5 10.3 6.7 3.7 1.2 
Table 15. Inco r r ec t Boundary Conditions Are Used 


































2.2 3.9 7.9 14.5 23.4 17.8 14.8 7.9 5.3 2.2 
Table 16. F i n i t e Element Model Is Too Coarse 


































2.5 4.3 11.0 24.1 24.5 15.0 9.8 4.7 3.1 1.0 
PART III(B). SIZE OF ERRORS FROM DISCREPANCIES IN MATHEMATICAL MODELS 
^Continued) 
Table 17. Geometric Idealization Is Incorrect 
> • 


































3.9 4.0 7.6 14.2 24.0 23.1 11.7 5.6 4.4 1.6 
Table 18. Anisotropic or Inhomogeneous Materials 
Treated As Isotropic or Homogeneous 


































8.3 7.0 10.2 16.5 22.3 16.1 10.2 5.0 3.2 1.3 
s 
Table 19. Other Discrepancies 


































" » — ' • 
7.2 3.3 7.8 15.6 18.9 22.2 12.2 7.2 3.9 1.7 




End of Questionnaire A 
Please enclose in envelope provided and mail to 
Dr. S. Hanagud 
School of Aerospace Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 




GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30332 
SCHOOL OF DANIEL GUGGENHEIM SCHOOL 
AEROSPACE ENGINEERING OF AERONAUTICS 
Dear : 
Your response to our first questionnaire on factors affecting the accuracy 
of aerospace s t ructural analysis was certainly appreciated. Some meaningful 
pre l iminary resu l t s have already been obtained from Questionnaire A, and a 
summary of those resu l t s is enclosed. Analysis of Questionnaire A is continuing 
along the line of searching for better data reduction techniques. 
As mentioned in our f irs t le t ter an enclosed second questionnaire has been 
prepared , which is s imi la r to the first questionnaire, but deals with the increased 
analytical accuracy obtained through an expanded component and model develop-
ment tes t p rogram. 
It has been determined that Pa r t Il(A) in Questionnaire A was probably 
poorly constructed (see enclosed Pre l iminary Results from Questionnaire A) . 
Therefore , a revision of Pa r t 11(A) is included in this mailing. P lease complete 
the revised Table 2 and re turn it with Questionnaire B. 
Your reply to Questionnaire B is especially important to us , since it is 
being sent only to respondents of Questionnaire A. 
If you intend to reply, p lease do so by September 17, 1973. Thank you 
again for spending p a r t of your valuable t ime in helping with this r eaea rch . 
Sincerely, 
J e r r e l l M, Thomas 
JMT/j t 
Enclosure 
Serial Number Mean Response 
Questionnaire B 
A STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF 
MODEL AND COMPONENT TESTING IN INCREASING 
THE ACCURACY OF AEROSPACE STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 
S . V. Hanagud and J. M. Thomas 
School of Aerospace Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Atlanta, Georgia 30332 
( ) Please send summary of study results 
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INTRODUCTION 
This questionnaire seeks to determine the amount and source of er-
rors in aerospace static structural analysis, assuming that the analyst 
has available to him the results of an extensive component and model de-
velopment test program. This is done by using the analyst's predicted 
value as a baseline value and attempting to determine the scatter about 
this baseline. The analyst's prediction contains no safety factor. That 
is, the 100% value is the load at which the analyst predicts the struc-
ture will fail. It is assumed that there is always some difference (some-
times very small) between the analyst's prediction and the actual failure 
load. 
In Questionnaire A you were asked to assume that the analyst's pre-
dictions were based on a typical development program of a typical aero-
space system. The point In time assumed was before any static qualifica-
tion testing had been accomplished. The only change in these assumptions 
for Questionnaire B Is that much more than a typical development program 
is assumed to have been accomplished in the area of component and model 
testing. The expanded component and model test program to be assumed is 
described qualitatively In the following paragraph. 
A component is defined as a reasonably small structural subassem-
bly such as a ring segment, a thrust post (longeron), or a major fitting. 
A model is a scaled (in the engineering sense) replica of a large struc-
tural assembly. Development testing is accomplished on such components 
and models through the use of an iterative process. The iterative process 
involves basing the test conditions on expected service conditions, pre-
diction of test results by the best available analysis methods, direct 
and detailed comparison of test results with analytical predictions, and 
repetition of design, analysis, and tejsting until analysisi and test re-
su±t:s~agre"e. Design of every subassembly of the flight article i_s_ then 
based on these components and models, and the flight article is analyzed 
by the same techniques which agreed with the model and component test re-
sults . 
All parts of Questionnaire B pertain to the accuracy in analysis 
of the flight article after such an extensive development program but 
before any full scale structural qualification testing. 
Even if you have no data or observations in such a situation, we 
are interested in your opinion about the expected accuracy. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE B 
PART I. HOW ACCURATE ARE ANALYSTS' PREDICTIONSV 
Suppose that during development of a typical aerospace system, a 
number of large structural assemblies have been developed through the 
model and component test procedure described in the introduction. For 
each assembly, the responsible stress analysts have given predictions of 
the ultimate failure loads under static conditions (no fatigue involved). 
We are interested in your judgement of how accurate we can expect these 
predictions to be. 
In the table below are ten test failure load increments, expressed 
as a percentage of analysts' predictions. Please indicate the approximate 
percentage of test failures you would expect to fall In each increment if 
each assembly developed by the above procedure is subjected to a static 
test. For example, if you believe 20% of the assemblies tested will fail 
between 80% and ^0c/0 of failure load predicted by the analysis, you would 
enter 20% in column (h). 







































0.11 0.94 3.33 8.00 19.72 41.40 
L 




Check: Do your estimates of percent failures total 100%? 
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PART 11(A). WHAT CAUSES DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PREDICTED AND ACTUAL FAILURE 
LOADS? 
Assume that differences of various magnitudes have been observed 
between analysts' predicted failure load and actual test failure load in 
each of 100 structural assemblies consisting of components developed 
according to the expanded component and model test program described in 
the introduction. In the table below Is a list of possible causes of 
the observed differences. 
Assume that in the sample of 100 structural assemblies you will 
always find one of the causes present, and that occasionally you may find 
more than one cause present. For example, scatter in material properties 
and variation of dimensions could be present in addition to an analyst's 
poor mathematical model. 
In what percentage of the tests do you believe that each of the 
causes was a contributor to the observed difference, regardless of the 
magnitude of the difference? Your entries in Table 2 can also be inter-
preted to represent how often or how frequently you think the given cause 
contributes to differences in predicted and actual strengths. Because the 
sample Is concerned with all structures that differed from the analyst's 
prediction, without regard for the magnitude of the differences, any one 
or more of these causes (e.g. scatter in material properties or variation 
of dimensions* or any one of the other 8 causes in the list) may be re-
sponsible (Hypothetically) for only small magnitudes of differences, but 
could be present in Large numbers in the sample of 100. Causes h and 5 
are to be interpreted as normal or natural occurrences and the remaining 
causes are Intended to represent errors or anomalies. Since one or more 
causes are assumed to always be present, your entries should total 100^ 
or more. 
Table 2. Causes of Differences 
Frequency of 
Cause of Difference Occurrence 
1. Analysts' mathematical model is a poor representation 
of the actual structure. 21.33 % 
2. Analyst made a mathematical error. 6.72 % 
3- Analyst overlooked (or failed to analyze) some 
critical area or failure mode, 24.44 % 
*These causes are given as examples only and should not be permitted 
to influence your response. 
Table,2. Causes of Differences (continued) 
Cause of Difference 
h. Scatter in material properties. 
5. Variation (within tolerance) of dimensions. 
6. Undetected manufacturing error. 
7• Test load condition did not represent flight 
condition used by analyst for prediction, (e.g., 
aerodynamic loads and boundary conditions are 
difficult to duplicate). 










PART 11(B). SIZE OF ERRORS FROM DIFFERED CAUSES 
On the previous page you gave an indication of what you believe 
are the causes for differences in predicted and test strengths of 
structural assemblies. In the tables below you are asked to indicate 
the amounts by which you believe these causes can affect the difference. 
The causes are to be considered one at a time. You are asked to assume 
that a given cause has been determined to be the reason for differences 
between test and predicted strengths in a number of assemblies. 
Please enter in the tables below your opinion of the percentages 
of assemblies which you believe would fail in each load increment due 
to the given cause. The sum of entries in each table should total 100$. 
Table 3« Analysts' Mathematical Model Is A Poor 
Representation of the Actual Structure 
• 
Test F a i l u r e Load Increment - Percent of A n a l y s t s ' 
P r e d i c t i o n 
(1) 
<6o 



























Es t imate of 
Percentage 
of F a i l u r e s 
1.89 2.22 8.17 15.11 22.94 23.33 15.28 
.. , ... »J 
6.11 3.50 1.44 
Table h. Analyst Made a Mathematical Error 
Test F a i l u r e Load Increment - Percent of A n a l y s t s ' 
P r e d i c t i o n 
(1) 
<60 


























Es t imate of 
Percentage 
of F a i l u r e s 
1.69 3.88 8.56 18.44 23.88 21.81 11.88 5.81 2.81 1.25 
PART 11(B). SIZE OF ERRORS FROM DIFFERENT CAUSES (Continued) 
Table 5. Analyst Overlooked (or Failed to Analyze) 
Some Critical Area or Failure Mode 


































3.83 8.00 13.28 23.89 27.22 12.78 7.22 2.72 1.00 0.06 
Table 6. Scatter in Material Properties 


































0.06 0.13 1.81 9.81 28.25 34.63 19.91 4.81 0.50 0.06 
Table 7- Variation (Within Tolerance) of Dimensions 


































0.06 0.50 2.25 10.00 31.56 33.75 15.81 4.38 1.63 0.06 
PART 11(B). SrZE OF ERRORS FROM DIFFERENT CAUSES (Continued) 
Table 8. Undetected Manufacturing Error 
T e s t F a i l u r e Load I n c r e m e n t - P e r c e n t of A n a l y s t s ' 
















1 0 0 -
110 
(7) 
1 1 0 -
120 
(8) 
1 2 0 -
130 
(9) 





E s t i m a t e o f 
P e r c e n t a g e 
[of F a i l u r e s 
4.00 7.11 11.78 23.83 28.33 16.39 6.44 1.28 0.67 0.17 
Table 9. Test Load Condition Did Not Represent Flight 
Condition Used by Analyst for Prediction 
T e s t F a i l u r e Load I n c r e m e n t - P e r c e n t of A n a l y s t s ' 
















1 0 0 -
110 
(7) 
1 1 0 -
120 
(8) 
1 2 0 -
130 
(9) 





E s t i m a t e of 
P e r c e n t a g e 
o f F a i l u r e s 
0.13 1.56 8.44 16.38 28.88 22.19 13.94 5.81 2.19 0.50 
Table 10. Other Causes 
T e s t F a i l u r e Load I n c r e m e n t - P e r c e n t of A n a l y s t s ! 
















1 0 0 -
110 
(7) 
1 1 0 -
120 
(8) 








E s t i m a t e o f 
P e r c e n t a g e 
o f F a i l u r e s 
2.50 11.00 10.50 16.00 24.50 15.50 9.00 6.50 3.00 1.50 
Check: Do your entries in each table total 100#? 
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PART III(A). DISCREPANCIES IN MATHEMATICAL MODE IB 
The purpose of Part III is to further quantify the errors in 
mathematical models (Cause Number l). That is, the individual dis-
crepancies which cause the analysts' mathematical model to be a poor 
•representation of the actual structure will be examined. 
In the table below, please indicate in the Frequency of Occurrence 
column the percentage of occasions you believe the discrepancy in the 
left column will be the primary reason that the analysts' mathematical 
model is in error. The Frequency of Occurrence column should total 100$ 
Table 11. Frequency of Discrepancies 
Discrepancy Between Analysts' Mathematical Frequency of 
Model and Actual Structure Occurrence 
1. A stress distribution is assumed instead of cal-
culated. Example: Linear stress distribution 
assumed over beam cross section near end of beam. 11.72 $ 
2. A linear analysis is used where a nonlinear analysis 
is closer to reality. Examples: Elastic analysis 
used in plastic area. Small deformation theory used 
where deformations are large. 17.65 j£ 
3. Empirical data is extrapolated too far. Example: 
Lightly stiffened shell buckling coefficients used 
for heavily stiffened shell. 12.94 % 
h. Incorrect boundary conditions are used. Example: 
Fixed edge used where component joins another 
elastic structure. 18.94 $ 
5. Finite element model is too coarse. Example: 
Rapid stress changes at discontinuity or 
cutout not prelicted by model. 20.00 <f0 
6. Geometric idealization is incorrect. Example: 
Sheet-stringer combination treated as 
isotropic plate . 13.59 <f0 
7. Anisotropic or inhomogeneous materials treated 
as isotropic or homogeneous. Example: 
Composite material analyzed by methods applicable 
only to homogeneous, isotropic materials. 3.76 j0 




PART III(B). SIZE OF ERRORS FROM DISCREPANCIES IN MATHEMATICAL MODELS 
In this part you are asked to indicate the amounts by which you 
believe the discrepancies listed on the previous page can affect the 
difference between predicted and test strengths. The discrepancies 
are to be considered one at a time. You are asked to assume that a 
given discrepancy is known to be the reason for differences between 
predicted and test strengths. 
Please enter in the tables below your opinion of the percentages 
of assemblies which you believe would fail In each load increment due 
to the given discrepancy. The sum of entries in each table should 
total 100$. 
Table 12. A Stress Distribution Is Assumed Instead of Calculated 


































0.33 2.67 10.67 15.73 25.33 24.13 12.40 5.33 3.13 0.27 
Table 13. A Linear Analysis Is Used Where a 
Nonlinear Analysis Is Closer to Reality 


































1.69 2.13 8.63 18.69 23.75 22.81 12.88 5.75 2.69 1.00 
PART I I I ( B ) . SIZE OF ERRORS FROM DISCREPANCIES DJ MATHEMATICAL MODELS 
(Continued) 
Table Ik, Empir ica l Data Is Ex t r apo la t ed Too Far 
T e s t F a i l u r e Load Inc remen t - P e r c e n t of A n a l y s t s ' 






























E s t i m a t e of 
P e r c e n t a g e 
of F a i l u r e s 
0.47 4.59 13.06 22.24 25.12 16.53 10.88 4.82 2.12 0.18 
Table 15. I nco r r ec t Boundary Conditions Are Used 
T e s t F a i l u r e Load I n c r e m e n t - P e r c e n t of A n a l y s t s ' 
















1 0 0 -
110 
(7) 











E s t i m a t e of 
P e r c e n t a g e 
[of F a i l u r e s 
0.53 3.06 5.82 16.12 32.71 19.53 10.18 7.82 3.53 0.71 
Table 16. F i n i t e Element Model Is Too Coarse 
T e s t F a i l u r e Load I n c r e m e n t - P e r c e n t of A n a l y s t s ' 
















1 0 0 -
110 
(7) 











E s t i m a t e of 
P e r c e n t a g e 
of F a i l u r e s 
0.71 4.59 13.00 22.76 30.76 15.59 7.53 3.76 1.18 0.12 
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PART III(B). SIZE OF ERRORS FROM DISCREPANCIES IN MATHEMATICAL MODELS 
(Continued) 
Table 17. Geometric Idealization Is Incorrect 
1 _ 
Test F a i l u r e Increment - Percent of Ana lys t s ' 





























Est imate of 
Percentage 
of F a i l u r e s 
0.41 2.59 11.41 19.82 29.71 19.59 10.41 4.47 1.47 0.12 
Table 18. Anisotropic or Inhomogeneous Materials 
Treated As Isotropic or Homogeneous 
.,_ . _ — Test F a i l u r e Load Increment - Percent of Ana lys t s ' 
















1 0 0 -
110 
(7) 











Est imate of 
Percentage 
of F a i l u r e s 
2.73 5.67 12.00 17.27 25,33 17.33 10.93 5.00 3.33 0.40 
Table 19• Other Discrepancies 
• - — • . . . i 
Test F a i l u r e Load Increment - Percent of Ana ly s t s ' 
















1 0 0 -
110 
(7) 
1 1 0 -
120 
(8) 








Est imate of 
Percentage 
of F a i l u r e s 
1.67 3.83 7.50 22.00 21.67 26.33 9.17 4.17 2.00 1.67 
Check: Do your entries in each table total 100$? 
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PART IV, COST OF DEVELOPMENT TEST PROGRAM 
We are interested in the relative cost of the model and component 
development test program considered in this .questionnaire. All costs 
related to the testing are of interest except construction of facilities 
Some pertinent costs are test hardware, instrumentation, fixtures, and 
test operations. 
What would you expect such a model and component test program to 
cost, expressed as a percentage of a typical static structural qualifi-
cation test program? 
50 i 
PART V. COMMENTS 
End of Questionnaire B 
Please enclose in envelope provided and mail to 
Dr. S. Hanagud 
School of Aerospace Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Atlanta, Georgia 30332 
Name: 
Employer: 
Revision to Part II(A) of Questionnaire A 
Please complete and return with Questionnaire B 
213 
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PART 11(A). WHAT CAUSES DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PREDICTED AND ACTUAL FAILURE 
LOADS? 
Assume that differences of various magnitudes have been observed 
between analyst's predicted failure load and actual test failure load in 
each of 100 structural assemblies developed according to what you would 
consider typical aerospace structural development program. In the table 
below is a list of possible causes of the observed differences. 
Assume that in the sample of 100 structural assemblies you will 
always find one of the causes present, and that occasionally you may find 
more than one cause present. For example, scatter in material properties 
and variation of dimensions could be present in addition to an analyst's 
poor mathematical model. 
In what percentage of the tests do you believe that each of the 
causes was a contributor to the observed difference, regardless of the 
magnitude of the difference? Your entries in Table 2 can also be inter-
preted to represent how often or how frequently you think the given cause 
contributes to differences in predicted and actual strengths. Because the 
sample is concerned with all structures that differed from the analyst's 
prediction, without regard for the magnitude of the differences, any one 
or more of these causes (e.g. scatter in material properties or variation 
of dimensions* or any one of the other 8 causes in the list) may be re-
sponsible (Hypothetically) for only small magnitudes of differences, but 
could be present in large numbers in the sample of 100. Causes k and 5 
are to be interpreted as normal or natural occurrences and the remaining 
causes are intended to represent errors or anomalies. Since one or more 
causes are assumed to always, be present, your entries should total 100^ 
or more. 
Table 2. Causes of Differences 
Frequency of 
Cause of Difference Occurrence 
1. Analysts' mathematical model is a poor representation 
of the actual structure. 25.00 % 
2. Analyst made a mathematical error. 8.38 <f0 
3- Analyst overlooked (or failed to analyze) some 
critical area or failure mode. 24.69 <f0 
* These causes are given as examples only and should not be permitted 
to influence your response. 
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Table 2. Causes of Differences (continued) 
Frequency of 
Cause of Difference Occurrence 
h. Scatter in material properties. 
5. Variation (-within tolerance) of dimension. 
6. Undetected manufacturing error. 
7. Test load condition did not represent flight 
condition used by analyst for prediction, (e.g., 
aerodynamic loads and boundary conditions are 
difficult to duplicate) . 19-63 




— 4.69 fQ 
Total: 130.33 % 
Serial Number Mean Response 
Questionnaire C 
AEROSPACE STRUCTURES 
STRENGTH IMPROVEMENT BY DESIGN MODIFICATIONS 
AND 
LOADS EXPERIENCED BY SATURN V FLIGHT STRUCTURES 
J. M. THOMAS 
School of Aerospace Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Atlanta, Georgia 30332 
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QUESTIONNAIRE C 
Questionnaire C consists of two separate areas of interest: improvement 
in strength of structural assemblies gained by design modifications made 
in the structure after test failures and loads typically experienced by 
structures in flight. These areas will be considered separately in 
Parts I and II. 
Part I. IMPROVEMENT IN STRENGTH BY DESIGN MODIFICATIONS 
Suppose that a large number of large aerospace structural assemblies, 
designed and analyzed by typical methods, have been static tested. We 
are interested in the portion of these structures that failed at less 
than the analysts' predicted failure load, which is designated as 100% 
design ultimate load (DUL). Suppose that of those structures failing, 
8% failed between 7 0% and 80%, 35% failed between 80% and 90% , and 
57% failed between 90% and 100% of the analysts' predicted failure load. 
This is shown in line 1 of Table 1, below. 
Now assume that failure analyses of these structures are conducted, 
design changes are made and incorporated in the test assemblies, and 
the assemblies are retested and all sustain at least 100% load. 
Suppose that a new group of these assemblies is now built, and the 
same design changes incorporated in the test assemblies are incorporated 
in the new build. If this new build of assemblies should now be tested, 
what percentage would you expect to fail in each load increment given 
in Table 1? Enter your estimates in line 2. Your estimates should 
total 100%. 
Table 1. Strength Improvement 
, 
Line 
i ' • • • •• • 
Description 
Test Failure Load Increment - Percent 
of Analysts' Prediction (DUL) 
(1) 







1 Percent of Structures 
Failing First Test in 
Each Increment 
8 35 57 -
2 Your Estimate of Per-
cent of Redesigned 
Structures Failing in 
Each Increment 
0.11 1.22 6.78 91.89 
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Part II. LOADS EXPERIENCED BY SATURN V FLIGHT STRUCTURES 
We are interested in loads experienced by large structural assemblies 
of the Saturn V system in actual operation. Many structural assemblies 
have more than one critical design condition. In all that follows, 
consider the maximum load experienced in each mission for each design 
condition as one "loading" of the structure. Of all loadings experienced 
by all assemblies of the Saturn V launch vehicle in all missions to date, 
what percentage of the loadings do you believe fell in each load increment 
shown in Table 2, below? The Table is in terms of design ultimate load. 
Your entries should total 100%. 
Table 2. Loads on Saturn V Structures in Operation 
^ — __ «., . 






















Your Estimate of 
Percent of Struc-
tures Experiencing 
Loading in Each 
Increment 
15.00 7.22 9.22 12.44 20.22 13.78 22.11 
* 71% of design ultimate load is approximately limit load. If you are 
aware of any Saturn structures experiencing greater than limit load, 




This appendix gives the resul t s of a paramet r ic analysis which was done 
to establish the sensitivity of the probability of failure of a s t ruc tura l assembly 
to certain variables: test option T., safety index j3, safety factor v, and 
coefficient of variation of load y. The figures presented here a re very useful 
o 
for determining the probability of failure for a single application of load, p f ( k ) , 
as given by equation (7. 6 ) , Chapter VII. The p f(k) determined from these 
figures can then be entered into the cost model through equation (7 . 30), Chapter 
VII, or used for any other purpose for which p f(k) is required. 
The figures, in conjunction with the nomenclature in Appendix A, a re 
essentially self-contained, and no detailed explanation of each figure is required. 
An outline of the method used to calculate a typical point for plotting on 
the p f (k) versus (3 curves follows. F rom the definition of the safety index, 
P = , R ~ S , (c-i) 
^R'W 
where or = y R and a = y S . Then 
XV xt O b 
R - S 
^ V R 2 + 7 S 2 S^ 
(C-2) 
220 
Note that for positive values of 8> R > S . If both sides of equation (C-2) a re 
squared, and the result ing equation is solved for S , 
1 W 1 - ( l - y 2 / 3 2 ) ( i - y 2/?2)' 
s = R 1 . y 2^2 ~ • ( c - 3 ) 
Interest is usually in positive values of 8, and S and R a r e defined as positive 
rea l quantit ies. Note that the denominator of equation (C-3) is always less than 
unity. Therefore, if R is to be g rea te r than S as must be the case for positive 
j3, the numera tor in brackets must also be less than unity. This implies that the 
minus sign must always be chosen in front of the radical . 
s - R rfrv—— " (c"4) 
Now, beginning with an assumed test option (which uniquely determines 
R and y ) , an assumed value of y , and an assumed positive value of 0, S can 
R o 
be calculated from equation ( C - 4 ) . If a normal distribution of the applied load 
is assumed, then sufficient information is now available to evaluate the integral 
equation (7. 6) of Chapter VII and plot one point on the p f(k) versus p curves . 
Next, additional values of B a r e assumed with the other p a r a m e t e r s held fixed, 
and severa l points a re plotted to establish one curve. These computations a re 
easily ca r r i ed out on a hand calculator or a smal l computer . 
Once S has been determined from equation ( C - 4 ) , the safety factor v 
consistent with the assumed value for B can be determined from equation (4. 20) 
of Chapter IV. To do this, a value of q must be selected, and a value of 3. 0 
was selected for q for all numerical computations in this dissertation. The 
results of the parametric calculations are shown in Figures 33 through 38. 
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Figure 34. Probabili ty of Fai lure versus Safety Index for 
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To i l lustrate the method used for plotting the cost optimization curves , 
F igures 27 through 32 in Chapter VIII, sample calculations will be performed in 
this appendix for two of the sample problems . This is accomplished by applying 
the equations of Chapter VII to data for the example problems in Table 9. 
D. 1 Procedure 
A s tep-by-s tep procedure for calculating one point in the cost optimiza-
tion curves will be given. 
1. List the input data from Table 9: c , C „ , C_ , C_ , y^, n, m. 
w F F D. S 
P J 
2. Assume a value of (3. 
3. F rom Figure 33, read the corresponding value of v for the appro-
pr ia te t e s t option and y . 
o 
4. F r o m the appropriate Figures 21 through 26, read the weight value 
r^J 
corresponding to v from step 3. 
5. Determine W(j3) by subtracting the baseline weight from the weight 
determined in step 4. The baseline weight may be selected a rb i t ra r i ly and the 
expected cost will then be relat ive to this a rb i t r a ry baseline. In the examples 
in this d isser ta t ion, baseline weights corresponding to v - 1.4 were used 
/ • » > 
except for the S-II forward sk i r t , where i> = 1.3 was used. 
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6. Calculate the cost of weight, C = c W(/3), equation (7 . 18). W(/3) 
w w 
is from step 5, and c is from the input data. 
w 
7. Read p f(k) from the appropriate Figures 34 through 38. 
8. If the calculation is for the proof test option, determine 
, 6.43 
/ r \ 
\ 0 \ 
\ 115 5 / 
P f(p) = F ( r ) = 1 - e \ ' / from equation (4. 1). 
I JA 0 
9. Calculate the expected cost of fai lure, C_ = C n p (k) + C m p (p) 
F F 1 F t 
P 
from equation (7 .31 ) . C and C a r e input data, and p f(k) and p f(p) a re 
P 
from steps 7 and 80 
10o Calculate the total expected cost for this example problem from 
equation ( 7 . 3 2 ) , using C (direct costs) from the input data, C from step 
J 
6, and C from step 9: C.(/3) = C + C + C _ . 
F j D. W t 
J 
11. Plot a point on the expected cost versus j3 curve using the assumed 
value of /3 from step 2 and C.(/3) from step 10. Plot a point on the expected 
cost versus v curve using the value of v from step 3 and C.(/3) from step 10. 
D. 2 Sample Calculation for S-IVB Aft Skirt 
A sample calculation for test option T2 with r 0 = 60 will be made for the 
S-IVB aft skir t using the procedure outlined in section D. 1. 
1. Input data from Table 9: c = 11,500 dollars pe r pound, C^ = 
250 x 106 dol la rs , C^ - 0. 72 x 106 do l la rs , C ^ - 3 .28 x 106 do l la rs , v -
J? D a 
P 2 
0.12916, n = 15, and m - 15. 
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20 Assume that /? = 3. 00. 
AVI 
3. Read v = 1. 57 from Figure 33a for (3 - 3. 00 and y = 0.12916. 
4 . F rom Figure 21 , the S-IVB aft ski r t weight for v = 1.57 is 
W(7 = 1.57) = 1920 lb. 
5. W(/3) = W(~ - 1. 57) - W{v = 1.4) = 1920 - 1815 = 105 lb. 
6. C w = c w W(j3) = 11, 500 (105) = 1, 208, 000 dol la rs . 
7. F rom Figure 35b, p f (k) = 3 . 2 x 10~
5. 
8. p f(p) = F R (60 ) = 1 - e V
1 1 5 ' 5 / = 0. 01472. 
9. C F = C F n p f ( k ) + C F m p f ( p ) - ( 2 5 0 X 10
G) (15) ( 3 . 2 X 1 0 - 5 ) 
P 
+ (0.72 X 106) (15) (0.01472) - 279,000 dol lars . 
10. C (3.00) = C_ + C _ = C =3 ,280 ,000 + 1,208,000 + 279,000 
2 D W F 
J 
- 4 , 7 6 7 , 0 0 0 dol la rs . 
11. The resul t from step 10 is plotted in Figure 27a as points A and B. 
D. 3. Sample Calculation for ET Intertank 
A sample calculation for tes t option Tt will be made for the ET intertank. 
1. Input data from Table 9: c = 13,706 dollars pe r pound, C = 
125 x 106 do l la rs , C ^ = 2. 0 x 106 do l la rs , ya = 0. 05787, n = 445, and m = 445. 
D l S 
2. Assume that 0 = 4 . 00. 
3 . F rom Figure 33, 7 = 1 . 5 3 for 0 = 4 . 0 0 , and y = 0. 05787. 
4. F rom Figure 23, W(v - 1. 53) = 12, 600 lb. 
t 
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5. W(j3) = W(^ = 1.53) - W(u = 1.4) = 12,600 - 11,600 = 1,000 lb. 
6. C =c W(/3) =13 ,706 ( l , 000 ) = 13,706, 000 dol la rs . 
W W 
7. F rom Figure 34, p (k) = 5. 2 x 10 - 4 for (3 = 4 .00 , tes t option T^ 
8. Not applicable for tes t option T j . 
9. "C_ = C_ n p i k ) = 125 x 106 (445) (5 .2 x 10~4) - 28.925 X 106 
r b I 
dol lars . 
10. C (4.00)=C< + C + C- = 2,000,000 + 13,706,000 + 28,925,000 
1 ' D. w F 
3 
= 44,631,000 dol la rs . 
11. The resul t from step 10 is plotted as points C and D in Figure 29b. 
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